The sectarian conglomerate

The recent sectarian killings of over 35 people in the Bolan district and Shikarpur display the resilience of terrorist groups despite the fact that the army has been conducting an operation against them in the tribal regions and the civil administration has taken a host of measures to check the activities of sectarian outfits.
The state has tackled sectarian terrorism largely by nabbing sectarian activists or, in some extreme cases, eliminating them in staged police encounters. Steps have been taken to ban hate literature and provocative speeches. These measures somewhat put a check on sectarian terrorists but could not wipe them out.
Shortcomings of the internal security system notwithstanding, a major reason behind sectarian terrorism’s endurance is that these organisations are spread far and wide, and the penetration of violent ideology in the name of religion is quite deep. The capacity of civilian security agencies does not match the size, resources and influence of sectarian forces.
There are two major sources from which sectarian terrorist organisations draw their cadres: (a) a huge mass of population that believes in sectarian, orthodox interpretations of Islam; and (b) the unemployed youth bulge belonging to the socio-economically marginalised section of society that sees little hope for upward mobility in the present system.
Those people who combine both features – the destitute indoctrinated with religious bigotry, though not necessarily schooled at seminaries, are the most lethal. Sectarian ideology and networking through militant organisations empower them and provide them upward mobility and they, in turn, give their energy and blood to the sectarian cause.
Sectarian terrorism is a product of sectarian culture. It thrives on a sectarian base that comprises sectarian ideology, clerics or proselytisers, religio-political parties and financial sponsors.
The sectarian base may not be directly involved in terrorism, but sustains it by other means. Without the sectarian base, terrorist groups cannot survive; they cannot recruit new killers and cannot pool funds for sustenance.
The seemingly non-violent component of the sectarian base is dedicated to proselytising a certain brand of sectarian Islam, running seminaries and churning out literature that breeds orthodoxy, bigotry and intolerance. Orthodox clerics, by fault or default, groom a sectarian mindset. It is inherent in an orthodox and conservative interpretation of the religion to produce a sectarian outlook.
The narrative formed by the clerics motivates the more energetic and aggressive amongst their students and followers to join militant organisations. Each year, the government has to bar hundreds of clerics from entering certain regions or speaking in public.
The terrorist infrastructure might be located in the country’s northwestern tribal areas or Afghanistan, but ideological hubs of the sectarian movement are located in the country’s big cities including Lahore and Karachi. The seminaries and clerics based in these cities provide ideology and literature to sectarian activists.
It is not without reason that when a group of clerics (ulema) issued a fatwa asking the Taliban to cease violence and start talks with the government, the TTP responded positively. A Taliban leader was quoted as saying that an edict by these clerics amounted to an order for them. The TTP could not defy the clerics as it is dependent on them for maintaining its popularity.
A variety of religio-political parties provide political cover to the sectarian base. The rank and file of seemingly non-violent religio-political organisations has an emotional and ideological attachment with the sectarian movement. The workers and leaders of these parties provide moral, political and legal support to sectarian activists when the need arises.
The agenda of terrorist organisations suit the ultimate objective of the religio-political parties. This spirit of camaraderie was publicly visible when the country’s religio-political parties mourned the killing of TTP chief Hakeemullah Mehsud in a drone attack in 2013. These parties have been quite steady in expressing either a soft corner or outright support for the Taliban.
The sectarian forces at home received a shot in arm when they found a powerful ally in the form of the Taliban in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s onward. The Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban are tied to each other and the sanctuaries of the TTP led by Mullah Fazlullah in Afghanistan are also home to its ally, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
This conglomerate of sectarian forces is too potent to be defeated by administrative measures alone. A comprehensive policy needs to be formulated, which should aim at: (a) preventing supply of new recruits to sectarian organisations by providing alternate means of affordable education and employment; (b) cutting linkages between different components of the sectarian base; and (c) countering the sectarian ideology with a non-sectarian, modern interpretation of the religion.
Email: adnanadilzaidi@gmail.com