Pakistan and the NSG

Pakistan has once again demanded access to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), during the recent Pak-US strategic talks, assuring that it will not be the first country in the region to resume nuclear testing.
The major concern on the part of Pakistan’s nuclear establishment is that if India becomes a member of the NSG, it would permanently block Pakistani membership in the future as all decisions in the NSG are taken by consensus. In addition, opening the door to Indian membership in the NSG would undermine the group’s ability to ensure that the Indian government respects its non-proliferation commitments.
It should not be forgotten here that India’s diversion of fissile material for weapons purposes was the sole reason behind the formation of the NSG. After the first Indian nuclear test on May 18, 1974, the US, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the UK, France and the Soviet Union joined hands to coordinate their nuclear export controls. All these seven nuclear supplier countries were totally convinced of the fact that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was not doing enough to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The plutonium used in India’s nuclear test was diverted from the ‘safeguarded’ Candu reactors supplied by Canada. The group of seven countries met for the first time in 1975 in London – as the ‘London Group’. In 1977, membership was expanded to 15 states and, after the 9/11 attacks, the NSG emerged as the world’s leading multilateral nuclear export control body.
The NSG’s original aim was to supplement the NPT, which permits peaceful use of nuclear energy but also prevents nuclear technology from being used for military purposes. Yet, in light of major developments, particularly the increasing nuclear proliferation outside multilateral controls, the NSG faces a host of challenges ranging from big question marks on its credibility to a growing debate about engaging nuclear states outside the NSG framework.
In the course of globalisation, the world’s nuclear industry is rapidly evolving into a system of complex proliferation transactions involving independent financiers and traders whose shady dealings are totally disconnected from the world of nuclear trade controls.
India and Pakistan, non-signatories to the NPT, have already expressed interest in joining the NSG a few times. In the annual meetings of the NSG, many member states have been opposing India’s proposed entry into the NSG, even questioning the need to expand the group. It is commonly agreed by most experts that deviation from a criteria-based approach is more likely to undermine the credibility of the NSG.
Furthermore, the question of expanding membership will have to be decided from the perspective of the NSG remaining fundamentally committed to the goals of the NPT or developing into a group of states that is capable of engaging in nuclear exports. Many countries have frequently complained that the NSG constitutes a cartel of nuclear technology owners.
Pakistan also demands a civilian nuclear deal similar to the India-US accord that allows India access to nuclear technology despite being a non-signatory to the NPT. China has supported Pakistan for membership of the NSG. However, on whether the US should extend cooperation to Pakistan in civilian nuclear technology, US experts feel that, in addition to proliferation threats, Pakistan, due to its poor economic situation, might not be able to buy sensitive nuclear technology even if the US agrees to any such kind of deal.
Approval of a country’s bid for NSG membership must be agreed on by all NSG members. The criteria include adherence to the NPT or a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty, the capability to supply the goods listed in the NSG guidelines and the ability to ensure implementation of nuclear export control regimes in compliance with NSG rules.
New Delhi strives hard to gather broad international support before formally applying for entry into the group. Some member states, including the US and France, have promised to back India’s membership of the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes.
From the NSG’s point of view, the advantages of Indian membership would be the integration of an important potential exporter into its regime and that many other countries may also profit from India’s nuclear market. The watershed event in this process occurred in 2008, when the NSG issued an India-specific waiver allowing it to engage in nuclear trade. Later, India signed civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Canada, Russia, Kazakhstan, South Korea and many other countries. By securing full membership of this export control cartel, India would have its voice heard in determining new export guidelines.
From a non-proliferation perspective, India’s NSG participation seriously threatens the credibility of the NSG, particularly given the irony of adding a member whose action was the very impetus for the body’s creation. However, India’s acceptance would make it the first non-NPT country in the NSG and encourage Pakistan to seek membership, emboldened by China’s support.
Acceptance of India would permanently preclude later admission of Pakistan, as Delhi is most likely to vote against Islamabad’s entry. NSG membership for India would increase resentment among those non-nuclear NPT states that regard the NSG as an illegitimate instrument of industrialised countries, which aim to refuse less developed countries access to economically significant technologies.
India is thus far unwilling to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); it is more likely that India would try to relax existing guidelines and thus be an obstacle to addressing future proliferation threats. This will also be a dangerous precedent.
At the moment, it is certainly difficult to predict the outcome of the debate over expansion of the NSG but if a decision is taken in favour of expansion, admission to the group should be based on some consistent criteria. Creating an exception only for India has the potential to render the NSG irrelevant, to the detriment of non-proliferation norms. How the NSG resolves this issue will inevitably shape its future role in the non-proliferation agenda.
Email: rizwanasghar5@unm.edu