Lessons from the end of the Afghan war

War is beyond the question of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It involves risks and consequences beyond the conflict boundaries. The aftermath of war is usually horrendous. Whether inter or intra-state, the very first outcome when the war ends is anarchy.

The incapability and incapacity to ensure public safety and security from internal, regional and external threats, deteriorated economy and an imminent crisis in the form of refugees and internally displaced people are to name just a few of the examples of the anarchic end of a long war. This is exactly what is happening in Afghanistan today. One may draw five lessons from the Afghan war and its humiliating end:

1. Security: A suicide bombing at the Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 26, 2021 by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) in Kabul speaks volumes of the weak security structure in Afghanistan at the moment. The Taliban took over after 20 years of war during the chaotic exit of the US and Nato troops and their allies on August 15, 2021 – automatically inspiring regional sibling organizations that an extremist militant non-state actor can still win against local and foreign forces despite years of war. Even after emerging as winners, the Taliban are still not equipped and trained to confront ISIL-KP or groups alike. They have the weapons and vehicles that the US provided to the Afghan forces during its 20-year war but are not trained as a sophisticated military of the state which takes years of skills, training, knowledge and strategic learning process.

2. Post-war strategy: An efficient and effective strategy identifies the undesirable outcomes of the war and suggests ways to overcome or deal with the emerging threats amicably. If you can’t beat them, include them to run a hybrid government. The Afghan war ended in anarchy. Stakeholders feared this anarchic end yet did not prepare any mechanism for the sake of a ‘graceful’ exit of the US and in the greater good of the Afghans. The US spent 83 billion dollars to develop and train the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). It provided modern aircraft and vehicles worth 10 billion dollars, gave 130 aircraft to ANDSF and pledged to provide more even after the withdrawal.

India invested massively in nation-building, reconstruction, bilateral trade and the capacity building of the ANDSF. According to India Today, India spent three billion dollars, signed the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership in 2011, invested in 400 infrastructure projects across all the provinces. Afghanistan, going through brutal war and violence, was still receiving training and funding primarily from the US and India; and the European Union, Germany, and many other countries for reconstruction and peacebuilding. Yet it seems the security investment was not sufficient enough and so the country fell within a few days of the Taliban capturing Kabul and major provinces in Afghanistan.

What went so wrong that the ANDSF could not confront the Taliban? It was the insufficient – rather, poor – post-war strategy of the US, India, EU and many stakeholders which could not deal with the situation in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. It could have been a workable multi-pronged strategy to work with both legitimate government and insurgents/militants together. Ashraf Ghani’s government is seen as a corrupt one. What do we expect from a country which has been at war continuously since 1979? Neither did the US manage to defeat the Taliban, nor did it develop enough trust with them during the Afghan Peace Process 2020 to discuss and manage the immediate post-withdrawal anarchy. War and diplomacy failed miserably in this case.

The same goes for India. Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby lauded India’s ‘constructive role’ in Afghanistan on August 10, 2021. India certainly did play a role. It developed infrastructure. It supported an ‘Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled national peace and reconciliation process’ – but that ‘Afghan-led/owned/controlled process’ did not include the Taliban as a stakeholder – even though the Taliban were controlling more than half of Afghanistan then. An indigenous process should have included the Taliban because they were/are the stakeholders in both war and peace times in the country. On August 17, 2021, India evacuated its diplomatic staff from Kabul hastily. Clearly, the support was not visionary, sustainable and inclusive to Afghanistan because India ran away the moment the Taliban took over. This leaves a question mark on both its partnership with Afghanistan and its credibility in the future.

3. Refugee crisis: The evacuation of thousands of Afghans and settling them in different countries is in no way closer to conflict resolution or sustainable peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Today, there are images of miserable Afghan families arriving at international airports in Washington DC, London, Toronto, and Brussels. Evacuating, dislocating or displacing a good number of indigenous populations after 20 years of a useless war is no victory.

The moment a person leaves their country and arrives at a developed one with an uncertain future, s/he trades off their identity as an Afghan citizen with the status of a refugee – a totally vulnerable phenomenon. Around 775,000 troops and $300 million per day for 20 years could not bring peace in Afghanistan. Bringing Afghans to other countries is not a workable solution and will rather create animosity among those who could not leave Afghanistan for better prospects.

4. Ultimate beneficiary: The 20-year war actually gave an opportunity to the Taliban to learn how to fight against a sophisticated, well trained international force such as Nato. Though they are still far from obtaining legitimacy as an army, they are on their way to forming a desirable government. The ANDSF’s weaponry (US courtesy) tends to be in the possession of the Taliban. It is not difficult to predict what kind of government Afghanistan will have; the Taliban seem to be a player in the regional and international state system.

5. Adversity as opportunity: Iran, Qatar, China and Russia had a wiser approach in helping Afghanistan achieve stability and peace in the coming years. Pakistan has been an equally affected country in this 20-year war. It is already urging the world to accept the reality of the Taliban and work for the greater benefit of regional peace and security. The West, unfortunately, lived in a state of denial for 20 years. Had it worked for inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding in Afghanistan and made efforts to develop trust with both the Afghan government and the Taliban, the situation would have been a little better than today.

The writer is assistant professor, Peace and Conflict Studies, at the National

Defence University, Islamabad.