If talks fail

With peace talks floundering, should the government consider war now? The liberal conscience is troubled by the thought of the mass-scale death and destruction that wars usually cause. Conservatives focus only on effectiveness in war. However, liberals emphasise both legality and effectiveness.
So, while conservatives support drone attacks, liberals oppose them since human rights experts question their legality. In fact, one can even question their effectiveness if it is defined as reducing terrorism globally, rather than narrowly as just killing some high-profile terrorists. The US 2013 terrorism report shows terrorism to be increasing globally. Thus, liberals support a war against terrorism which is really effective but also legal in line with the ‘just war’ principles propounded by liberal political scientists.
I never assigned a high success probability to talks. However, even so, I did not oppose the peace initiative completely. Chasing even this small probability seemed worthwhile since (time-and-constitution bound) talks provided key advantages. First, talks could help avoid mass-scale death and displacement. Second, talks are conducted by politicians but war by generals. Thus, success through talks could boost politicians in the civilian-military imbalance. Third, there was a naturally imposed window of opportunity for talks when they started given the severe winter prevalent in militant areas which made major combat difficult. Finally, even in failure, talks would help meet the principles of the just-war theory.
These arguments for talks are losing their validity though. If talks remain deadlocked over the next 2-3 weeks, the government must switch to Plan B (war) quickly. However, the war must satisfy ‘just war’ principles.
The first principle is ‘just cause’ which states that force must be used only to correct grave public evils or massive violations of basic human rights. The Taliban have killed thousands and committed

massive human rights violations in areas they control, thereby satisfying this principle fully. The second principle – comparative justice – states that while there may be wrongs on both sides, to overcome the presumption against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other. This is also true today. While there have been extrajudicial killings of Taliban combatants, an overwhelming proportion of the losses have been borne by the Pakistani military and civilians.
The third principle states that only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. With the PML-N in its first year of rule after obtaining a clear electoral majority, this principle is also met.
The fourth principle relates to last resort – force may be used only after all peaceful alternatives have been seriously tried. This is where the utility of initially trying talks for a time-bound period seems apparent. During negotiations, Taliban remain uncompromising even on simple matters like releasing non-combatants like Shahbaz Taseer and Ali Gilani even when the government releases some prisoners. The Taliban are unlikely to make major concessions given the presence of numerous dissenting groups within their ranks that oppose compromise. There were terrorist attacks even during the ceasefire period.
The fifth principle states that the probability of success must be reasonably high. Imran Khan reported that the military calculates only a 40 percent chance of winning. First, even if true, this percentage seems high enough given that the last resort principle has been met and talks carry an even lower chance of success while non-action carries a much higher probability of major damage from terrorism. Second, the army’s own statements repeatedly stress that the army is capable of defeating terrorists. This makes sense since Pakistan has the strongest army among all countries badly affected by terrorism – Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia and Nigeria.
These five principles related to the decision of launching war. On all of them, there seems ample justification for war against terrorists, unlike in Balochistan, where most principles are not satisfied to justify all-out war.
The next three principles relate to the actual conduct of war subsequently. These include the principle of fair means, which states that combatants may not use illegal methods, and the principle of distinction which states that war should target enemy combatants, and not non-combatants caught in circumstances they did not create. These two principles create major implications for how the war should be conducted. They effectively rule out drone attacks, torture and disproportionate power. Furthermore, weapons of mass-scale destruction – artillery and air bombardment – must be used judiciously.
The initial strategy should use smart and light special operations units which focus on capturing Taliban leaders. This will help minimise civilian casualties. Heavier forces should be used in case the lighter units face overwhelming force. However, before heavier forces are operationalised, adequate warnings and time should be given to civilians to move out. People in Fata described to me how they were ordered by pamphlets thrown by combat-ready helicopters hovering above to vacate the area immediately during the 2008-09 operations. Such abrupt notifications must be avoided.
Furthermore, adequate preparations should be in place to house displaced people in a dignified manner until they can go back safely. They must also receive adequate restitution for damages incurred, another sensitive public issue in Fata and Swat during previous operations. The final principle relates to fair treatment of prisoners of war, which says that enemy combatants who are captured no longer pose a threat. It is, therefore, wrong to torture them or otherwise mistreat them.
By sticking to these principles, Pakistan can ensure both legality and effectiveness. As talks stretch on without producing tangible results, the government is increasingly giving the impression of being paralysed. Fortunately, the government has not offered any unconstitutional concessions to-date. However, it must take major decisions in the next 2-3 weeks without waiting for major terrorist hits on the military or in the government’s main areas of support.
The writer is a development and political economist and affiliated as a Senior Fellow with UC Berkeley.
Email: murtazaniaz@yahoo.com