Fifth-generation war

Legal eye
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.
Ajmal Kasab was executed by India this past week. In Pakistan, those who labelled Kasab a hero and vowed to avenge his death included not just Lashkar-e-Taiba but also Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP also assumed responsibility for targeting and attacking Muharram processions in Rawalpindi and Karachi, claiming 25 Pakistanis’ lives. And Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and TTP reiterated their pledge to continue attacking Shias due to their faith. Meanwhile, a suicide bomber attacked Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who unabashedly claimed that the attack was a US-Zino-Indo conspiracy and had nothing to do with the TTP.
What do these events have in common? They lend credence to contemporary security studies literature asserting that we might be witnessing Fifth-Generation Warfare (5GW). Let’s quickly recap. First-generation warfare depended on manpower: the largest number of able-bodied men fighting physically. Second-generation war depended on artillery and superior firepower, epitomised by World War I. World War II marked third-generation warfare characterised by synchronised air, sea and ground operations. The evolved form of insurgency warfare witnessed during the Chinese Revolution (1925-27) and later in Vietnam and Afghanistan has been called fourth-generation.
Fourth-generation warfare wasn’t about states fighting states or armies fighting armies within bounds set by the law of international armed conflict. Here combatants (who didn’t formally represent the state) used non-conventional strategies and targets to fight conventional military forces. Whether called insurgents or national liberation forces, the combatants used loose armed networks and un-disciplined brigades, had a great appetite for accepting casualties, and had no strict time limits to achieve their objectives. Their cause resonated with the local populace, which lent it legitimacy – such reputational credibility helped their recruitment

drive.
So what then is fifth-generation warfare? It is loosely organised networks practicing violence and attacking nation-states in the name of a unified cause, while being empowered by contemporary political, economic, social and technological changes. Whether the emergence of Al-Qaeda or our indigenous jihadi groups of various hues – TTP, LeT, LeJ, Jaish etc. – is fourth-generation or fifth is a moot point. Semantics do not matter for our purpose. What is clear is that non-state actors are no longer mere proxies of state but the prime threat to it. So fourth and fifth-generation warfare are ‘pre-Westphalian’, in the sense that they mark the end of the nation-state’s monopoly over violence.
The armed groups or networks neither fight in the name of the state nor are under its control. This argument cuts both ways. It challenges those who argue that jihadi groups still function as a ‘veritable arm’ of Pakistani state agencies (that nurtured and created them in the first place). And it undermines the logic of conspiracy-mongering patriots who argue that these groups are free agents being financed and used by foreign forces to sow mischief within Pakistan. The understanding of fifth-generation warfare still doesn’t take away from the fact that state policies will remain the most crucial factor in defeating these new combatants.
We now know that these terrorist groups are structurally horizontal and not hierarchical, which adds to their resilience. The nation-state isn’t their unit of analysis and territorial boundaries don’t obstruct their objects and goals. They are willing to co-opt other networks or be co-opted whenever there is synergy: TTP and LeJ share anti-Shia agenda; TTP and LeT share anti-India agenda; and Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and TTP share anti-US agenda. Given that these networks are not structured organisations but loose constellations, they are free agents and are probably co-opted by foreign agencies against Pakistan and its security forces for select operations.
But what we frequently miss in our analysis is that common amongst all these non-state networks of violence – and probably at the top of their list – is their anti-Pakistan agenda. They don’t accept the constitution of Pakistan and the rights and responsibilities it imposes on citizens; they don’t accept the writ of the state and the government and the legitimacy of the policies crafted by the state; and they don’t accept the rights and responsibilities of Pakistan as a nation state under international law.
These networks will agree to be co-opted by the Pakistani state so long as state agenda overlaps with theirs. So if our formal policy is to send jihadis into Kashmir and Afghanistan, TTP, LeT and Jaish are willing partners. But if our national security and foreign policy changes and exporting jihadis isn’t seen as promoting Pakistan’s national security interests, the same groups turn on the state. The biggest failing of our national security establishment has been the two-pronged delusion that (i) violent jihadi networks can be controlled and employed to singularly further state objectives, and (ii) the religion-based ideology of hate that drives them can be turned off at will.
What we have witnessed instead is reverse indoctrination. It is the state agents that have come to be indoctrinated with the religion-inspired ideology of hate that then leads them to sympathise with the jihadi outfits, as evident from reportedly insider-facilitated attacks on security establishments. And this makes logical sense. Nationalism and the nation-state are contrived concepts. Religion isn’t (except for atheists, of course). While our soldier is motivated both in the name of country and religion, it would be hard to assert that his state identity trumps his religious identity in the event that there is a perceived conflict between the two.
What the history of conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan has taught us is that even when powerful states fought a fourth-generation war with a third-generation strategy, they lost. Fifth-generation warfare has further blurred a lot of boundaries: What is a battlefield and what isn’t? What is a combatant and what isn’t? What is a weapon and what isn’t? If you take the war to North Waziristan, they will bring it to the urban centres. If you attack throat-slitting brutes, they will attack 14-year-old school girls. While you ponder over the legality and reasonability of the use of airpower and heavy artillery, they will brainwash 14-year-olds to blow themselves up amongst unsuspecting civilians.
This is a new form of warfare. The combatants or terrorists are no misguided fools. These are shrewd and ruthless tacticians fighting a no-holds-barred conflict. They understand the moral, psychological, social, economic and political dimensions of this war. They see a growing national consensus against their agenda and their tactics led by the media after the attack on Malala, and they threaten to attack the media. But deterrence isn’t enough. So they justify the attack in religious terms, while relying on examples from the lives of our prophets. And that helps sow enough confusion to stem the rising tide against them.
And what is our response to this extremely complex war? The ruling political elite has capitulated. The president has thrown his hands up stating there is no national will to fight. Our internal security czar wishes to ban bikes and cellphones, while the army fights this fifth-generation war with third-generation strategies. In speaking of solutions, let us start by acknowledging our grievous mistake: we have willingly made our sovereign territory the battlefield for this fifth-generation warfare by nurturing and entrenching terror groups within our polity.
Let us also acknowledge that Pakistan has witnessed a massive shift to the religious right over the last three decades and this shift has resulted in a proportionate increase in religious intolerance. Terror networks like the TTP, LeT, LeJ and others derive their legitimacy from a certain interpretation of religion. Since we don’t have one authentic view of religion, asserting that religion-inspired terrorists don’t represent true Islam is largely pointless. We have no prospect of winning this fifth-generation war unless, to start with, we consciously and formally (i) disconnect religion from the state, and (ii) identify in-house jihadi groups as the foremost threat to national security.
Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu