Terms of engagement with Afghanistan

After 20 years and a trillion dollars, the US Military Industrial Complex (MIC) has experienced a déjàvu. Refusing to learn from the historical imperialist follies of the past, Vietnam, Iraq, Syria and Libya, are the tip of the iceberg. These misplaced military interventions have brought grave instability to entire regions, peoples and countries, who have had to pay the price in terms of terrorism, economic and political retardation, as well as, social and societal upheavals.

The American failure in Afghanistan has put the Pakistani state on test. As the Taliban make moves internally, regionally and on the international chessboard, the Pakistani government needs to build a national narrative on the fundamentals of “Terms of Engagement with Afghanistan and Issue Relating to National Security”. The bedrock of such a narrative must be, Pakistan’s sovereignty will be safeguarded, Pakistan’s nuclear programme and assets, including its safety and security, cannot be compromised, the guidelines for “Revised Terms of Engagement with USA/NATO/ISAF and General Foreign Policy,” dated 12th April, 2012, unanimously adopted by a joint sitting of parliament.

As a member of parliament, I should be making these proposals on the floor, as is the past practice, for that is the only place to build a national narrative. But as the parliament is ebbed out, the columns of a beleaguered print media become my crutches. The “Terms of Engagement with Afghanistan and Internal Security” need to cover issues, such as engagement with Afghanistan, internally displaced persons, internal security and relations with the USA and other countries.

Let me now take these up, in seriatim;

Engagement with Afghanistan

(i) Pakistan should interact with China, Russia, Iran and Turkey to develop a consensual approach to the fast-changing situation in Afghanistan.

(ii) Pakistan should encourage a reconciliation process in Afghanistan and align itself with the regional consensus to establish an inclusive transitional setup.

(iii) Pakistan should link its recognition of a Taliban government with other states of the region.

(iv) Pakistan should engage in a dialogue with all the political stakeholders in Afghanistan.

(v) Pakistan needs an explicit assurance that the Taliban government will not provide sanctuaries to the TTP or other transnational militants, nor will it allow its territory to be used to export terrorism to Pakistan.

Interally displaced persons (IDPs)

It is too early and the situation too fluid, to rule out the possibility of the Afghan internal conflict emerging violently, Pakistan must be prepared for this contingency, therefore, it should;

(i) Strive that if there is an exodus from Afghanistan, these people are given the status of ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ and not ‘Refugees’.

(ii) Convince the international humanitarian agencies to make camps for the displaced persons on the border with Pakistan, preferably on the Afghan side.

(iii) Ensure the displaced persons are not allowed to melt into the local population.

(iv) Displaced persons camps should be made at the border and they be confined to them. This is necessary, as it will be difficult to distinguish who is a genuinely Internally Displaced Person or who may be TTP or other terrorists coming into Pakistan.

Internal security

The Taliban’s military success, reports of splinter TTP groups based in Afghanistan reuniting backed by transnational militant groups will increase militancy, religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. There are also reports of transnational militant groups stepping up their activities along the Pak-Afghan border.

(i) The internal and external funding of Madrassahs should be monitored and quarterly reports be laid before parliament.

(ii) The activities of sleeper cells and suspicious persons should be monitored.

(iii) The sharing of information and coordination among the intelligence agencies, the Federation and provinces needs to be enhanced.

(iv) The National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC), as a platform for intelligence coordination and cooperation should play the lead role in providing unified actionable intelligence information.

(v) Pakistan should not allow the movement of imported arms for the Taliban through its territory.

(vi) Pakistan will need to pursue an internal policy to control religious extremism.

(vii) The state must engage itself in a dialogue with nationalist forces, particularly the Pashtun and Baloch.

(viii) The safety and security of personnel and projects of CPEC should be ensured.

(ix) There is a need to reassess the national security paradigm as the focus has shifted to destabilising CPEC.

(x) The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), created by an Act of Parliament, should be revitalized in terms of Section 4 of the said Act.

(xi) The National Action Plan should be implemented and or revisited by parliament.

Relations with the US, China and other countries

(i) The “Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with USA/NATO/ISAF and General Foreign Policy”, as adopted by the joint sitting, be followed. In seriatim, some of the points are reproduced;

(a) No verbal agreement regarding national security shall be maintained by the government, its ministries, divisions, departments, attached departments, autonomous bodies or other organisations with any foreign government or authority. All such agreements or understandings shall cease to have effect forthwith.

(b) No overt or covert operations inside Pakistan shall be permitted.

(c) That for negotiating or re-negotiating agreements/MoUs pertaining to or dealing with matters of national security, the following procedure shall be adopted;

All agreements/MoUs, including military cooperation and logistics, will be circulated to the foreign ministry and all concerned ministries, attached or affiliated organisations and departments for their views.

All agreements/MoUs will be vetted by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs.

All agreements/MoUs will be circulated to the parliamentary committee on national security. The committee shall vet and make recommendations in consultation with the stakeholders and forward the same to the federal cabinet for approval under the rules of business of the federal government.

The minister concerned will make a policy statement on the agreements/MoUs in both houses of parliament.

(d) No private security contractors and/or intelligence operatives shall be allowed.

(e) Pakistan’s territory will not be provided for the establishment of any foreign bases.

(ii) Pakistan should invest in the infrastructural rebuilding of Afghanistan.

(iii) Pakistan should strengthen its strategic partnership with China.

(iv) Pakistan must build a political and economic partnership with Iran, Turkey and Russia.

(v) Pakistan cannot depend on OIC support, therefore, it must build bilateral relations with Muslim countries, particularly in the East.

(vi) The role of the KSA and the Gulf States in Afghanistan context must be defined.

(vii) None of the states should be accepted as brokers of peace for and on behalf of the United States.

(viii) Pakistan should build a political economic relationship with the Central Asian countries – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which should focus on regional connectivity and to have a coordinated regional approach.

The issues identified are the periphery of a complex situation that engulfs the region. The concepts of encirclement of China, containment of Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear programme and hegemony of India can be the long term objectives for the region. Therefore, national narrative and political consensus are required. Such policy formulation is only possible through standing committees and parliament.