Appeasing India

The positive and friendly gestures by President Ashraf Ghani towards Pakistan have proved disquieting for the Indian leadership. They are apprehensive that the dramatic improvement in Pak-Afghan relations will reduce space for India which it had painstakingly built during Hamid Karzai’s 10-year presidency.
Ghani might not have consulted India on issues of direct interest and concern to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He, however, felt the need to take India into confidence over the Afghan policy to initiate negotiations with the Taliban. He reportedly sent Abdullah Abdullah, effectively the prime minister of Afghanistan, to brief the Indian leadership on overtures towards the Taliban in order to promote reconciliation.
Given the inherently unstable nature of South Asia, Afghanistan’s attempt is not unusual. In fact, by doing so it has avoided many unnecessary risks. Having served in the cabinet of former president Karzai, Ghani is aware of the challenges in managing the trilateral relationship. In many ways, he has already annoyed India by spurning their supply offer of military hardware and training of Afghan cadets.
By limiting India to trade, investment and financial assistance, Afghanistan cannot expect that India will remain complacent. There is a likelihood that the hawks in India may decide to escalate the proxy war against Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan or freeze or reduce Indian investments or educational scholarships and technical assistance to Kabul.
Pakistan’s strategic thinkers, especially from a military background, who often argue that Afghanistan must not be allowed to become too friendly with India may find the Abdullah’s visit worrisome. In it they may see India winning back Abdullah Abdullah to convey its concerns for accommodation while negotiating with the Taliban and Pakistan. However, one must realise that Abdullah Abdullah had always favoured India and has never trusted Pakistan. Apparently his views have

undergone some change after he was convinced of Pakistan’s complete neutrality in the Afghan general elections.
With the departure of Hamid Karzai, official communication between India and Afghanistan has declined. By making Beijing his first foreign port of call, President Ghani tried to distance his government from New Delhi. In Beijing, he identified India’s role in Afghanistan principally as an aid-provider – but not in the sphere of security. His statement was interpreted as a clean break from his predecessor Hamid Karzai’s policy announced in 2005 that Afghanistan considered New Delhi a critical security partner.
Ghani’s early foreign policy pronouncements listing five circles critical for peace in his country lent credence to this theory. He placed Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours – including Pakistan – in the first circle. The second circle included other Muslim countries and the third circle key western allies. India and other Asian nations came in the fourth circle – followed by the UN and other international organisations in the final circle.
India is concerned. It sees its space being squeezed out and shrinking of its role as a regional counterweight to China and an active player in power games in Afghanistan and beyond. It was also frustrating for India to see Ghani sign a key transit pact with Pakistan without securing Indian economic interests. India may not have minded President Ghani meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif since India cannot replace Pakistan in terms of immediate priorities as a next door neighbour and the shortest route to sea for landlocked Afghanistan.
However, India must have been stung to learn how swiftly our military leadership was able to develop a collaborative relationship with the Afghan President. In a sign of Delhi’s displeasure, work has already stalled on some key Indian-backed development projects in Afghanistan (as claimed by Dr Spanta in a Guardian interview).
No one could have anticipated a year ago that the Afghan government would launch operations against the Fazlullah group at the request of Pakistan’s military. The Pakistan chief of army was also hosted in Kabul. In contrast, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval was the only senior Indian official who had met Afghan leaders in October. The other official contact was made a week and a half back when the Indian foreign secretary left from Islamabad to Kabul on the last leg of his ‘Saarc Yatra’. A proposed visit by Ghani to India in March remains unconfirmed.
The Indian disquiet over Ghani’s palpable tilt towards Pakistan is shared by Afghan leaders in general, and allies of Karzai in particular. Fortunately their influence is shrinking but they refuse to fade away. There is a likelihood that if the Taliban summer offensive continues or is intensified, their voices will certainly regain lost strength and the new found warmth in Pak-Afghan relations will be at peril.
Influential persons like Fazil Hadi Muslimyar, the speaker of the Upper House of the Afghan parliament, have already demanded that “President Ashraf Ghani must have a guarantee from Pakistan that if the Taliban enter into negotiations, Pakistan will not use other militants as proxies to fight against Afghanistan”. Even Omar Daudzai, who had served as Afghanistan’s chief of staff and interior minister and ambassador to Islamabad, said that he thought Ghani’s attempts to woo Pakistan were “courageous” but would ultimately fail to change the country’s (Pakistan) behaviour.
The secret visit of Abdullah Abdullah to India must have come as a pacifier. Afghanistan’s decision to share with Indian leaders its plans on reconciliation with the Taliban was a carefully thought out move. The visit will certainly help New Delhi better understand the Afghan government’s priorities. At the same time, Kabul might have conveyed its top priority to have peace and stability in the country as the only possible guarantee for survival of the national government in the wake of the drawdown of US/Nato forces and the perceived ascendancy of the Taliban.
According to army sources, during his last visit to Kabul Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif had assured his hosts of the willingness of the Taliban to initiate serious negotiations with the Afghan government. The first formal round is likely to start in the next few days. The foreign media has already reported the initial contact where issue like agenda, procedures and location of meetings were discussed.
Pakistan will have to keep its promise – the Taliban to at least ensure a workable power-sharing reconciliation with the Afghan government. The unsettling dimension is that the said challenge may be beyond Pakistan, notwithstanding claims from the Pakistan military which reportedly exercises influence on the Taliban.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Email: mian.sana@gmail.com