Post Balakot: What the IAF will do to restore image?

It is clear that on February 27, 2019, the aerial clash between two nuclear powers Pakistan and India was a momentous event, involving fourth generation combat aircraft and beyond visual range missiles besides modern aerial combat tactics.

Now according to the Indian media, all future operations on the lines of 2019 Balakot air strikes, if any, will have a video feed of the attack for military personnel to get real-time information, which will also help with subsequent analysis of the hit. “This is what IAF will do to ensure Balakot-style op isn’t questioned again,” said a recent Indian report. For this, the IAF has rewritten firing protocols for air-to-surface Israeli missile Crystal Maze, which gives live feed of hitting the target.

The report further added: “The decision was taken after the lack of a video feed from the Balakot air strike became an issue of intense political slugfest, and helped the Pakistan military’s publicity wing, Inter-Services Public Relations, launch a propaganda war, which helped create initial doubts in the minds of many.”

It further admits: “The non-availability of a clear video of the air strike came as a setback as commercial satellite images of the JeM camp that came out later appeared to show intact structures at the site without any exterior damage.”

Another Indian report starkly admitted: “The PAF is a professional force which has always attracted the best human capital in Pakistan to man its diverse cockpits. In fact, the PAF has one of the highest rejection rates amongst air forces in the world, while clinically aiming at a high ratio of 2.5 pilots per aircraft cockpit— meaning it can sustain a greater sortie rate over a protracted conflict — with lesser number of aircraft. The PAF has remarkably done well to update and increase its airpower assets over the last couple of decades; attempting to maintain parity with the IAF at the technological, operational training and air war doctrine employment levels.”

The concerned Indian defence analyst further admitted: “What is very visible in the PAF’s various newer acquisitions, operational and maintenance philosophies and upgrade programs – is its emphasis on widespread flexibility and reliability towards achieving a high sortie rate during crisis. The PAF has also focussed persistently on the right fit of platforms, a bang for the buck necessary to execute all facets of full spectrum, networked missions across its geographical bounds of operational influence.”

Meanwhile, the new Indian air chief Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhaduria stated: “The Indian Air Force is looking at regaining its edge over its Pakistani counterpart in air-to-air missile capabilities that was allowed to slip amid a struggle to acquire them in a process that has lasted 15 years.”

In a “frank conversation” on the takeaways from the Balakot air strike and the subsequent dogfight on 27 February 2019, the IAF chief said the force is not just depending on the Rafale aircraft and its weapons to regain the edge but also on other missiles, including indigenous ones. “When Pakistan launched Operation Swift Retort, their F16s were armed with the Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile — AMRAAM — which has higher capability than that of the R-77 used by the Su-30 MKI and the MICA used by the Mirages.”

The IAF chief underlined that in air engagement, especially in a deeply-contested area, it is important to have an edge in weapons. “Once we retain this edge, it is important that we don’t allow it to slip,” he said. The IAF chief further said that the force cannot depend on the Meteor missile alone to meet the requirements and so is looking at other systems too.

The Indian media in its analyses is missing many points indeed. Rafales with their allegedly superior missiles will take years to become fully operational; PAF will by that time have in its armoury counter-Rafale tactics and weapons. Then superior manpower and training, the man behind the machine, also counts. A close reading of statements originating from India and senior IAF personnel clearly show who had the definite upper hand in the February 27 aerial clash and who admits making efforts for “regaining the edge”. It is definitely not the PAF.