The Aam Aadmi’s self-inflicted crisis

It may appear to be an unfortunate coincidence that serious dissent should break out in India’s political wunderkind, the Aam Aadmi Party, within a few weeks of its spectacular victory in the Delhi Assembly elections, which stopped the Narendra Modi juggernaut.
Unfortunate it certainly is – especially for those who hope that the AAP would emerge under Arvind Kejriwal’s leadership into a formidable challenge to the BJP at the national level. But coincidence it definitely isn’t – although it’s a setback for the cause of a clean, decent, broadly secular and inclusive politics.
In fact, the immediate reasons for the discord in the young party, which led to the unceremonious sacking of veterans Yogendra Yadav and Prashant Bhushan from its political affairs committee, are intimately connected to the Delhi elections in three different ways: through an altering of the AAP’s internal equations, in highlighting its leaders’ differences over election strategy and tactics, and by ensuring that a centralised, personality-based organisational model would prevail.
First, the AAP’s 67-out-of-70-seats triumph shook up the political balances inside the party overwhelmingly in favour of the team of activists who worked day and night in its Delhi campaign, and isolated Yadav and Bhushan, who weren’t central to the campaign, and on the contrary, were seen by some to have played a negative role in it.
Yadav was keen that the AAP contest the Haryana and Maharashtra Assembly elections, which preceded the Delhi elections by barely five months. Kejriwal took the view that Delhi was winnable, but Haryana – where the AAP did poorly in the Lok Sabha elections despite Yadav’s exertions – wasn’t; nor would the AAP have a remotely respectable showing in Maharashtra.
It wouldn’t do for the AAP to divert energy away from Delhi, felt Kejriwal. He prevailed. Meanwhile, however, he flirted with the idea of joining hands with the Congress in the-then still-undissolved assembly to prevent the BJP from poaching MLAs and forming a government.
This is where the second factor, strategy and tactics, comes in. Kejriwal was convinced that if the AAP didn’t win the Delhi Assembly elections, it would be finished nationally. That’s why he unilaterally decided last May to ask the lieutenant-governor not to dissolve the assembly. This opened him to Bhushan’s charge that he was acting against the AAP mandate to fight both the Congress and the BJP – and doing so highhandedly.
However, Bhushan was himself accused of trying to sabotage the AAP in Delhi by objecting to the candidate selection process. Matters were further fouled up by his father Shanti’s statement last August that Kejriwal “is a great campaigner, but in my opinion, he lacks organisational ability. He does not have that kind of competence which can spread the message of the party all over India…” The elder Bhushan later backed the BJP’s Kiran Bedi.
Although his son distanced himself from this, his statement wasn’t seen as strong enough. Rumours also started circulating within the AAP of a secretly taped conversation in which Bhushan allegedly said he’d be happy to see the AAP only win 20-25 seats in Delhi. The climate got progressively vitiated.
Eventually, when the Delhi results came in, Kejriwal was vindicated. He inducted his closest loyalists like Manish Sisodia into the cabinet, didn’t include a single woman, and took no portfolio himself – as if to indicate that he isn’t just first among equals, but in a class apart.
Soon thereafter, Yadav stepped up his demand that the new chief minister, with all his onerous responsibilities, shouldn’t also remain the AAP’s national convenor. This is by no means an unreasonable demand, but Kejriwal loyalists disingenuously countered it by saying he held no portfolio and therefore could function normally as the national convenor.
Bhushan, Yadav, and some of their friends, suggested the post should go to Yadav, given his national profile and interests. This mild expression of ambition – which would be considered unobjectionable in any party – was seen as a threat by the Kejriwal camp. So was the demand raised by the two leaders to look into issues like the selection of candidates, sourcing of funds and details of election expenses.
It didn’t help matters that many in the AAP considered Yadav’s personal style excessively pious and syrupy-sweet. A sting operation was launched to show that he wasn’t loyal to the AAP and had briefed journalists in Chandigarh in a misleading way. Confidential letters and emails were leaked to the media by all concerned and nasty accusations were tweeted. The AAP’s organisational crisis worsened. To discuss it, a meeting of the national executive (NE) had to be convened on March 4.
Before or during the meeting, Kejriwal had a chance to act as a moderator and reach some kind of reconciliation to maintain the AAP’s unity. But he absented himself from the meeting and got his deputy Manish Sisodia to move the proposal sacking Yadav and Bhushan from the PAC – apparently after some last-minute manipulation and number-rigging. He prevailed because of his loyalists’ numerical strength. The only surprise is that the Yadav-Bhshan duo lost narrowly – by an 8-11 vote.
This is as a clear indication as any that Kejriwal wants a strongly personality-focused, over-centralised organisational model – not the open, consultative, participatory one the AAP advocates in its own political campaigning. This is a regression from its earlier status as an unformed party with an uncrystallised organisational apparatus and a confused internal democratic structure, which is fuzzier than that, say, of the Communist parties.
The new model will give fixers and loyalists the upper hand within the AAP, and inhibit debate and discussion on strategies and ideas. It will also put off a number of AAP supporters and sympathisers who were greatly impressed by the cohesion and unity of purpose it has shown until now.
More importantly, the AAP is now likely to evolve in a more centrist ‘non-ideological’ direction, with greater emphasis on ‘pragmatic problem-solving’ approaches – rather that policies and programmes based on a broad social vision. Yadav and Bhushan might not be flaming radicals – although Yadav has a Socialist background – but both repudiate neoliberalism and have a deeper and broader understanding of various phases and trends in Indian politics than most AAP leaders.
If the AAP really intends to challenge both the BJP and the Congress, as it says it does, it can only do so from the Left. This means targeting both parties for their largely shared neoliberal policy orientation and countering the BJP’s Hindu-sectarian politics of communal polarisation through a strong, uncompromisingly secular agenda.
Yet, despite the handsome support it got from the poor in Delhi in the assembly elections and in some other cities in last year’s Lok Sabha elections, the AAP is not, and doesn’t consider itself, a Left party. Whether it evolves in that direction or drifts rightwards into confused pragmatism will decide if it has a long-term future in national politics.
The AAP is at this crossroads just when Narendra Modi’s political honeymoon has ended and the BJP’s general downslide has begun – reflected in its disappointing first full-year budget, its appalling performance in parliament, and its super-opportunistic alliance with the People’s Democratic Party in Jammu and Kashmir. The BJP can be further weakened. That’s why it would be tragic if the Aam Aadmi Party doesn’t quickly overcome its turmoil and confusion and take a stride forward.
The writer, a former newspaper editor, is a researcher and rights activist based in Delhi.
Email: prafulbidwai1@yahoo.co.in