After 20 years and a loss of trillion dollars, the US military–industrial complex has experienced a déjà vu. Refusal to learn from the historical imperialist follies of the past — Vietnam, Iraq, Syria and Libya — is the tip of the iceberg. These misplaced military interventions have brought grave instability to the regions, countries and the people who have had to pay the price in terms of terrorism, economic and political retardation, social and societal upheavals.
The American failure in Afghanistan has put the Pakistani state to test. As the Taliban make moves internally, regionally and on the international chessboard, the Pakistani govt needs to build a national narrative on the fundamentals of the terms of engagement with Afghanistan and issues relating to national security. The bedrock of such a narrative must be safeguarding Pakistan’s sovereignty, Pakistan’s nuclear programme and assets, including its safety and security which cannot be compromised. The guidelines for “Revised Terms of Engagement with USA/Nato/ISAF and General Foreign Policy” were unanimously adopted by a joint sitting of the parliament on April 12, 2012.
As a member of the parliament, I should be making these proposals on the floor, as is the past practice, being the only place to build a national narrative. But as the parliament is ebbed out, the columns of a beleaguered print media become my crutches. The “Terms of Engagement with Afghanistan and Internal Security” needs to cover engagement with Afghanistan, internally displaced persons, internal security and relations with US and other countries.
Let me now take these up in a series:
ENGAGEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN: (i) Pakistan should engage with China, Russia, Iran and Turkey to develop a consensual approach to the fast changing situation in Afghanistan.
(ii) Pakistan should encourage a reconciliation process in Afghanistan and align itself with the regional consensus to establish an inclusive transitional setup.
(iii) Pakistan should link its recognition of a Taliban government with other states of the region.
(iv).Pakistan should engage in a dialogue with all the political stakeholders in Afghanistan.
(v) Pakistan needs an explicit assurance that the Taliban government will not provide sanctuaries to the TTP or other transnational militants, nor will it allow its territory to be used to export terrorism to Pakistan.
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS.
It is too early and the situation too fluid to rule out the possibility of Afghan internal conflict emerging violently. Pakistan must be prepared for this contingency. Therefore, it should;
(i) Strive that if there is exodus from Afghanistan, these people are given the status of “Internally displaced persons” and not “refugees”.
(ii) Convince the international humanitarian agencies to make camps for the displaced persons on the border with Pakistan, preferably on the Afghan side.
(iii) Ensure the displaced persons are not allowed to melt into the local population.
(iv) The camps for displaced persons should be made at the border and they be confined to them. This is necessary, as it will be difficult to distinguish who is a genuinely internally-displaced person or who may be TTP or other terrorists coming into Pakistan.
INTERNAL SECURITY.
Taliban’s military success and reports of splinter TTP groups based in Afghanistan backed by transnational militant groups’ reuniting will increase militancy, religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. There are also reports of transnational militant groups stepping up their activities along Pak-Afghan border.
(i) The internal and external funding of madaris should be monitored and quarterly reports be laid before the parliament. (ii) The activities of sleeper cells and suspicious persons should be monitored.
(iii) The sharing of information and coordination between the intelligence agencies and the federation and provinces needs to be enhanced.
(iv) The National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC) should play the lead role as a platform for intelligence coordination and cooperation in providing unified actionable intelligence information.
(v) Pakistan should not allow the movement of imported arms for the Taliban through its territory.
(vi) Pakistan will need to pursue an internal policy to control religious extremism.
(vii) The state must engage itself in a dialogue with nationalist forces, particularly the Pashtun and Baloch.
(viii) The safety and security of personnel and projects of CPEC should be ensured.
(ix) There is a need to reassess the national security paradigm as the focus has shifted to destabilising CPEC.
(x) The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) created by an Act of Parliament should be revitalised in terms of Section 4 of the said Act. (a) The National Action Plan should be implemented and or revisited by the parliament.
RELATIONS WITH THE USA, CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
(i) The “Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with USA/Nato/ISAF and General Foreign Policy”, as adopted by the joint sitting, be followed. In seriatim some of the points are reproduced;
(a) No verbal agreement regarding national security shall be entered into by the government, its ministries, divisions, departments, attached departments, autonomous bodies or other organisations with any foreign government or authority. All such agreements or understandings shall cease to have effect forthwith.
(b) No overt or covert operations inside Pakistan shall be permitted.
(c) That for negotiating or renegotiating the agreements/MoU’s pertaining to or dealing with the matters of national security, the following procedure shall be adopted:
(aa) All the agreements/MoU’s, including military cooperation and logistics, will be circulated to the foreign ministry and all the ministries concerned, attached or affiliated organisations and departments for their views;
(bb) All the agreements/MoU’s will be vetted by the ministry of law, justice and parliamentary affairs;
(cc) All the agreements/MoU’s will be circulated to the parliamentary committee on national security. The committee shall vet and make recommendations in consultation with the stakeholders and forward the same to the federal cabinet for approval under the Rules of Business of the Federal Government.
(dd) The minister concerned will make a policy statement on the agreements/MoU’s in both houses of the parliament.
(d) No private security contractors or intelligence operatives shall be allowed.
(e) Pakistan’s territory will not be provided for the establishment of any foreign bases.
(ii) Pakistan should invest in the infrastructural rebuilding of Afghanistan.
(iii) Pakistan should strengthen its strategic partnership with China. (iv) Pakistan must build a political and economic partnership with Iran, Turkey and Russia.
(v) Pakistan cannot depend on OIC’s support. Therefore, it must build bilateral relations with the Muslim countries, particularly in the East. (vi) The role of the KSA and the Gulf states in the Afghanistan context must be defined.
(vii) None of the states should be accepted as brokers of peace for and on behalf of the United States.
(viii) Pakistan should build a political and economic relationship with the Central Asian countries – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. (a) It should focus on regional connectivity to have a coordinated regional approach.
The issues identified are the periphery of a complex situation that engulfs the region. The concepts of encirclement of China, containment of Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear programme and hegemony of India can be the long-term objectives for the region. Therefore, a national narrative and political consensus is required. Such policy formulation is only possible through standing committees and parliament.
