As tension between Pakistan and India is all time high and IHK on the boil, a powerful Chinese military delegation is visiting Islamabad. The important visit of Vice Chairman of China 's Central Military Commission, (CMC), General Xu Qiliang along with other members to Pakistan, ahead of Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, is strategically vital.
They met the Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa at GHQ in Rawalpindi. The Chinese’s military leadership would be listening to Pakistan’s short and medium term concerns on India re, post-370 abrogated IHK, reviewing regional ramifications of the annexation and reappraising the explosive situation in the IHK. After the annexation of the IHK (by India), China has become a direct stake holder not only in ensuing instability in the region but also in the IHK by virtue of modified status of Ladakh by Delhi: after the abrogation of provision 370, India also annexed Ladakh declaring its as federal territorial. China lays claim to its northern part hence took it as direct violation of its territorial interests.
Beijing’s strong reaction over the IHK was aptly on display at the UNSG: it not only accepted Pakistan’s request to call in the UNSC meeting but also brought in Russia closer to its stance on Kashmir linking bilateral agreements for its potential solution with the UN resolutions; Beijing was even willing to go further and conduct and open debate on Kahamir in UNSC. It was a big diplomatic set back for India which could not —like in the past—pre-empt Islamabad raising Kahamir issue internationally at the UNSC; Delhi witnessed for the first time qualified balancing act from the US; and a measured degree of despondency over meek support from the UK.
It (India) almost lost a closed freind (ie, Russia) to Pakistan: the Indian strategic community and political elite were particularly shocked at the Russian pivot to Pakistan proving the limits of the support Delhi can count on, now from an increasingly evolving transactional Moscow.
China and Pakistan have a complete agreement to diplomatically put pressure on India short of any violent means. If the situation in the IHK deteriorates further, there is strong possibility both China and Pakistan push for open debate in the UNSC—a nightmare scenario for India. Recently, unabashed India, partly egged on by the US, and partly to offset Chinese support for Pakistan on the IHK in the UNSC, criticised Beijing on its handling of protesters in Hong Kong using HK as a pressure point.
Secondly, China has realised the limits of its efforts to normalise ties with Delhi set in motion under the Wuhan Spirit—(a summit meeting between President Xi and PM Modi in 2017 in Chinese City of Wuhan resolving to address bilateral issues peacefully). China felt shocked and threatened by offensive move of India on the IHK. Itself, Beijing never undermined the autonomy and two-state-system mechanism promised under its own constitution for Hong Kong even though the HK is a Chinese territory and is not a claimed or disputed issue like the IHK. China viewed the IHK’s annexation as something which undermined its sovereign interests; it termed the move a new source of regional instability not confined to Pakistan and India tension; and warned Delhi that its actions could potentially undercut all efforts aimed at stabilising the region. President Xi’s visit to India in October may still go head but clearly Wuhan spirit has come under huge strain. Beijing at the moment is facing multiple challenges and uncertainties from trade tension with the US, to deliberate campaign of propaganda by western powers to creat unrest in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. The last thing it needed was an unfamiliar strategic situation born out of India’s annexation just across permanent Line of Actual Control in Aksai Chin—on its very border.
What is now clear to Chinese thinking and psych is that with all Beijing’s best efforts to reach out to Delhi, India will continue to treat China as “strategic enemy” blocking its economic rise on every available opportunity even serving as regional client state to leverage the US hostility towards Beijing and undermining its interests.
Pakistan and China has a complete understanding to work on another issue (ie Afghanistan) with Russia on board. This is why the latest round of talks between the two countries will asses the possible fallout of Kashmir situation on Afghanistan. There is a unanimity between the two sides not to let Kahamir’s shadow fall on Afghan talks refusing to take Indian bait—perhaps one reason for Modi’s annexation of the IHK was to offset the impending win of Pakistan in Afghanistan after almost 17 years curtailing India’s influence. Hence both Islamabad and Beijing are of the view not to allow any distraction to peace efforts in Afghanistan as they are solely in the interest of the region and stability of these two countries. Sharing broader strategic calculus, Pakistan and China along with Russia, which is firmly in Beijing’s strategic orbit, view Indian move as offensive and runs the risk of undermining wider but shared interests in the region, (ie, Afghanistan’s US pull out, ISIS’s burgeoning threat post-Taliban settlement, Iran and US’s possible collusion, the sustenance of BRI—CPEC & Tehran’s strategic decision to join BRI-hence the Chinese-led-Economic Order).
On the need of possible talks with India, however, there is one caveat: as Islamabad has discounted any prospect of engagement with Delhi post 370 IHK, It has deep concern— reverting back to statuesque on the IHK is unacceptable so it does not make diolomatic sense to engage India: engagement on what ( e.g, recognise LOC as international border?) no way. As India will be under increased pressure with the IHK being talked about on every forum with its ground situation threatening out of control, Delhi will likely offer cosmetic talks either directly of through third party as their own proposal. There is no strategic or tactical incentive for Pakistan to give up on its tough stance—backdown as what is being termed “de-escalation” in diplomatic parlance. In particular, China and Russia understands Islamabad’s strategic imperatives and short of any progressive movement on the IHK with India, Islamabad-Delhi tension will likely ratchet up then decrease. As curfew and other restrictions will gradually be lifted in the IHK, the oppression will likely further harden Pakistan’s stance and forced to adopt other tough measures. At least for the foreseeable future ( i.e, in the run up to UNGA meeting and in the immediate aftermath, there is a scant chance of any engagement with India.
However, the the long-term concern of Pakistan and China remains a stable region, development and resolution of lingering disputes—a goal unachievable without an India being peaceful with itself and peaceful towards its neighbours. Delhi believes it can afford conflict with Pakistan without any cost to its economy and rather its continued confrontation with Islamabad benefits with domestic political constituencies. Yet, China’s solid support for Pakistan in internationalising Kahamir gives sleepless nights to Delhi; for Indian policy makers, managing China is a big challenge. Off course, high level military delegation talks between China and Pakistan provides an opportunity of discussion on other range of issues including Pakistan’s military hardware requirements in the face of new hostile posture of India. Pakistan and Chinese military to military ties are in excellent shape. Army Chief General Qamar Bajwa is viewed as a revered military leader in China by both military and political leadership. President Xi especially invited him to Beijing to seek his input. Besides, Chinese military is convinced of prowess of Pakistan army contrasting with Indian Army at various stages of professionalism (ie, operability, preparedness, efficiency and robustness) shows Pakistan armed forces are far successful then their Indian counterparts. This comes against the backdrop of Pakistan- China joint aerial exercise—300 km north of Ladakh closed to Indian border. The military delegation’s talks with the Army Chief is very significant, setting the contours for joint regional approach in the wake of annexation of the IHK.
Jan Achakzai is a geopolitical analyst, a politician from Balochistan, and ex-adviser to the Balochistan government on media and strategic communication. He remained associated with BBC World Service. He is also Chairman of Centre for Geo-Politics & Balochistan.
