Cycles of acrimony and bonhomie

Cycles of bonhomie after acrimony have become the hallmark of Indo-Pak relations. This was in full display yet again at Ufa a few days ago. The media glare on the meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi was so intense that it almost eclipsed the other significant event of the two countries becoming full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an important regional alliance.
Unfortunately, it didn’t evince much enthusiasm in Pakistan, and perhaps in India too, as the people of the two countries have seen such initiatives numerous times in the past, only to sink into deeper disappointment. The indicators for the Ufa moot didn’t take long in coming as even before the first meeting of officials from both sides, an Indian drone violated airspace along LoC and was downed. This is now an added dimension to the tension along the LoC and quite unwarranted.
It is obvious that the accumulative force of ‘negatives’ such as mutual distrust, violence on borders, a mistaken belief in India about the significant imbalance of power in its favour and even hatred, as displayed by the Indian prime minister in Bangladesh only last month, far outstrips the few ‘positives’ generated by the yearning amongst people in the two countries for peaceful coexistence. It is a measure of failure on both sides that with the passage of time, these negative forces have gained traction instead of being eliminated.
Just how superficial the two sides can get was evident as two foreign secretaries read out – half and half – a five-point joint statement, loaded as it was in India’s favour. Earlier, Modi acted like some medieval monarch in receiving Nawaz Sharif at the venue, even though the talks were held at India’s request – a gesture which only reduced his own stature and not that of Nawaz Sharif.
Modi’s spectacular ascent to pinnacle of political power, in spite of the Gujarat pogrom, has assured him his due place in history. His achievement is cause for inspiration for billions of underprivileged people across continents. He therefore needs to understand that indulgence into eccentricities in the company of other world leaders will not help further his legacy. Rather, it makes people wonder if he is not bent upon proving that other adage: give small man power and he will show you how small he is.
The Ufa initiative is welcome as there is no arguing the fact that a dialogue process is the only means to constructively resolve disputes. After all, what better method could there be of finding solutions to contentious issues on a sustainable basis between affected parties than through an honest exchange of views in an interdependent and pluralistic world.
If any proof about efficacy of dialogue being the best course of action for resolving disputes was required, the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal has just provided that. It is disheartening to see that instead of acting on their own, a reluctant India and Pakistan have to be routinely nudged towards a handshake by external powers, which is then much publicised. We miss the point that the UN and big powers’ interest is limited only to: ‘if they are talking, then they can’t be shooting’ paradigm – and not much beyond that.
It is about time we took a bold departure from the past and seriously moved towards addressing ‘below the waterline’ issues, as it were, for some real progress. We need to strengthen our inner convictions that lasting peace is beneficial for the region and these frequent external nudges (which we so reflexively obey but never openly acknowledge) are a commodity of diminishing returns in the 21st century where many world economies are galloping towards development.
It does not matter how much we play around with these papers we call joint statements, declarations, or accords – since the undeniable structural cause of protracted conflict between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. This will have to be discussed with all sincerity and genuineness of intentions. India can delay this process but it cannot stop it. Also India cannot succeed in inserting its own imperfect solutions to the textbooks of global conflict resolution.
India and Pakistan have again agreed on ‘Track II’ diplomacy which has an obvious advantage – that the two sides can place ideas centre stage which otherwise may not be possible in conventional ‘Track I’ diplomacy due to constraints of power politics. In the next few months, it could juggle around with such issues as our mutual grievances, psychosocial dimensions of our relationship and different power politics. But for any success, the level of any understanding reached will ultimately require broad-based acceptance by the populace on both sides.
‘Track II’ diplomacy on Kashmir was also tried during the tenure of former president Musharraf. Although the exact details of the proceedings have not been made public, it is generally believed that there was agreement on three points: a) Jammu and Kashmir would have maximum autonomy or self-rule on both sides of the LoC which would be harmonised for all three parts with its different parts remaining under sovereignty of India and Pakistan; b) the LoC itself would be ‘made invisible’ and J&K would develop cooperative institutions for development; and c) India and Pakistan would jointly monitor progress under this peace plan.
These are clearly flawed parameters – for one, just try making the LoC invisible when India and Pakistan couldn’t manage a highly visible LoC for seventy odd years and the two sides will get a taste of things to come. So ultimately it will have to be ‘Track I’ diplomacy which will carry the burden of finding a lasting and mutually acceptable solution.
India is trying to convert a de-facto situation of annexing Kashmir into a de-jure position through such shenanigans as the 1954 ratification of instrument of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India by its state’s constituent assembly. In 1957, the assembly subsequently approved the state’s constitution.
Since then India has claimed Kashmir as part of its union, which is void of any legal basis. How can it be legal in the face of earlier UN Security Resolutions on Kashmir and an Indo-Pak the instrument of accession will have to be put to referendum by the people of Kashmir.
On the instrument of accession itself, there is no last word whether Maharaja Hari Singh signed it before or after arrival of Indian troops in Kashmir. A de-jure solution to any untenable de-facto dispute can therefore only be achieved through a negotiated settlement and not though stubbornness and intransigence.
The task of any meaningful negotiations with India, if it ever gets to that stage, is going to be a very challenging one indeed. For this our Foreign Office needs a lot of strengthening. In its present shape it has struggled with a draft of a joint statement containing merely five points and clearly fallen well short of national expectations.
The provisions of ‘voice samples’ to Indian investigators to expedite the Mumbai trials has received much publicity. It has been reported in the Indian newspaper, ‘The Hindu’, that such an assurance was given by Pakistan previously also in May 2010 after the Saarc summit at Thimphu.
Later in June 2011, Pakistan announced that voice samples couldn’t be given as they will be challenged in a Pakistani court and investigators could face contempt of court. With Lakhvi on bail, it remains to be seen how our government handles its commitment to India on the Mumbai investigations especially if Rehman Malik’s stance is found to be legally correct.
If India refuses to accept reason to move beyond Mumbai and onto Kashmir which is the core structural cause of our bedevilled relations, then Mumbai can be on the agenda for a thousand years. India can gloat over it as much as it wants but our relationship will remain stuck in a time warp.
Albert Einstein once said that problems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them in the first instance. There lies the tragedy of the Subcontinent. It seems we could be hitting the acrimony road once again – and sooner than we expected.
The writer is a retired vice admiral.
Email: tajkhattak@ymail.com