India-US relations are as complex and complicated once again as they were in the Cold War period. Though Nehru-led India had tilted both ideologically and tactically, towards the USSR 1950 onwards - India did not strategically join the Soviet bloc. American politicians and policymakers offered Nehru-led India their food provision programmes. India opted to stay non-aligned; it continued to interact with both the USA and the USSR. However, as far as ideological thrust, military modernisation and strategic imperatives were concerned, India looked mostly towards Moscow rather than Washington.

Importantly, India reached a friendship treaty with the USSR in August 1971. This, on the one hand, reflected India’s growing reliance on Soviet Union and, on the other hand, exposed the shallowness of its so-called non-aligned policy. Pakistan, by comparison, was regarded as a US ally in the Cold War. The nature of bilateral relations, however, was characterised by transactional exchanges. Unsurprisingly, after the 1965 war, Pakistan opted to consolidate ties with China.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 marked a new era as far as regional alliances and global partnerships were concerned. Pakistan, a Cold War ally, was severally sanctioned, in the 1990s, on account of its nuclear programme and, later, derailment of democracy. Pakistan also had strained relations with the Russian Federation in the said decade. Interestingly, India-US engagement incrementally increased in the 1990s and 2000s. The 2005 US-India deal for civilian nuclear energy and outer space cooperation is a case in point. Bilateral relations further consolidated under the Obama administration. Regionally, India played an active role in Afghanistan, which Pakistan sought to counter through its War on Terror collaboration with Washington.

Following the initiation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, American strategic interests in Asia Pacific underwent a change. The latter marked the centrality of what is now called Indo-Pacific in its national policy aimed at safeguarding US commercial and military interests in this vital part of the world where China was perceived as a potential rival. Under the BRI and beyond, China is preoccupied with Indo-Pacific, too, in terms of building bilateral and multilateral cooperative mechanisms with key regional economies such as Indonesia and the ASEAN.

Ironically, despite being a part of Quad, India is reluctant to champion an anti-China stance in military terms. Paradoxically, India-China bilateral trade rose to $135 billion by the end of 2022.

Since commercial interests cannot be protected without effective security apparatuses, the US has, in the recent past, launched a variety of such initiatives such as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) comprising Australia, Japan, the USA and India. The Quad was formalised in 2007 but remained dormant for years until it was recently rejuvenated by the US to neutralise Chinse influence in, for example, the South China Sea. Ironically, however, despite being part of Quad, India is seemingly reluctant to champion an anti-China stance in military terms. Also, India-China bilateral trade reached $135 billion by the end of 2022. This is despite their territorial disputes. This author worked at Shangahi International Studies University (SISU) during 2018-19 and observed Indian scholars working professionally but passionately to, for example, launch a Hindi-Chinese cultural magazine to promote cultural exchnage at the popular level. This is just one example of India’s interest in Chinese culture, language, economy and political system. I never saw such an initiative by Pakistan’s diplomatic community there.

With Russia, India is currently collaborating at several levels. Commercially, India is one of the top buyers of Russian oil; it is even exporting it to some EU countries. Politically and diplomatically, India has sided with Russia over Ukraine; it did not condemn Russian invasion of Ukraine. Militarily, India is still a major importer of Russian military hardware. India is currently the fifth largest economy of the world in GDP terms; it is also the largest market of the world in headcount terms.

Owing to the aforesaid factors, top economies of the world- particularly the US (the largest) and China (the second largest) - are keen to boost economic ties with India. Some foreign policy observers have invoked ‘liberal values’ such as democratic commonality between the US and India as a binding principle for long-lasting strategic cooperation through, for example, QUAD.

Empirically, this is not the case. India only qualifies as an electoral democracy whereas the US is a liberal democracy. Modi-led India is massively violating liberal values. There are crackdowns on media, freedom of speech and association; the minorities, particularly Muslims, are facing the wrath of political Hindutva being imposed by the BJP which is guided by the extreme right-wing RSS. Modi might have expected smooth sailing during his American tour, but it turned out to be a nightmare when he was publicly rebuked for killing Muslims and minorities.

It is unlikely that Modi’s US visit will change India’s position on Ukraine, Russia and China. Since the Cold War period, India’s policy elite have believed in ‘strategic autonomy’. Despite being the largest market, India faces a technology and innovation deficit, which the US monopolises, thus, necessitating commercial and (military) technological cooperation between the two. However, India is not likely to join the American camp against China or Russia.

The writer has a PhD in political science from  Heidelberg University and a post-doc from UC-Berkeley. He is a DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright fellow and an associate professor. He can be reached at ejaz.bhatty@gmail.com