On the Afghan front

Events that took place in the month of October in Afghanistan reflect the changing winds in the region and might offer a new direction to the decades-old internecine wars in the country.

During the first week of October, the US administration formally opened a peace dialogue with the Afghan Taliban militia. This is the first formal acceptance by the US administration of the Taliban’s longstanding position to not negotiate with the Kabul regime, which they consider to be a ‘mere puppet’.

In the third week of the same month, a strong anti-Taliban police commander – General Abdul Raziq – was killed by the provincial governor’s bodyguard at a highly-secured governor’s compound in Kandahar. A majority of Afghans, including government leaders, believed General Raziq was one of Afghanistan’s most effective commander who stood in as a lone bulwark against the Taliban and kept the militia away from Kandahar.

The high-profile murder of General Raziq – who is known among the Taliban ranks as the “savage commander of Kandahar” – was followed by the US administration offering certain concessions to the militia.

One major concession that made headlines was the release of two top Taliban leaders: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the co-founder of the Afghan Taliban, and high-ranking militia commander Mullah Abdul Samad Sani. Baradar was arrested from Karachi in 2010 following reports that the Taliban leader had started secret negotiations with the then Afghan president Hamid Karzai, keeping Pakistan in the dark.

The US also withdrew its longstanding opposition to the inclusion of five senior Taliban leaders – released from Guantanamo Bay in 2014 – to join the Taliban’s political office in Doha. The induction of these five Taliban leaders into the dialogue team appears to be a significant concession from Washington, which had earlier opposed this long-standing demand. The five members also include Mullah Mohammad Fazl, the former head of the Taliban’s army. The decision to include Mullah Mohammad Fazl in the Taliban dialogue team suggested that the group’s dominant military wing was being brought into the deliberations.

American and Pakistani interlocutors believe that a meaningful peace process in Afghanistan could be pushed further by these concessions as both Mullah Mohammad Fazl and Mullah Ghani Baradar are widely respected, with significant influence within the rank and file of the Afghan Taliban.

In this nascent peace dialogue between the Taliban militia and the US, Pakistan’s major challenge might be to not only facilitate the dialogue process, but also to ensure a stable balance of power between Kabul and Taliban militia.

Baradar’s release is surely a major step to push the dialogue further. But past experiences are a testament to the fact that the Afghan and US leadership might demand more steps, such as ensuring the success of the process rather than mere facilitation.

Before committing to anything beyond what is practically possible, Pakistan must keep in view the uncertain Afghan political scene, America’s unreliable stance vis-a-vis the Afghan insurgency, and the failures of similar initiatives in the recent past. Two major issues are still likely to haunt the dialogue: the sincerity of the US to engage the Taliban, and the readiness of the Taliban to ultimately reach a final agreement with Kabul leaders.

In the past, we observed that any peace initiative between the Afghan Taliban and the Kabul regime was always prone to deadly terrorist attacks in Kabul or any other Afghan city. If such incidents happen now, they will lead to the reversal of the dialogue at any stage as such knee-jerk reactions might culminate in Afghanistan levelling allegations on Pakistan.

Pakistan should also keep a vigilant watch on developments, especially in Kandahar, following the murder of General Raziq as ordinary Afghans have become more suspicious about Washington’s future role and the likely alliance with the Taliban militia in the region. In addition, there are concerns about the Afghan leadership’s approach of resorting to allegations against Pakistan to avert major criticism or political backlash. General Raziq’s body hadn’t even been buried when Afghan President Dr Ashraf Ghani asked Pakistan to take action against the handlers of the “lone shooter” whom, he claimed, was trained across the border in Chaman.

The US also promptly followed in Ghani’s footsteps when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatened Pakistan of dire consequences if actions wasn’t taken against “elements’ across the border.

“Our expectation is that Pakistan will not provide safe harbour to terrorists on their western border,” Pompeo said after the Kandahar incident. “We couldn’t make that message any more clear and that Pakistan will be held to account if they don’t see about it... if they’re not sincere in that effort.”

Moreover, Afghans are largely suspicious under dubious circumstances wherein their highly revered anti-Taliban police commander became the sole target of the alleged insider in the presence of top military commanders of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

How did the Taliban’s alleged ‘insider’ manage to aim directly at only General Raziq, sparing a much bigger target, General Scott Miller, who was standing close to the victim in the same compound. According to the existing security protocol, in parts of Afghanistan where top US or Nato commanders are present, security rests with US/Nato troops to prevent insider attacks. How can an intruder get so close to his target in a high-security zone without going through many layers of security?

General Raziq was a major hurdle in the Taliban’s way and his death is seen to be a conspiracy or part of a future plan to create a free zone for the militia in Kandahar. In addition to releasing senior Taliban prisoners, the militia had also demanded a “free zone” inside Afghanistan to facilitate their families.

The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist.

Email: hasan.khyber@gmail.com