Addressing cause to avoid effects

Becoming a nuclear power was not at all a pleasant preference but an imposed choice for Pakistan because either the armed forces or democratic governments would prefer not to have any nuclear weapons to begin with, if the global environment and regional situation afforded the country that option. Pakistan’s conventional disparity in the face of belligerence and utter violence on the border as well as inside our cities by successive Indian governments, are key limiting factors to take any steps for off-putting or relegating Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
Pakistan which is maintaining a formidable nuclear and missile programme primarily Indian centric for serious historical reasons, has lived with multiple threats since its inception. In the presence of explicit and hidden hostilities, traditionally from eastern border, gradually kept burgeoning from diverse potential adversaries on western border too when erstwhile Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan during early eighties, then India was a strategic partner with the invading power but swiftly changed its loyalties in the aftermath. In recent years the US and NATO involvement under the phenomenon of “Operation Enduring Freedom” in post 9/11 scenario, manifested the threat to Pakistan’s over all security besides grave threat to strategic programme in a more amplified but drastically complex manner.
On the other hand Pakistan’s resultant challenges chiefly due to collaboration with the US during Soviet intervention and later in the WOT that caused spillover effects of Afghanistan’s insurgency, encouraged India to proliferate its permanent hostility by intrusive means into country’s internal affairs and obliquely triggering economic turbulence, law-and-order as well as sectarian and parochial issues in Karachi, Balochistan, KPK and Gilgit Baltistan, to primarily undermine by attracting negative attention of global powers towards Pakistan’s strategic programme. This approach is espoused with the support of contemporary global powers of which India has become strategic partner soon after the demise of its previous friend. In this paradigm, the gravity, extent and nature of threat to Pakistan’s nuclear systems has increased manifold from the traditional foe, despite country’s efforts to forge peace and resolve contagious issues like Kashmir, which is the main cause of past conflicts, current tension and potential cause of future nuclear stand off, with India.
Though Pakistan’s custodial and control arrangements have been accepted and appreciated during various past nuclear summits, yet veiled references to certain Pakistan specific threats primarily on the persuasion of Pakistan’s arch enemy India, makes periodical admirations less reassuring. Though the US media and Think Tanks to include Carnegie Endowment, Stimson Centre and Hudson Institute, have long acquired worldwide reach, desired maturity and credibility for them to serve the purpose yet these entities at various instances have been supportive to the US government policies towards Indian persuaded stance about Pakistan’s position on nuclear issue. A former Pakistan envoy is periodically squeals in the Indian and American media against Pakistan, its nuclear programme and armed forces to obtain rewards. The aggregate effect of such support is evinced by the barrage of insinuations against Pakistan in Western media and Think Tanks while using persons like the former envoy, portraying it as a rogue or fragile state; that sponsors terrorism. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program generates intense concern in Washington and among its allies for a variety of reasons. To name only a few, there are unfounded concerns about the potential of nuclear war with India, proliferation, about Pakistan’s impact on the global arms control regime, (because Pakistan has showed its principled stance on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the wake of particular prejudice towards Pakistan and preferential treatment and nepotism towards India), about an arms race in South West Asia, about state failure and about military control over nuclear weapons.
These concerns are legitimate to be sure but a closer examination of the US synergy at strategic levels involving almost all stakeholders raises a larger concern from Pakistan’s standpoint. Various state institutions in USA continue to undertake self-initiated contingency planning and exercises (most famous was operation alligator) aimed at securing or dismantling Pakistan’s nuclear assets. These activities hint at consistent apprehensions amongst certain quarters in US establishment as well as Think Tanks perceiving Pakistan’s nuclear programme as most likely source of threat.
Though these cannot out rightly be termed as official US policy, yet these initiatives reflect the orientation and thought process of certain quarters within the US government that is under influence of crafty Indian diplomacy. Many US legislators, in both houses have also been repeatedly suggesting expanding the net of Nun-Lugar Act and applying it on other nuclear capable states especially Pakistan. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, intermittently known as Nun-Lugar Act, is originally an initiative housed within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) aimed at securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in erstwhile Soviet Union. While incorporating Indian forces into its stratagem, the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) that carried out high profile missions like Operation Neptune’s Spear, inside Pakistan resulting in the death of Osama Bin Laden, can pose a potent entity to all those perceived threats including Pakistan’s nuclear assets in future, particularly if Pakistan lowers its nuclear guards under pressures.
Pakistan has shown complete restraint against Indian violence and intimidations so far and willing to do so in future too in case global powers or UN authorities sincerely mediate two countries to resolve chief cause of tension and potential nuclear conflict between two countries. All the ensuing rhetoric or tensions are nothing but effects of the main cause, once the main cause is addressed all perceived threats related to nuclear war will be dissipated and peace prevailed in Southeast Asia.