Strategic surrender

Every time there is a political crisis, civil society activists in Karachi become conflicted over ‘strategy’. Which political force best represents their liberal, progressive cause? The regrouping of progressives, to counter the fresh wave of religious extremist sentiment after Governor Taseer’s murder, raises the same dilemmas once again.
Civil society is split on whether it should partner with the MQM on resisting religious extremism in Karachi, particularly after the Nizam e Adl and now, the Taseer murder. During the lawyers’ movement of 2007, civil society had grouped under a resistance banner and recognising their limited street power, had carried out some protest rallies with the right-wing religious parties. The common dual-point agenda was to restore the CJ and civilian governance. The MQM was not quite so forthcoming an ally then.
However, the dynamics of activism around the lawyers’ movement were very different from the current blasphemy politics. A comparison is completely unhelpful both conceptually and/or to borrow strategic parallels. The aims and politics of the lawyers’ movement were clear; civil society was incidental to the lawyers’ independent movement; and the issue was not related to religion or the nature of the state (directly). This resulted in very different strategic allegiances. It was old-world, pro-democracy struggle for the independence of the judiciary and to remove army from politics. The politics of adjusting the place of religion and state is a completely different and far more complex issue.
There were other conflicts of interests too. Many members of the resistance group initially supported the lawyers’ movement, but abandoned it right after the PPP leadership made a deal with General Musharraf. In fact, many turned vocally anti-lawyers’ movement and disagreed with the restoration of the CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry and supported the PPP appointment of Justice Dogar instead.
Today, some of the same liberal activists who abandoned the people’s movement have rejoined for another democratic cause. While it was their prerogative to cut off their alliance with the people’s movement then, there is a need to remember and reconcile that such decisions by liberals also redefine principles and movements.
Yes, for the ‘higher’ democratic cause, during the lawyers’ movement there was a conscious decision that in Karachi, civil society would temporarily rally with religious parties. However, to suggest that this is comparable to rallying with the MQM in today’s context is inaccurate. There are a few reasons for that; first, the MQM is part of the government – what does it signify for it to conduct oppositional strategies such as street rallies? The concern is that this party takes up issues for its own expediency not on the basis of a consistent, representative ideology.
Second, there is a repeated misconception that it represents a ‘liberal, secular’ politics. How does this compare with the recent MQM’s massive support and rallies for Afia Siddiqi? Whatever political justifications we give it, does this not contradict civil society’s rallying point, which is to resist, not support extremist politics whenever expedient?
Third, theoretically, oppression that is based on tribal and feudal political structures can be challenged, by removal of the material bases of their power and dismantling class hierarchies. What are the means of challenging the abstract but truly ominous power of urban-based parties when it is not based on class oppression but on a horizontal sharing of the benefits of a culture of violence? If leaders and cadre benefit equally from this kind of politics this amounts to class complicity with no desire for liberation. Also, while ‘feudal’ and tribal politics and politicians are criticised (often by name) and challenged, this is impossible in the context of Karachi.
When larger crises of state are in question, such as army rule or removal of CJs or dissolution of parliament, then temporary alliances become easier, since most democratic parties have a stake in that cause.
Other national and provincial parties are equally oppressive and even non-democratic in their constituencies, as well as in terms of internal hierarchies. However, for the purpose of civil society strategy, the only relevant factor is that the hegemony of MQM in Karachi is unrivalled by any other party or group.
In other words, to take out a rally in Raiwind, Mansoora or Dir with religious groups has very different implications to shouldering with them in Karachi. Not to suggest that this is not a precarious, troubling and moral dilemma – just that strategically, the context of resistance politics makes a lot of difference.
An additional dilemma confronting civil society today is that despite the anti-liberal policies and statements of this supposedly liberal, secular government, many in civil society are still reluctant to criticise the government, including at protests and rallies. Is this not another conflict of interest – to self-censor while demanding the right to free debate and differences of opinion?
The broader goals of civil society groups today are vague compared to the lawyers’ movement. In the latter case, the CJ was to be restored and there was a conscious challenge to army rule. What is the goal here? Rule of law, change in procedures for the Blasphemy law, moderation, secularism or de-weaponisation? After one rally, what’s next....continued collaboration towards this undefined vague idea of ‘liberalising’ Karachi? Unless this is a seriously considered project, it only qualifies as a euphemistic call for ethnic cleansing.
The politics of vigilantism is another troubling strategy proposed by liberal groups. To encourage political workers to lay vigil at mosques to monitor sermons is a bizarre suggestion. What about the right-wing’s equal right to conduct vigilantism at public parties, fashion shows and study groups then?
The boundaries of extremist rhetoric, fatwas and incitement have to be dealt with through legal discourse and linked to criminal consequences. This cannot be done by arbitrary reports by political enemies accusing each other of something called extremist speech. What qualifies as ‘extremist’ rhetoric and who defines what may offend the moral sensibilities of liberals? This is the same strategy taken by the right when it objects to liberals’ public expressions as offensive, even irreligious. No vigilantism is acceptable – only regulation and that can only be done by the state.
These are not perfect choices but when strategic allegiances are formed they should at least carry historical clarity and intellectual honesty. To pretend that the MQM is some liberal alternative to some homogenous right-wing is to self-delude. To strategise on the basis of short-term comparative politics is to fall into the trap of seeking legitimacy through street politics.
It’s as futile a strategy as invoking enlightened, moderate interpretations of Islam from Al-Azhar, Saudi Arabia and even Malaysia. On the one hand, liberals object to conservative fatwas by local clergy but on the other, they welcome fatwas that fit their liberal agendas from foreign sources. This is undemocratic. And how does one counter the foreign authority on other non-progressive interpretations regarding women, minorities and other groups?
This is a political and ideological surrender to the opposition. It’s also an admission of defeat that the liberal’s own framework is non-representative and illegitimate. Half the battle is lost by simply taking such strategic decisions.
Perhaps a clarification of terms would help as a starting point. Rather than posing the choices as the right vs liberal/moderate, we need to identify the political divisions in Karachi as communal, as a far more accurate placement. This allows at the very minimum, an exposure of how close these two supposedly ideological poles really are, and how linked their agendas and parochial, material interests.
It may also open up an opportunity to present a meaningful liberal alternative in people’s imagination, one based on liberal politics and ideas, regardless of numerical strength. At the very least, it may prevent the current strategic nightmare that sees us bouncing between two equally dangerous and illiberal political options.