At a crossroads

nder the current Taliban regime, Afghanistan remains a nation riddled with deep fractures. The threat of regime change remains a serious concern regionally.

Since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, the country has descended into turmoil, facing economic collapse, humanitarian crises and political instability. Beset by internal strife and external vectors, the Taliban administration can count on little global support. Here I analyse Afghanistan’s current circumstances through four crucial prisms: the widening rift between the Kandahari and Haqqani factions, the failings of regime change, Pakistan’s strategic recalibration, and the consequences of US aid cut-off.

The Taliban are often viewed as a monolithic organization. However they are closer to being a coalition of many factions with conflicting interests. The Kandahari faction, currently in the ascendant in Kabul, is led by supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. The Haqqani Network, a militant group with to links to Pakistani tribal areas, is the second most important power centre.

The Kandahari faction, based in southern Afghanistan, maintains a strict view of Islamic law and privileges ideology over effective governance. In comparison, the Haqqani Network is more pragmatically minded and concerned primarily with effective governance and relationships with foreign entities.

In recent months, tensions between these faction shave been growing. This has put the Taliban unity at risk. For a large section of the Afghan populace as well as international community, the Kandahari faction’s hardline focus on issues like women’s place in the society leaves them out of touch with the public sentiment. The Haqqani Network has tried to project a more moderate face and pushed for limited contact with outside groups.

This division has resulted in a race to seize state resources and make appointments to public offices. There have been reports recently that Akhundzada’s authority is being challenged by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s interior minister.

This has raised the spectre of a possible regime change in Kabul. Haqqani, with his military heft and approach, is seen as a serious candidate for leadership. Akhundzada’s leadership has been characterised by some as weak and indecisive. The impression is undermining his support within the Taliban.

The Kandahari faction, based in southern Afghanistan, maintains a strict view of religious law and puts ideology over effective governance. In comparison, the Haqqani Network is more pragmatically minded. It is concerned primarily with effective governance and relationships with foreign entities.

Unresolved dissent could result in a coup or assassinations. Should Haqqani take charge, however, he could gain the backing of not just disgruntled members of the Taliban but also of regional players like Pakistan.

A change of leadership has the potential to trigger sweeping consequences for the future of the country. A government led by the Haqqani faction might take a more pragmatic approach to governance and permit a degree of engagement with the international community. However, it could also fuel tensions with the Kandahari faction and start a civil war.

Next door, Pakistan is closely watching the events unfold in Kabul. Although it helped enable the Taliban’s return to power in order to counter Indian influence, Islamabad’s relationship with the Taliban has been fraught recently.

Pakistan has an obvious strategic interest in not allowing a hostile regime in Kabul as this can turn the country into a sanctuary for anti-Pakistan militants. It also needs to protect its economic interests, including access to Central Asian markets.

Meanwhile, all international support and US aid have come to a halt. Since the Taliban’s takeover, the US has frozen Afghan assets worth billions of dollars and cancelled most economic assistance, making it difficult for the government to provide even basic services and salaries. The humanitarian crisis has worsened.

Given the foreign aid void, the Taliban are increasingly suspected of resort to illicit activities such as drug trafficking and hazardous mining. However, the revenue from such activities cannot suffice for the nation’s pressing needs. This has exposed a large population to poverty and starvation. This humanitarian crisis has further undermined the Taliban’s legitimacy and given rise to opposition groups like the National Resistance Front.

Lack of funds has also limited the Taliban’s leverage to negotiate with foreign governments. Fissures within the Taliban are making them more vulnerable to outside pressure. They may be forced to trade economic assistance for concessions on human rights and counterterrorism.

Taliban’s failures in governance and crisis management have laid bare deep vulnerabilities. The months ahead will show whether the Taliban can hold on to power or whether Afghanistan will once again be consumed by civil war.

There is room for global action as well as challenges for the international community. Given the stakes, selective engagement with Afghanistan in the form of humanitarian assistance — in exchange for genuine reforms — may be the best chance of staving off catastrophe without legitimising the Taliban’s policies.

The writer is thecentral information secretary of the Awami National Party.He can be reached at anpspoxgmail.com