Tahir and Tahrir

Of all the claims made by various political leaders, from the avengers of democracy to the forecasters of tsunamis, the feeblest one is perhaps, the comparison that Dr Tahirul Qadri made between his dharna in Islamabad and the Tahrir square revolution.
Several analysts of the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have contested the term, ‘Arab Spring’ and have preferred to use, ‘Arab Awakening’ or ‘Arab Uprising’. The post-revolutionary electoral rise of Islamist parties has led some analysts to suggest that the Arab uprisings of 2011 were followed by an, ‘Islamist Spring’ or ‘Islamist Winter’ or even, ‘Islamist Thaw’. Regardless of the etymology, over the last fortnight, Dr Qadri’s dramatic parachute entry into the political foray has been more of a one-time adventure, unlike the slowly brewing uprisings across Arab countries. In reverse order, by using Tehrik-i-Minhajul Quran (TMQ) as a political platform, Dr Qadri offered a soft Islamist winter as the precursor to a supposed ‘Pakistani spring’.
In comparison to the Arab calls for the removal of monarchies and dictators, Dr Qadri called instead for the disruption of a democratically-elected, civilian, parliamentary governance. Then, rather than directly addressing structural issues of class, gender or human rights (even as the Quetta ethnic-sectarian massacre took place on the eve of his long march), Dr Qadri stuck to his preconceived and rather delayed demands for reform of electoral mechanisms.
Of nearly 10,000 riots and protests in Algeria in 2010, most were over health care and education. Dr Qadri’s self-righteous interests revolved around grand narratives such as, political and legislative reform but not about economic or social alternatives.
There have been some commonalities though. The Arab uprising was as much a visual spectre and cultural phenomenon as it was a political revolt. Thus when we see the Tehrik-i-Minhajul Quran activists dancing on

Constitution Avenue in Islamabad as part of a faith-based protest, there is some claim to be made about the recovery of public spaces by women and especially, women from faith-based organisations or movements.
Also, while not pluralistic like Tahrir Square, the practice of non-violence was adhered to by the TMQ. But that’s where the similarity ends and Tahirul Qadri morphs more into a Barelvi Anna Hazare than the saviour of Islamic democracy.
Hazare led a less spectacular protest and yet, was criticised for holding India’s democracy hostage through his personal threat to fast to death. Qadri held the nation hostage for days, announced dramatic deadlines and yet the government agreed to negotiate with a man who has the ability to mobilise followers but no political legitimacy. How then can critics complain about lack of democratic space to contest their ideas and politics?
There is also another possible correlation, which is to do with the role of the United States. In the case of the Arab uprisings, the US did not or could not, play its conventional role of the counter-revolutionary. The relationship between Tahirul Qadri and the US is uncertain but to play the part of the counter-revolutionary by masquerading as a revolutionary, is a game that doesn’t seem to be capturing the imagination of the Pakistani people as yet. Tahirul Qadri and his special interest sponsors need to understand that all the references to him as ‘imported’, ‘Canadian’ or the ‘outsider’ are not incidental. These express a conscious rejection of any interlocutor, whether white, uniformed or in a white uniform, by the people and the political community of this country.
The whining refrain of the elite is the usual cry over the ‘failure of democracy’ – yet the issue is not of whether democracy has ‘passed’ or ‘failed’. It is not even (in this case) about whether politicians have university degrees or pay taxes or not. It is that through serial civilian elections, a new condition of governmentality will be possible – one which attempts to liberate itself from the looming interference of the military and other forces of repression.
This governmentality, which is imperfect, flawed and dirty is still one that we can influence as citizen-subjects. The way to do so is not by interpreting (whether it is democratic or not) but by changing it. The way to do so is not to subvert the process but to improve it.
The mode of pressure should borrow from the post-, not pre-revolutionary Tahrir methods. This would mean not to fantasise about removing an elected government through non-constitutional means, either in Egypt or in Pakistan. But instead, there should be an attempt to enable a context of dialogue and inclusion, which can only be through the electoral and legislative process. That we get to view street level negotiations on TV between the government and the protesting Qadri is a testament to the changing nature of political processes and democratic jostling, not often seen in Pakistan.
The Arab uprisings have not yielded democratic perfection. Most affected countries continue to struggle to draft a consensual constitution even today. The process is still messy and tenuous but Tahrir Square continues to be a space where the quest for representative democracy is being contested, while Tahirul Qadri has simply interrupted our political space and filled it instead with a resonating emptiness.
The writer is a sociologist based in Karachi. Email: afiyazia@yahoo.com