olitics in Pakistan has mostly remained interest-based rather than issue-based, and often volatile due to the absence of consensually defined rules of the game. No surprises then that the parliaments have been arbitrarily dissolved on several occasions in the past 75 years. In the 1950s, for example, seven prime ministers, some with bureaucratic backgrounds, were dismissed by the so-called “viceregal” system controlled by the civil bureaucracy. After martial law was imposed in October 1958, political and electoral contours were determined by the military, which ruled the roost till the collapse of united Pakistan in December 1971. In the post-debacle period, a civilian, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, tried to control the civil-military bureaucracy through a combination of constitutional and organisational measures. The experiment failed because the former fumbled at democratising his party and building political and social alliances with opposition groups. The latter indeed formed an anti-Bhutto alliance, causing his political and personal downfall by the late 1970s. Contextually, he was dismissed as prime minister and the parliament stood dissolved because of the martial law that Gen Zia imposed in July 1977.

The Zia regime further fractured Pakistani politics as well as society. Indeed, his legacy haunted political discourse and activity in the 1990s through the infamous constitutional clause called 58(2)b. It was incorporated in the 1973 constitution as part of the Eighth Amendment by the Zia regime, following negotiations with certain politicians who accepted 58(2)b as a lesser evil in order to get rid of martial law. Article 58(2)b empowered the president to dismiss cabinets and dissolve National Assembly (lower house of the parliament) arbitrarily. Little wonder, the elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were sent home twice each in the so-called “decade of democracy” (1988-99). In addition, the first Benazir Bhutto government faced a no-confidence motion in 1989, which it survived by a 12-vote margin.

Interestingly, however, civil-military relations were very tense by late 1990s. The then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, was not only able to make the then army chief resign but also undo 58(2)b through the Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment legislated in 1997. Sharif, however, faced the music in terms of his unceremonious exit from office in a military coup in October 1999. Political instability lingered despite Musharraf’s efforts, culminating in an Emergency Plus that he imposed on November 3, 2007 in order to control the judiciary. The Red Mosque incident, the Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the lawyers’ movement weakened his grip on politics and the state, thus, paving way for general elections in 2008.

In the post-Musharraf period (2008-present), political instability and socioeconomic deterioration have been the hallmark of politics and governance in the country. Some political scientists have termed it a ‘hybrid’ political system in which the civil government and the military establishment rule together. This author, however, has theorised civil-military relations and governance during this period as a “duality” [in Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan (Routledge, 2020)]. In the dualised system, the civilians/ politicians institutionally accorded a political, administrative and economic role to the military leadership in a bid to avoid being ousted from office in another coup/ martial law.

In so doing, however, our politicians overlooked the political paradox that is inherently structured in the duality arrangement. By formally bringing the military in governance, economy and foreign policy in a desire to stop coups, politicians failed to save themselves from being sent out of political office and/ or system altogether. Put differently, three prime ministers of three different, often rival, political parties were ousted from prime minister’s office without a military coup or imposition of martial law. In the case of the governments of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the National Assembly, however, completed its five-year tenure. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), not only lost their first-choice prime minister but also the government. The PPP and the PML-N had instead lost their prime ministers through court verdicts. However, Imran Khan’s government ended on account of a successful vote of no-confidence in April 2021.

Since his ouster, Imran Khan has employed various methods to get back into office, if not power. One, he tried to pressure the former military leadership through “derogatory” public pronouncements. Two, he indulged in street agitation, leading a long march. Both these tactics failed to deliver the desired results since the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif countered Khan’s moves by sticking to the book. The government cannot be sent home until there is a successful vote of no-confidence or an unconstitutional measure is taken i.e., coup. Since the PTI has opted out of the National Assmbly, a no-confidence motion against the PDM set-up is not likely. Also, since the new army chief has assumed office, the political dust is settling in terms of stated institutional neutrality, so that a coup is also not likely. The PDM dispensation thus appears all set to complete the five-year tenure of the National Assembly. Electorally, amid low economic indicators such as high (food) inflation, the PDM will cut its own feet if it agrees to call early elections. As a rational actor, it is trying to stabilise the economy through loans etc. Before going to polls, the only option left for the PDM to attract the electorate is through economic relief via (mini) budget.

For the PTI, dissolving the provincial assemblies is easier said than done. From personal perks to development projects, carrying financial incentives for local politicians, intra- and inter-party disagreements are serious hurdles for Khan. Two, dissolution on its own cannot compel the federal government to call general election. Three, the PDM can deter such a move through vote of no-confidence against the PTI-PML-Q set up in the Punjab. If it is unsuccessful, its failure will seal the fate of the assembly. Four, by-election can be held on the vacated seats, too. Hypothetically, if by-elections are held and the PTI wins in the Punjab and the KP, it has to deliver on its campaign promises. If it fails in the provinces and the PDM can manage the inflation over the coming months, the latter can reap electoral benefit in the general elections scheduled to be held next year.

The writer has a PhD in political science from Heidelberg University and a post-doc from UC-Berkeley. He is a DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright fellow and an associate professor. He can be reached at ejaz.bhatty@gmail.com