Politics and the Pakistani diaspora

Historically, ‘diaspora’ had a very specific meaning – mostly ascribed to Jews and Armenians’ dispersions around the world – epitomizing the historical oppression and neglect these communities had to face in their lands.

These cases were presumed to be the paradigmatic and classical cases of diaspora communities who were presumably ‘sojourning’ in these new lands they now inhabited, until their homelands became liveable again. But as the dreams of homelands got deferred, either because of the continuous tumult or uncertainty in their lands, these communities built their own cultural enclaves in the lands they now inhabited , marked by a predominance of continuous homeland orientation, residential segregation, the creation of cultural and vernacular schools for the education of their children, boundary maintenance through religion, prohibition from out-marriage, resistance to assimilation to local cultures and a general aloofness and apolitical attitude towards local politics except in the areas which affected them directly.

But over the years, ‘diaspora’ became an all-encompassing term now used to describe labour, migrants, and expatriates living abroad – from Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis to Filipino, Korean, Turkish communities, among others. Moreover, these diasporic communities, contrary to the classical apolitical cases of the diaspora, maintain deep social and economic ties with their homelands and actively participate in the homeland politics. Sometimes this support gets overzealous with instances of these communities supporting terrorist and even ultra-nationalist forces back home – owing to which Benedict Anderson defined them as “long-distance nationalists”.

In the last decade (especially since the post-2008 financial crisis) as populist and right-wing politicians captured political space around the globe, a huge support for these leaders came from their diasporic communities. In 2014, the BJP in India amassed huge financial contributions from Indians living abroad; in fact, according to some estimations, the biggest fraction of support for party funds, after neoliberal tycoons like Ambani, came from Indians living abroad. Moreover, the RSS, the militant and parent wing of the BJP, has a history of galvanizing Indians abroad, in a bid to popularise the Hindutva message beyond Indian borders.

Similarly, the Turkish diaspora vouches for Erdogan’s authoritarian politics and his Neo-Ottomanism. Vicktor Orban is another right-wing populist politician who is extremely popular among ethnic Hungarians living abroad. Imran Khan’s popularity among the Pakistani diaspora is another example of strongmen and larger-than-life politics finding resonance among the diaspora population.

To use this popularity among the overseas Pakistanis for electoral gains, the PTI in its tenure passed a bill allowing overseas Pakistanis to vote in the elections. This is again not an anomaly as multiple other countries have either been considering or have allowed their diaspora communities to vote. For example, Canada and Greece have allowed their expats to vote, while discussions in the UK, New Zealand, India and Nepal are underway to allow the diaspora vote. The PTI was also heavily reliant on the remittances of expatriates for ‘alleviating’ the economic woes of the country and also for its own party funds in the 2018 elections. The most recent example was after the party’s exit from power, when Imran Khan in a video message requested expatriates to fund the party for the impending election campaign.

But what is it about the Pakistani diaspora’s involvement in homeland politics which makes it a corrosive endeavour? It appeared that after Imran Khan’s government was ousted after a successful no-confidence vote, the Pakistani diaspora had a huge meltdown. Expatriates gathered around the world to protest against the move, espousing the PTI’s narrative of deeming its exit as a conspiracy spearheaded by the US – supported by alleged “traitors” who have dissented against the PTI – in collusion with “corrupt” and dynastic “monsters”, the PML-N and PPP.

Not surprising, but this was the most recent example of diaspora failing to understand the internal contradictions which plague Pakistani politics. The diaspora instead augmented the bandwagon of conspiracy to make sense of Imran Khan’s exit, which far from a conspiracy, was just another episode of a civilian government forming a rift with the emperor.

They fail to understand that Imran Khan’s ascent to power was favoured by a hybrid compromise, in which a team of electables was assembled for the PTI in the 2018 elections, which helped them marginally have a lead over other parties and form a coalition government. A continued and entrenched control by the unelected in the economy design and foreign affairs of the state was a price paid in return. As the chasm appeared in the hybrid model starting from late 2021 – mainly due to disagreement appointments at key positions – the former hand of patronage was pulled back, providing the then opposition the opportunity to mobilize the same electables against him.

Imran Khan’s governance, just like his populist counterparts in the world, was marked by a predominant reliance on rhetoric and a meagre focus on governance with continuous maligning of the opposition parties, a neoliberal economic vision with no clarity, extra-parliamentarism, threats of authoritarian steps to undo the 18th Amendment, misogynistic and callous statements against women and rape victims and intermittent use of the religion card to salvage the declining popularity caused due to skyrocketing inflation and debilitating economic conditions.

The inability of the Pakistani diaspora to grasp these nuances of Pakistani politics, its controlled democracy, and the ceaseless predicament of the working classes, and the religious, ethnic and gender minorities, makes it a politically regressive entity. One had hoped that those living in comfortable democracies might have developed some sense of democratic plurality and why democratic and constitutional dispensations are important for fragile democracies like Pakistan. Instead, we see that forced cultural territorialisation and the general paradoxes of diasporic conditions further the ideological contradictions of those that form the Pakistani diaspora.

The result comes out to be an extremely polarised political consciousness – just like the urban middle/upper class – that continues to inspire a conspiratorial and dichotomous worldview to make sense of the political realities in Pakistan. It imbibes in diasporic orientalism which disparages the common Pakistani as incapable of making informed political decisions. It deems corruption as the sole malaise troubling Pakistan. It sees solutions in authoritarian/strongman autocracy with absolute disengagement with other political entities. It maintains bellicosity towards progressive and pro-people politics. And it indulges in parochial and patriarchal nationalism.

Benedict Anderson presciently summarised the contradictions of this ‘long-distance nationalism’ through an anecdote of a Sikh nationalist living in Toronto, who stays apolitical in Canadian political life but feels the overwhelming urge to influence homeland politics through his regressive ideas. Anderson writes “His political participation is directed towards an imagined heimat in which he does not intend to live, where he pays no taxes, where he cannot be arrested, and where he will not be brought before the courts – and where he does not vote: in-effect a politics without accountability or responsibility”.

The writer is a graduate of CEU and teaches at the Institute of Liberal Arts, UMT, Lahore. He tweets @laalgulabi