re we back in 2008? This is the question many, who have monitored terrorism for long enough, are asking. As terrorist attacks continue across the country, the writ of the state has been put into question. More than the physical violence, it seems, the war of narratives has gained traction. It’s not just bullets being fired from across the border but also an ideology.

“There appears to be no need for a large-scale military operation; the terrorists hold no space,” a senior official who attended the Apex Committee – the highest decision-making body – reportedly said in the aftermath of a suicide bombing that targeted a mosque at the Police Lines in Peshawar. “It’s not 2008,” he said, adding, “we need to reinvigorate our current efforts. All will be well.”

Pakistan is once again under terrorist attacks. The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan has sought to blame the army operations against it for the latest surge in violence.

It may be recalled that there was no uniform consensus in the country on terrorism till the attack on the Army Public School in 2014. After the attack, however, the political parties and the military leaders decided to launch an extensive crackdown on terrorism and the first National Action Plan on terrorism was prepared.

After several successful operations in the tribal belt, Pakistan is still fighting its war on terror. However, this time, the optics and dynamics of the war have changed drastically. For one, the Afghan Taliban who were then fighting against the US, have now formed a government in Kabul.

After the US pulled its troops out of Afghanistan and the Taliban took control of Kabul on August 15, 2021, the Taliban have transitioned from an armed insurgent movement to a government. To execute their governance plan, the Taliban leaders have had to implement a set of rulings aimed at preserving stability and sustaining security. Their approach to tackling terrorist groups has been determined, among other factors, by limited resources and lack of intelligence.

As a result, the neighbouring countries have suffered the backlash of militant elements nourishing in Afghanistan. For its part, Pakistan has witnessed the rise of the TTP with more advanced military tactics and some innovative narrative-building.

The TTP was among the first terrorist groups to felicitate the Taliban over their victory in Afghanistan. As the TTP leadership is based in Afghanistan, the group has undergone a number of improvements in its military tactics and organisational structure. Since August 2021, the TTP has reintegrated several militants who had been captured in the previous years by the previous government.

Soon afterwards, it announced a general reorganisation of its administrative structure, modeling it after the Afghan Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan against the US and its allies. It instituted several provinces, ‘ministries’ and ‘commissions.’ In December 2022, it issued an updated chart of the organisation that revealed significant expansion in Pakistan.

In early 2022, the TTP had announced its first spring offensive (al-Badr), in a move that resembled the annual Afghan Taliban campaigns in Afghanistan. A ceasefire agreed to shortly afterwards prevented a surge in violence until September.

In January 2023, the TTP issued a new code for military operations – the first since 2018 – that could lead to another spring offensive in 2023.

Meanwhile, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP) has intensified its attacks. The ISKP has a virulent anti-state narrative. Pakistan has suffered the most besides Afghanistan at the hands of the ISKP. Since the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the ISKP has claimed more than 70 attacks in the KP. The Bajaur tribal district and the Peshawar region have been two hotspots of ISKP violence. In addition, Islamic State-Pakistan Province (ISPP), which operates in close coordination with the ISKP, has claimed more than a dozen attacks in other areas of the country, including Balochistan, the Punjab and Karachi.

In 2022, the ISKP and the ISPP carried out some major suicide attacks including the blast at an imambargah in Peshawar and an attack at the Sibi Mela festival. The perpetrators were understood to have been trained in Afghanistan.

Another alarming development has been the overlapping claims by the TTP and the ISKP in the KP, Rawalpindi and Karachi, indicating the possibility of some local militants working for both these outfits, or else the two groups collaborating at the local level.

The TTP and the ISKP are now trying to legitimise their attacks against civilians by describing them as part of law enforcement agencies. The TTP, for instance, has claimed attacks against several representatives of local communities, accusing them of being informants of security agencies. The narrative is similar to some Baloch nationalist groups. The ISKP has been killing religious leaders and members of minority communities and calling them the ‘fifth column’ of the government.

Unlike 2008, Pakistan now has to fight its war on terror without significant help from abroad. The neo-jihadis are a hybrid of keyboard warriors and militants armed with M-4 carbines left behind by the NATO forces.

In the past decade, terrorist groups have evolved as a result of both global changes and socio-political dynamics at a local level. The threat that these outfits posed has then changed into a hybrid confrontation. The focus in the war has shifted towards narrative building and promotion of ideologies.

For Pakistan, the major concern at the moment is a lack of national consensus.

Even after the attack on a mosque in Peshawar’s Police Lines, the government was unable to get all the political parties to endorse a National Action. The government is also likely to struggle to allocate adequate resources for a military operation against terrorist outfits.

Finally, the US role in tackling the Afghanistan-based militant factions cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Expecting the Taliban administration in Afghanistan to do a similar job is not realistic.

The state of national economy and political discontent are also valid markers of how difficult it is to turn the narrative in your favour. However, it is not impossible.

The writer is the editor of The Khorasan Diary. He can be reached on Twitter @iftikharfirdous