The trouble with the politics of tsunami

There was a time when PTI founder Imran Khan used to harbour doubts over the compatibility of democracy with Islam. Clearly, he is now convinced that this combination is not just possible but desirable. The discovery comes with the revelation that, while spiritual rewards are subject to delayed gratification, political success in democracies can swell quickly, from a trickle to a... yes, tsunami. However, there is another compatibility concern that continues to elude the PTI leader – the distance between democratic methods and electoral success.
The usual (and mostly valid) criticism of the PTI has been over its potpourri ideology, inclusion of tainted political veterans, lack of economic, social or legal plans, its theological bent and conservative sympathies. Also noted is the PTI’s uncritical view of the military and its expenditures, bashing of western-funded NGOs (but not Arab funded, faith-based ones), selective rejection of western modernity, and the empty, flag-waving, face-book nationalism of its cadre who, simultaneously, symbolise and embrace all the materialist-capitalist products and ideas of globalisation.
But more than all these, the party is really guilty of a simpler, yet deeper and more important self-indictment. Its name. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf does not qualify as a movement and its politics is not reflective of democratically defined justice.
Although the call of ‘justice for all’ in an ‘Islamic Welfare State’ is very, United-Nations-meets-Jamaat-ud-Dawa, still, over the last 15 years, the PTI and/or its original members have not spearheaded any national movement to claim or substantiate even these identity-markers. It has also not delivered any substantive programme nor followed a viable, visible roadmap to underscore their ideals. They’ve just waited.
The Asian Development Bank’s project, ‘Access to Justice’, in Pakistan, ended up with a deposed Chief Justice, who was only restored due to the radical lawyers

movement, led by Aitzaz Ahsan. Ahsan’s political career has been one of consistent ideological opposition to military rule and a legal commitment to represent the vulnerable in women’s and human rights cases. It will be hard to reclaim from him, the title of leader of the original movement for juridical and constitutional correction.
Regardless of the legacy that led to an ongoing tussle between the judiciary and this government, and his own current predisposition towards the executive, it is Aitzaz Ahsan, who will always be associated with the movement for justice and the end of Musharraf’s regime. In many ways, Ahsan stole the thunder from the PTI’s avowed primary cause or constituency, in which the latter played only a small, supportive role.
There has been no identifiable PTI movement for justice for the working classes – such as the lady health workers, nurses, Okara peasants – and honour crime victims, the disappeared, religious minorities, victims of privatisation and not even a persuasive one on the much talked about, drone attacks.
Secondly, regarding welfare, the sustaa tandoor initiative may be counted as a welfare programme but there is no evidence to show that it qualifies as a sustainable and broader programme such as, the OPP, Khuda ki Basti, even Hafta-e-Safai or other community-based ventures. Individual members of the PTI may be running their own enterprises and charitable, socio-development works but to work as a party on identifiable projects is completely different. Also, such schemes have been implemented in a bigger, better way and arguably with more imagination, by the Sharif brothers.
Just like with cricket matches these days, it’s better to watch the PTI rallies on TV, rather than in person. The relevance of participating in such events has swung widely away from the learning process it used to be. Today, rallies have become about numbers, performativity, entertainment and clichés, rather than political information and learning. In the 1990s, when ideology still mattered, one would at least hear what parties stood for, not just what they rejected.
On the third issue, on the roadmap of the PTI, there has been the occasional glimmer of a political thought that was not just high on rhetoric but, possibly, an idea on the restructuring of some of the nuts and bolts of state institutions. Revolutionising the patwari and the educational systems are indeed worthy causes. Given the constant references to Muhammad Iqbal, the PTI’s vision could be said to be one that seeks to align the post-colonial state with something understood to be ‘Muslim politics’. Spiritually, this appeals to many Pakistanis.
In democracies however, nostalgic referencing to some glorious Muslim past and the ‘Shaheen’ philosophy is quite irrelevant. Just ask the religious parties, who despite the patronage of a military dictator, (Gen Ziaul Haq), ran pragmatic, effective, nation-wide programmes through the local bodies government, thereby forming networks that delivered services and in return, gained support. This is the conventional way of building a genuine political groundswell, which eventually surfaces and, as in the recent case with the Muslim Brotherhood, even succeeds, in democracies.
There is no memorialisation of any (rural or urban) localised PTI governance. The top-down approach of the PTI defies this convention and obviously invites suspicion or doubts. Further, the PTI’s stated commitment to merit-based governance is fast unravelling. This is not just due to the recent lateral entries of veteran politicians from other parties and technocrats from civil society. It’s more the fact that within days many of them have been appointed to vice-presidential positions, presumably based on their personal but certainly not party credentials.
The elite, pious and intellectually passive, tend to place a premium on good intentions, hope, prayers and moral purity. In terms of depth, deliverables and, most importantly, social class component, the tsunami is really a storm in a teacup that is actually not half-full but really just an empty vessel, to mix up several metaphors. It reminds one of that report card from the teacher attempting objective restraint over the mediocre performance of a student who may, or may not, be successful in life. Typically it will read, ‘average’ or ‘should try harder’ but really, you know it just means, ‘forgettable’.
Traditionally, political parties and their representatives run constituencies, not nations and they manage the needs of their local followers, not plan grand moral-cleansing programmes for the country. The PTI, on the other hand, is a postmodern enigma.
It’s anti-western but pro-modernity; it wants peace with India but is anti-disarmament; it’s politically conservative, culturally tolerant but economically neo-liberal; its ‘alternative’ leadership comprises non-PTI political auxiliaries; it supports collective rights for Muslims but not autonomous human rights for individuals; its ‘indigenous’ expertise comes from technocrats who run and/or are beneficiaries of multinational, corporate and western educational institutions; and its merit-based philosophy accommodates hierarchical patronage.
The PTI’s flexible membership, accessibility to urban drawing rooms and its virtual constituency make it an ideological cocktail. The PTI is, at best, a platform for political collectibles rather than a party.
All of which suggests that, in today’s classless, hypernationalist, religious revivalist, ideologically barren times, the PTI may just have a real floating chance at some electoral success. The pity is that, this may just happen through the thrust of an electoral tsunami rather than the trickle up of democratic ideas, norms and methods.
Email: afiyazia@yahoo.com