Peace in Syria

The death of Zahran Alloush on December 25 is a reminder that the Syrian regime is willing to risk the Vienna process in order to further its own more direct interests.

The peace plan and its constitutional milestones towards a better Syria are both ambitious and fragile: the plan has succeeded in crystallising parts of the Syrian opposition in Riyadh earlier in December and set in motion direct talks in the new year, making a rare optimism for 2016 to be the year in which the conflict goes in a better direction.

However, the killing of Alloush has already put a halt to the evacuation of opposition elements from the much beleaguered Yarmouk refugee camp and led other opposition leaders to question the regime’s intentions towards the ‘peace’ process.

Yet we should not forget that the Vienna process did not come about because of the desire of the regime. Indeed, the initial talks that set out the course ahead did not feature Syrian actors, but instead had patrons and allies from all sides around the table.

In contrast to the earlier Geneva process it appeared that in Vienna, global powers were serious enough about building a peace process that couldn’t be hijacked by the main fighting protagonists themselves.

With the targeting of Alloush, it would appear likely that the Syrian regime is trying to restore its own agency in the shadow of a Vienna process by which it feels marginalised.

This is a period of huge danger and opportunity for the range of actors that make up the Syrian opposition. They face being labelled as ‘extremist’ and excluded from the nascent peace process or being acknowledged as ‘moderate’ legitimate players and then assassinated.

The importance of this moment is matched by the need for leadership among the opposition to ensure not only the right agreements within the Vienna process, but also to bring about legitimate implementation of any deal. Bearing this importance in mind, the tactics of targeting an enemy’s leadership are not new or original.

The Assad regime famously has links to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other ‘anti-Syrian’ politicians in the country. It may be nominally happy to talk’ to the opposition, but we should be under no illusions that they would be happier see them dead.

More dangerous for the fragile, ambitious but desperately needed process is if the Russians are found to be involved in the killing either directly (they carried out the air strike) or indirectly (it was their intelligence that led to Alloush’s killing).

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces has already accused the Russians of conducting these killings. It is one thing for the Syrians - the object of the Vienna process - to try to assert independence from the process, it’s quite another for the Russians - co-creators of the Vienna process - to be seen to be taking out significant opposition leaders weeks before talks are scheduled to start.

The Russians may claim that until there is full agreement on who the ‘legitimate’ opposition are, all anti-Assad groups remain potential targets.

There is strong onus on the other key players in the Vienna process, particularly the US and the EU, to get clarity on what happened to Alloush, guarantees from the Russians about their intentions and guarantees towards the actors who will make up a key part of a process that they have co-designed.

Meanwhile, the more marginalised the regime feels, the more desperate its actions are likely to become, and nobody can be surprised by its simultaneously satisfying the diplomatic obligations expected of them by their Russian allies and doing their upmost to kill opposition leaders on the ground.

This article has been excerpted from: ‘Peace process in Syria: talk, talk, kill, kill’.

Courtesy: Aljazeera.com