Trump’s Afghan flip-flop

Donald Trump’s flip-flop on Afghanistan has hardly come as a surprise. Contrary to his previous opposition to America’s costly involvement in foreign wars, the enigmatic US president has announced his plans to shore up his country’s military presence in Afghanistan.

With the Taliban ratcheting-up their offensive against the beleaguered government in Kabul and the transnational cataclysmic organisation – the IS – taking root in the war-torn country, the about-face was always on the cards. The ultimatum to stick the knife into Pakistan in case it does not mend its ways is also not staggering in view of the country’s perceived role of a show-spoiler in Afghanistan. A country that is believed to hold the key to putting down the militancy faced by its neighbouring nation and allegedly continues to aid and abet militants needs to be conveyed the right message in so many words.

The new Afghan strategy implies a shift from the ex ante or time-based approach of the Obama administration towards an ex post or result-based approach. The ex ante approach resulted in the withdrawal of combat US troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, leaving 8,000 strong special forces to help the Afghan Army take on the terrorists.

The approach spelled disaster as the Afghan Army has proved unequal to the task of holding itself against the heightened Taliban onslaught. Last year and the first eight months of the current year have seen greater bloodshed in the country than any other period during the preceding 10 years.

What is worse, Daesh, which is currently on the retreat in Iraq, is looking for new safe havens. What can be a safer haven for it than a country like Afghanistan where the writ of the state is conspicuous by its absence, an overwhelming majority of the population has been condemned to live in abject poverty and squalor and sufficient ideological support exists for radical Islamist groups? Nearly two decades ago, it was these characteristics of Afghanistan that provided a fertile ground for Al-Qaeda to thrive in the country.

The Taliban, an essentially local outfit, have never been – and are not likely to be – a direct threat to US security. The fateful events of 9/11 – which brought the US back to Afghanistan – were the making of Al-Qaeda, which has been decimated in the region. If the Taliban were the only menace in Afghanistan, Washington’s interest in the country would have tapered off. What the US fears is that an unstable Afghanistan may become the stronghold of another transnational militant organisation like the IS. The July 31 fatal strike at the Iraqi Embassy in Kabul, which was masterminded by Daesh, lends credence to such apprehensions.

Pakistan has been warned against falling between two stools and presented with the stark choice of being either with the Americans or with the militants. A similar choice was given to Islamabad after 9/11. In case Islamabad does not side with Washington, which is another way of saying that if it does not stop “patronising” some factions of the Afghan Taliban – notably the Haqqani Network – it will have “much to lose”.

In the words of Trump, “we have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars. [At] the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting”. India has been asked to play a starring role in Afghan reconstruction, which may be seen as one way to punish Pakistan. The greater the Indian role in Afghanistan, the more conspicuous its presence there and the stronger its influence on the coalition government in Kabul.

The Trump administration’s view of Pakistan is the same as the perception held by the one that preceded it: an errant boy in the comity of nations in need of foreign assistance to sustain itself. So if the screw is turned on the chap, it may see reason. Seen from American spectacles, Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism and constitutes a direct threat to the stability of the key Washington allies in the region, namely India and Afghanistan.

The flip side is that Pakistan is the sixth largest nation in the world in terms of its population and the second largest state, economy and military power in South Asia. It possesses nuclear weapons and – at least on paper – is a major non-Nato ally as well as a strategic partner. Such credentials make Pakistan exceedingly important for durable peace in the region.

Understandably, the Obama administration as well as Congress remained on tenterhooks on Pakistan. Should Islamabad be left to its own devices or continue to be engaged? Was going harder or softer a better course of action in dealing with Pakistan? Should Pakistan be declared a state sponsor of terrorism?

Pakistan, on the other hand, has maintained that it has discarded the notion of good and bad militants once and for all and that by accusing it of backing Afghan militants, Washington is tilting at windmills. In international relations, as in interpersonal relations, perception is more important than reality. Despite Pakistan’s rebuttal, the Americans, Afghans and Indians remain unimpressed. In their book, mere tilting at Pakistan would be of little consequence. So the new administration in Washington must tighten up on Islamabad. But how?

The Trump administration may designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism (SST). American laws empower the executive to give a country this designation if it has repeatedly provided support for international acts of terrorism. Such countries can be slapped with sanctions. These include restrictions on foreign assistance, a ban on defence sales, specific controls over exports of dual-use items (technology that can be used for both civilian and military purposes) and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, such as a travel ban. The three countries on the SST list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria.

As indicated by the US secretary of state, Pakistan’s non-Nato ally status may be revoked. The status, which was conferred on Pakistan in the initial years of the war on terror, has been instrumental in providing substantial security and civilian aid to Pakistan – which has been of no small help to the capital-scarce country. The US may also carry out strikes on alleged militant hideouts in the settled areas of Pakistan, which may result in a good number of civilian casualties. 

Putting Pakistan on the SST list or withdrawing the non-Nato ally status, like a double-edged sword, may cut either way. It may squeeze the country economically at a time when it is running a huge current account deficit and thus make it change its counter-terrorism stance to the satisfaction of the US.

Alternatively, it may harden its stance on such matters, making it difficult for Washington to hit the bull’s eye in Afghanistan. The same goes for possible surgical strikes. Constructive engagement – in such a way as to address the concerns of both sides – rather than penalisation seems to be a better policy option as both countries have high stakes in uprooting militancy.

Giving India a greater role in Afghanistan is bound to raise Pakistan’s as well as China’s hackles. Beijing’s unequivocal defence of Islamabad’s counter-terrorism credentials following the unveiling of Trump’s Afghan strategy should leave no one in doubt that it differs with Washington on the modus operandi for tackling militancy in the region. The envisaged larger role for New Delhi will be seen by both Beijing and Islamabad as running counter to their strategic interests in the region. It will also push Pakistan even closer to China.

 

The writer is a freelance contributor.

Email: hussainhzaidi@gmail.com