Demystifying political representation

Political representation is one of the most elusive concepts in political science literature, with many facets and theoretical complexities. Scholars have employed a wide variety of theories and methodologies to examine the question of how public representatives should behave.

The results of these studies are by no means conclusive – due to a lack of consensus on the definition and empirical methodologies to analyse the representation.

The central questions posed by American political theorists are related to the behaviour of representatives and the role of representative institutions in the deliberative democratic process. Historically, the literature on political representation has focused on the ‘delegates vs trustees’ model. James Madison, an American statesman and founding father, propounded a delegate conception of representation that requires public representatives to follow their constituent’s views. On the other hand, Edmund Burke, a British political thinker, was a proponent of the trustee conception which required representatives to follow their own judgement about the proper course of action.

Numerous answers to the question of representation have been offered, but the delegate model is believed to have more explanatory power. Building upon this theoretical framework, it can be reasonably argued that, despite its current ills, the US Congress is a very representative institution perfectly reflecting the preferences of the American public. There is empirical evidence available to support the view that congressmen tend to be delegates on all issues of high salience.

The US Congress tends to act as a delegate because of two fundamental reasons: First, congressmen are motivated largely by re-election and they do not want to be seen as being out-of-step with public opinion in their constituencies. Second, constituencies frequently provide consistent cues regarding district preferences to their representatives.

The delegate model of representation helps explain today’s gridlocked Congress because individual and collective interests are misaligned. Acting as delegates, congressmen always respond to local incentives and in today’s polarised US, these local forces don’t align well with national needs.

Another possible reason for Capitol Hill’s reputation as the ‘do-nothing Congress’ could be that the American public is largely ill-informed, inconsistent and inchoate in their attitudes, beliefs and values. The confusion into which the US Congress currently finds itself is the result of congressmen working as delegates for a collectively confused and ill-informed people. Most of the studies view representation in terms of a dyadic relationship between a legislator and his/her constituency. This dyadic representation is important in several ways, but there is also an equally important tradition of viewing representation in terms of institutions collectively representing people.

The delegate model of representation is based on the idea that the constituents must organise and express their performances in a way that allows the representative to develop a reasonably accurate perception of constituency opinion. When studying the process of representation, therefore, it is imperative to take into account the role of all relevant actors. The role of the represented is particularly important in this equation because constituents are supposed to inform their representatives about the public pulse if fruitful delegate behaviour is to result.

The question of representation also becomes important in the face of large amount of empirical evidence suggesting congressmen’s emphasis on re-election as can be seen in the high return rates of incumbents. David Mayhew, a political scientist at Yale University, has emphasised the electoral connection between the represented and the representative derived from district party competition. Similarly, Morris Fiorina, a professor at Stanford University, argues that the homogeneity or skewness of the distribution of opinion within districts conditions the representational process generally. Constituencies affect their representatives’ abilities to carry out their delegate functions, however, by providing consistent cues regarding their preferences.

However, responding to the needs of their constituents has become a major reason of gridlock in the US Congress. Congressmen put their constituencies first and that often comes at the expense of the general interests of all Americans. The US Congress has geographical representation and a decentralised power structure. This structure leads members to support policies that benefit their states but are harmful for the country as a whole.

An important example is the congressional decision-making process when it comes to providing national defence. Winslow Wheeler in his book ‘The Wastrels of Defense’ presents evidence of how congressmen responsible for national defence put most of their efforts into grabbing benefits for their particular constituencies instead of ensuring the effectiveness of armed forces. Simultaneously, it seems logical for congressmen to seek more and more federal benefits for their constituencies because – facing a typical prisoner’s dilemma – if they don’t secure that funding, somebody else will.

Opinion polls of Americans over the years have found ‘appalling level of ignorance’ about the federal policy. People don’t make decisions about public policy by looking at actual cost and benefits. Rather, their decisions are based on their emotional and ideological feelings. This ignorance on the part of voters incentivises congressmen to support policies that have short run appeal instead of those with long-term benefits.

In a nutshell, representation is a complex process of interaction. The unfortunate fact remains that congressmen’s occupation with re-election – making them work as delegates so that they do not end up ignoring the public opinion in their constituencies – is a major reason for the morass in Washington. Congressmen approve the policies which serve their short-term constituency-related interests instead of the long-term interests of the nation.

 

Email: rizwanasghar5@unm.edu