Judging Musharraf by his own criteria

Celebrating Pervez Musharraf's resignation should be no more than a fleeting indulgence for people who are seriously interested in Pakistan's future. In October of 1999, Musharraf stole Pakistan from the people, ostensibly for the people. It is not that long ago that the punditry of Pakistan was in love with the dog-owning, mullah-bashing, straight-talking chocolaty hero. It took five flawed elections (referendum '01, local '01, general '02, local '05, general '08), the uprooting of the social order of the tribal areas, the systematic defacement of the judiciary, and the unprecedentedly self-worshipping book that he wrote before Musharraf-Hero turned into Musharraf-Villain.

In his strategic blindness, Musharraf was a Miandad-esque political figure, never able to see past the next quick single. Tactically, however, Musharraf was brilliant to the bitter end. Nothing anyone else did mattered. Musharraf has retired hurt. He has resigned. He has not been impeached, not bowled out, not caught out, or run out, or even stumped. The jubilance should be tempered by that fact alone. Musharraf has given Pakistan back to the people on his own terms. To be fair to him, there is no doubt that his love for Pakistan is deep and sincere. To be fair to the people of Pakistan though, there should be no doubt that patriotism is no qualification to play Russian roulette with a poor country. He will probably get away with the laws he broke. But nothing can repair the hearts he broke.

It was his flirtations with the law that eventually did him in. The lawyers movement is the most credible and powerful nail in the Musharraf presidency's coffin. It would be unrealistically romantic to think that it was political parties that managed to squeeze Musharraf out of power. Though Nawaz Sharif should be feted for his growth as a politician and his maturity as an emerging statesman, before the lawyers' movement, the PML (N) had been reduced to a shadow of itself. And while the Shaheed Mohtarma is a martyr in the truest sense of the word, the tragedy suffered by the Zardari-Bhutto clan does not neutralise the depressing fact that Pakistan's largest party is co-chaired by a teenager who's hardly ever lived in Pakistan.

The truth is that if he wanted to, Musharraf could have dragged this out further. That fact is the true legacy of his eight years in the saddle. That one man's tunnel-vision and exaggerated sense of purpose can drive a country so deeply out of whack that even a genuine people's movement had no chance of succeeding. That is how badly the Musharraf era has damaged Pakistani institutions. Pakistanis should prepare for a long and painful period of rehabilitation.

The severity of the challenge is best measured by Musharraf's own megalomaniacal rhetoric. In his meandering and pathetic resignation speech, Musharraf expressed pride over his achievements. The definition of an achievement is doing what one sets out to do. Pervez Musharraf began his coup with a seven-point agenda, announced on October 17, 1999. Exactly eight years and ten months later, let's take a quick look at what exactly has been "achieved".

The seven point agenda included, "Rebuild national confidence and morale", "Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion", "Devolution of power to the grass roots level", "Revive the economy and restore investor confidence", "Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice", "Depoliticise state institutions", and "Ensure swift and across the board accountability".

Only the most audaciously ill-informed can claim that these agenda items have been achieved. On devolution, supporters of the former General would say that he indeed was able to create local governments. Unfortunately, although local governments seem to have been established for good, the manner in which they were shoved down the throats of the provinces was counter-productive. Perhaps even more importantly, by stripping the bureaucracy of its regulatory role at the grassroots level, devolution made a mortal enemy from day one, the District Management Group (DMG). Not only has the DMG suffered as a result, but Pakistan has too, losing hundreds of its brightest civil servants to foreign universities, donor agencies and multilateral organisations. In the end, the elite bureaucracy always wins. The DMG will have their day and their way with the Local Government Ordinances, weakening an already fragile local government setup and reinforcing its own powers.

The other area in which Musharraf might think he has a case to make for success is the reviving of the economy. For certain, all the bankers in shiny suits from whom he took advice seem convinced about the brilliance of their economic model. Since Musharraf's emergency, the stock market lost over $30 billion in market cap, the foreign reserves shrunk by about half, inflation is now flirting with the 20% threshold and investor confidence is in tatters. Those advisers then have some audacity then to suggest that the fundamentals are strong. The truth is that while the middle class did indeed expand during the Musharraf era, this had more to do with capital injections after 9/11, than it did with good policy. Most crucially, since 9/11 Pakistan grew not because of the paltry $10 billion that Congress sneezed into Pakistan, but rather the consistently growing remittances from hardworking Pakistanis all over the world. At last count, since 2001 cumulative remittances are at least double what the Americans have provided in aid. Those remittances drove a real estate explosion, and helped banks fuel unprecedented consumption for Pakistanis who grew up on Fauji cornflakes and Pakistan Steel widgets. Of course they would consume their way into a serious current account imbalance. Managing all of this would have been a real achievement for Musharraf. Instead, his advisers have deserted him, and gone back to their real jobs: selling used cars to the next gullible "investor".

The rest of the items on the seven point agenda have not only not been achieved, they have actually regressed. National confidence is bruised by unprecedented terrorism and deprivation. The military brand, once the blue-chip jewel of the Pakistani ethos, has been politicised and monetised. National cohesion has gone to the dogs, with terrorists having a field day while progressive Pakistanis are under siege for being bold and beautiful, and practicing Muslims in Pakistan under siege for being bearded and veiled. The provinces are sick of being treated like children, with a federal government constantly expanding and crowding out the provinces. Pakhtun children wonder why their land is an acronym, while Baluch children wonder why only the warlords get a share of the gas royalties. Punjabi children grow up wondering why everybody outside the Punjab has a chip on their shoulder and Sindhi children don't grow up as Sindhis, but rather as members of the rural or urban quota. The tenuous link between the tribes of FATA and the federation has been fatally wounded. Accountability has become a punch line, with Musharraf mocking his agenda by forcing the incorruptible General Amjad to resign as NAB Chairman in 2001, and capping the mockery with promulgating the National Reconciliation Ordinance in 2007.

Did some good things happen during Musharraf's era? Sure, they did, but good things happen in every era. Most of the time, its not the state establishment that makes them happen, it is the incomparably resilient people of Pakistan. Indians that come to Pakistan don't go back singing the praises of Customs officers or the PIA, they go back singing the praises of the people. Afghans who were once refugees here don't speak warmly of the Pakistani state, but they cry tears of love in remembering their real hosts, their Pakistani brothers. The resilient and generous Pakistani people deserve something better than what they keep getting from both the dictators that select themselves and the politicians that get elected.

The current ruling politicians can prove they mean business and that they will never allow another dictator the grounds to delegitimise them again. To do so, they have to restore the judiciary, scrap the NRO, tear up the concurrent list, give the provinces their constitutional rights, and rename the NWFP. They must do so quickly. Time is a wasting.



The writer is an independent political economist. Email: mosharraf@gmail.com