Direct dialling

Last week’s drone strike in Pakistan has highlighted yet again the complete dysfunctionality of Washington-Islamabad ties. The news was first reported by the international media and then almost grudgingly accepted by Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucrats. The ensuing controversy – on whether the strike was on the Afghan refugee camp where a lone terrorist ranger had crept in or was on a target that the CIA had carefully monitored and then knocked out from the skies – further illustrates how different the public universes that both countries have chosen to dwell in are, even while still maintaining that they are in this war together.

But while drone strikes represent the cutting edge of a failing, faltering relationship, these are a miniscule bit of the larger problem: the absence of any meaningful attempt to halt the continuous slide downhill. Both countries are locked in a jarring battle marked by toxic exchanges involving innuendo, accusations and populist rhetoric that is pleasing to hear for raw nationalists but does nothing to break the deadlock.

Even the cooperation that continues between them such as exchange of information about the Taliban, about the moods and inclinations of different fighting factions towards the idea of talks, about the immediate concerns both sides have regarding each other’s actions and of course air and ground corridor facilities have not proven to be good enough dykes. The flood of distrust continues to flow.

The situation would not have been so desperate if it weren’t for the chaos in Washington. The Trump Administration (read: Trump Family) has turned decades of procedures of running government in the US upside down. It is American history’s most controversial administration and has a tendency to add layers of confusion – by the day – to decision-making. The chaos is hidden behind the veil of declarations about ‘clarity’ in policy, which is summed up in simplistic narratives and inane tweet attacks on all and sundry. Pakistan-handling is left to influential policymakers or think tanks dominated by Indian-Americans or those retired generals whose past failures in Afghanistan blindside them to reality. This is the basis of what is known as ‘Pakistan fatigue’ – a generic name for multiple syndromes and failures at different levels in the achievement of goals set by different administrations in the past nearly two decades in Afghanistan.

Moreover, easy punching bags are needed when the Trump Administration moves focus away from counterterrorism and towards more marketable threats like China, Iran and increasingly Russia. These are threats that have a palpable feel to them since they have people, leaders, land, actions, competition etc. This is contrary to terrorists who are hiding, are nebulous and – since the killing of OBL – have no face to represent them. In this situation, Pakistan is an obvious target of publicly expressed ire and demonisation since it sells well.

We in Pakistan of course don’t like these unfortunate turns in bilateral relations that have significant implications for our geo-strategic interests in the long run. However, our dislike has not changed the Trump Administration’s behaviour and, despite our claims of engagement, the situation remains tricky. The US continues to pile up pressure and the two countries are precariously balanced on the edge of an outright collision.

What can Pakistan do to make its case heard in a reason-deaf Washington? Not a great deal, except for phrasing its case in simpler forms and pressing for a comprehensive dialogue centred on Afghanistan and spearheaded by both Islamabad and Washington along with Kabul and whoever represents the battlefield opponents of Kabul. Let us be clear: Pakistan’s present problems with the US have little to do with Pakistan directly (except perhaps nuclear weapons, which is a long-term ongoing kind of an issue in the US). Most of the trouble stems from the situation in Afghanistan. However, since this trouble is infecting every facet of bilateral ties, it is important that in pushing for a direct dialogue with Washington on Afghanistan – by-passing all other forums but without abandoning them – Islamabad should market a fuller picture to Washington about its worldview.

There is clarity in the bottom-line strategic concerns of Pakistan when it comes to dealing with Washington, and Islamabad is not exactly asking for the moon. For instance, Islamabad does not want to be humbled, humiliated and physically hit (drone strikes in this case become critical) by the US. The backlash that US actions create in the public mind and within the officer and the non-officer corps of the army is extremely negative. While the US may get a few temporary advantages out of curse-coerce-attack strategy, the long-term damage to the base of cooperation totally outweighs whatever limited gains it might make in the short run.

Pakistan also does not want to be bolted out of the club of ‘friendly’ countries, nor wants to be shoved to the margins of debate about the future of regional peace and stability in South Asia. Pakistan’s vital interest also demand that it should not be completely aligned to China and, while retaining its greatly valued and valuable relations with Beijing, must not become a proxy in the backyard. Any developments that push Islamabad totally into the lap of China will have costs that only Pakistan will pick up and not China. The talk of immediate alternatives to the US is hollow. It misses out the fundamental point that Washington has the capacity to add exceptional strain to Pakistan’s strategic environment and there is nothing that Beijing can or will be willing to do about it.

Last but not least, Pakistan does not want to expand conflict with India. Being prepared for war and being able to tackle any act of aggression from Delhi is one thing; to be drawn into an expanding conflict with increased skirmishes on the LoC and attacks on the Working Boundary is quite another. This is something that Pakistan does not seek. That explains the exceptional restraint Pakistan has shown in dealing with Indian ventures on the LoC and the Working Boundary. Information has been carefully sent out about damages and casualties and there is no visible campaign to stir up emotions and prepare public ground for escalation.

Washington is central to meeting most of Pakistan’s basic defence and foreign policy goals in the immediate future, and Afghanistan is central to making it tick with a chaotic Washington. So is there a formula that Pakistan can come up with that will get traction in the US at this point in time? There isn’t any. But there are elements that can be reworked and introduced as the new basis for engagement.

For instance, the timelines that Washington insists on when dealing with the Taliban and the issue of their alleged presence on Pakistan’s border soil can be reconciled through structured dialogue. The repatriation of Afghan refugees can become part of the overall deal to settle, manage and supervise border-related incidents and movement of goods and people. Different models of a possible peace deal in Afghanistan that may have been tried and tested but are still on the table can be re-energised to discover if any of them can still be implemented.

The fundamentals of a graceful exit for the US from Afghanistan and less costly extrication for Islamabad from Afghanistan, as both save face and energies, is the foundation stone of a stable Pak-US equation. Much of this can be worked out if there is a Washington-led, Pakistan-backed dialogue on the many trouble-brewing aspects of Afghanistan. All the grievance, heartburn, complaints, betrayals, accusations can be placed on the table of direct talks on Afghanistan rather than being made the stuff of public fisticuffs. Without this direct dialogue there is nothing that can halt the nosedive that we are witnessing at present. Without dialling directly to each other and speaking clearly on all aspects of Afghanistan, the two countries will only witness long-term failure of their relationship.

Email: syedtalathussain@gmail.com

Twitter: @TalatHussain12

The writer is former executive editor of The News and a senior journalist with Geo TV.