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Wednesday November 27, 2024

Badaber questions

As funerals were held for those who perished in the attack on the PAF Badaber base on Saturday, questions continued to be asked over why the attack had not been preempted. News reports have confirmed that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) had issued at least two warnings to the

By our correspondents
September 21, 2015
As funerals were held for those who perished in the attack on the PAF Badaber base on Saturday, questions continued to be asked over why the attack had not been preempted. News reports have confirmed that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) had issued at least two warnings to the PAF Badaber management as well as government officials regarding specific intelligence over a possible attack on the airbase. The government and army have responded by air strikes in the Tirah Valley which killed around 16 suspected terrorists. The trouble with these attacks once again is that if the claim is true that the attack on the PAF Badaber base was coordinated from bases in Afghanistan, what intelligence is the basis for the air strikes in the Tirah Valley? Search operations have also started in areas around Peshawar and Kohat leading to at least 64 arrests, including of two Afghan nationals. What is strange is that if there was specific intelligence already available over the attack, then why were the air strikes and raids conducted after the operation? In a situation where the military is already undertaking a serious operation in the northern parts of the country, there is already enough legal cover available for pre-emptive arrests of potential terrorists in the area.
The issue of the forewarning should haunt the KP government and law-enforcement agencies. Is it enough for the CTD to rest on its laurels after delivering a warning? Earlier, in 2013, the DI Khan jail break had been preceded by a specific warning over a possible attack on the jail. No preventive action was taken. Similar warnings had been issued before the Karachi Airport and GHQ attacks; seemingly no one is taking intelligence warnings seriously. This means that good pre-emptive work by intelligence agencies is being wasted. In this context, it is worth thinking about the DG ISPR’s statement that the assault had been planned in Afghanistan and that terrorists were being controlled from there. Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz has said that Pakistan possesses enough intelligence on cross-border attacks to be shared with Afghanistan, with the government ready to demand concrete action. The issue is that if we had such concrete intelligence already at the start of September, then why was it not shared with Afghan authorities then? Pakistan needs complete cooperation from Kabul, which means that Pakistan will also have to deliver upon its promises to the Afghan government. There are also questions over Pakistan’s capacity to patrol its borders if attacks are continuing from across the border. Even if Pakistan can eliminate terrorists, if the border is still porous it won’t work. Aziz has correctly noted that Afghanistan and Pakistan must work together to eliminate terrorism through coordination and intelligence-sharing. This is correct, but the sharing of intelligence needs to be before an attack and not after it. This is something that will need to be learnt by both the Afghan and Pakistan governments as they continue their collective fight against terrorism.