Boys will be boys

Side-effect

The writer is a poet and author based in Islamabad.

In Kabul, the temperature was not that low but the wind chill factor made it feel much colder than what we feel in Islamabad in this season. The comforting hospitality of Dr Davood Moradian and his team of researchers and analysts at the Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS) brought us warmth but the words spoken and the concerns shared over two days of dialogue between the delegations of Afghanistan and Pakistan confirmed that Pakistan and Afghanistan are living through another winter of discontent.

It feels like two siblings first deciding to settle their differences by fighting a duel. They are standing in front of each other, staring into each other’s eyes with guns pointed at each other. But with time both of them realise that they do not want to shoot. Now the problem is that they are human beings and not machines and therefore their actions cannot be precisely synchronised.

So who pulls away first – even if in principle both decide to put the guns down together? Each one of them knows in his heart that he does not want to shoot but is unsure about what the other one is thinking. Hence, the mistrust, insecurity and paranoia sustain this continued standoff between them.

During the course of the event I was told many times by my fellow Pakistani delegates – all well-meaning, experienced and knowledgeable individuals – that the complexity of inter-state relationship between Pakistan and India is far more difficult to resolve than the differences that exist between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We have fought four wars with our eastern neighbour, supported secessionist movements in each other’s countries and instead of resolving longstanding issues, created new issues for each other along the way. This has not been the case with Afghanistan.

We were together in getting the Soviet Union ousted from their territory, we hosted around four million refugees and continue to host about three million even now. The Afghan economy is linked to transit trade through Pakistan (Karachi being their main port as well) and thousands of Afghans travel to Pakistan on a daily basis – with or without visas. My colleagues made sound arguments to support their call. But somehow I feel differently. After spending some time in Kabul and having met Afghan friends and counterparts in Islamabad on several occasions before, it seems that the relationship with Kabul is far more complicated than it seems.

With India it is different. Yes, we have fought wars and yes, we have waged proxy wars and yes, after Pathankot or a similar incident one would overhear a retired Indian military officer telling his television host that there is a problem with Pakistanis’ DNA. We have similar idiots on our side of the border as well who barely stop short of claiming that Indians are in fact not anatomically modern Homo sapiens. However, there is a large and expanding peace constituency for reasons ranging from economic interest to cultural similarities.

The relationship is more equal notwithstanding the fact that there is a lobby within India that actively pursues a non-nuclear, compliant Pakistan and there is a lobby here that continues to believe that the only way to guarantee our survival is to perpetually make India bleed.

Between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the relationship is not just perceived to be much less equal but is evident to be so from what one sees and hears. The new and largely young Afghan intelligentsia – including their academics, media, politicians and civil society – that has mustered strength and gained space over the last decade strongly believes that Pakistan has a wish to dominate Afghan affairs. It has a wish to impose its will over the decisions that a sovereign country has the prerogative to make. It continues to support incursions into Afghanistan and if it doesn’t support them, its inaction against the groups operating from its soil makes its claims about indiscriminately fighting terror seriously dubious.

According to Afghans, if Pakistan has shelved the ill-conceived idea of strategic depth it should be demonstrated through action. A different strategy on the ground is more important than the policy shifts Pakistan announces whenever the two sides meet. The issues of the Quetta Shura, different political and military commissions of the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and the so-called Peshawar Shura, militant sanctuaries on Pakistani soil, the alleged involvement of Pakistani intelligence agencies etc are highlighted in all these dialogues between the informed citizens of the two countries, who are not the direct decision-makers.

When Pakistanis press Afghans to move on and discuss other issues that could benefit us mutually, barring a few most stick to their guns. They have an argument. They say that unless the security environment does not change, there can be little movement on other fronts. Besides, they continue to face economic constraints imposed upon them due to Pakistan’s rigidity in getting them full and open access to Karachi Port besides overland transit to India, allowing their trucks to go beyond Peshawar.

Pakistan has its own set of concerns, primarily that militants and secessionists active in Pakistan are being provided sanctuary in Afghanistan. Afghans argue that if there are sanctuaries, they are not in the areas controlled by their government, and it is those areas where the Taliban have control and, therefore, it is all the more important that Pakistan treats the organisations on both sides of the border in a similar fashion.

Pakistanis take this with a pinch of salt and believe that parts of Afghan intelligence, if not the political government, are involved at some level. But the looming atmosphere of doubt and resentment on both sides keeps the real truth hidden.

Pakistanis and Afghans agree that Pakistan has a major role to play in turning the geo-strategic paradigm into a geo-economic paradigm, as stated by Admiral (r) Fasih Bukhari during a sober speech he made in response to the accusatory speech of Amrullah Sualeh, the former head of Afghan National Directorate of Security. I would take that beyond economy and introduce the dimensions of what strategists call soft power.

I think it is a misnomer. What is considered soft power is actually the real power. It is the power of the people to connect, to communicate, to share feelings and thoughts, to share their happiness and disappointments through art, culture, literature and film.

Lastly, on a separate note, I have gathered through many such dialogues and mediations between Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and China, that it is essential that we look at the patriarchal nature of these conflicts and discords. Boys will be boys. While it is understood that there is virtually no space for women in the narrative of extremist religious forces, it must be recognised that there is nominal and marginal space for them in the narrative of the states in question and even among those countering the extremist religious narrative. Recognition is important so that the course can be corrected.

Barring a few voices in such matters, who in effect and unfortunately emulate the largely masculine discourse of conflict, women are invisible, unheard and without real representation. It sounds idealistic at the moment but unless Afghan and Pakistani women come together, and Indian and Pakistani women also join hands and, finally, women form a broader South Asian alliance which questions the competing narratives, the lens will remain murky and the analysis lopsided.

Email: harris.khalique@gmail.com