Exercising moral authority over the army

Islamabad diary

It’s not a question of ‘being on the same page’, the silly turn of phrase which has become so popular with us, or a question of putting ‘generals in Suzukis’, the incendiary phrase used by Muhammad Khan Junejo. It’s more a question of setting out the outlines of national policy, which is the task of the national leadership, and then seeing to it that the generals, instead of following their own inclinations, take their cue from you.

This is the Holy Grail of Pakistan’s polity yet to be discovered. Although a democratic order is in place, and long may it last, politics as a currency stands debased while the might of the generals has grown. From foreign policy to the mechanics of internal security, theirs is the decisive voice. For the strengthening of the country’s political fibre – let’s leave the moral fibre to one side – how is this tendency to be reversed?

If words could do the trick Article 6 of the constitution which defines as treason any subversion of the constitution would have done it. We know from experience that these threatening words have had no effect on coup-makers.

Long ago the politicians now in power sought more attractive ways to bring leading generals into their sphere of influence, bearing gifts, call them Trojan horses, to generals marked for seduction. The BMW dealership was with a close confidant of the PM, Saifur Rehman, the onetime NAB chief whose Qatari connections are so strong. Shuja Nawaz in his book, ‘Crossed Swords’, says one such gift, a BMW, was pressed on Gen Asif Nawaz, the then army chief. There was no photographer at hand so his reaction is lost to posterity.

The present lot in previous incarnations brought high judges to heel, sowing dissension in the Supreme Court and getting rid of a bothersome chief justice. The art of taming the bureaucracy and making it perform like the tamed lions of the Lucky Irani Circus they perfected long ago in that mighty province, land of the five rivers (owing to the accidents of geography, now reduced to three), the real religion of whose elites and leading lights through the ages has been the worship of the rising sun…a province they have ruled, apart from the Musharraf interregnum, since 1985.

Industrialists they were themselves, so the business community and trading classes were always on their side. The army alone remained outside their circle of dutiful obedience.

But the problem was systemic rather than anything to do with individuals. The industrial, financial and banking landscape the present ruling coterie knew how to paint and use to their advantage.     They needed no lessons from anyone on how to juggle the tax regime, shift funds, and open hugger-mugger, surreptitious offshore accounts.

This was their own territory and they knew it like the back of their hands. But talking to the generals on policy matters was something slightly different. It was here that their discomfort would rise to the surface. They knew not how to engage with the generals and discuss, say, India and Afghanistan with anything like adequate much less commanding knowledge.

Why is it that Shahbaz Sharif, otherwise self-sufficient in most things, always takes Nisar Ali Khan with him when meeting army chiefs, whether Kayani or Raheel Sharif? Nisar can talk better and being the son of an army officer and brother to another officer, the late Lt-Gen Iftikhar, and not to forget that he is an Aitchisonian to boot, he is more at ease with the khaki crowd.

Muhammad Khan Junejo was no Aitchisonian, and spoke with no cut-glass accent, but he was honest and upright and there were no skeletons in his cupboard. He thus had no problem looking Gen Ziaul Haq in the eye and being straight with him. Junejo had no powerbase of his own, his sole qualification being Pir Pagara’s recommendation. But Junejo while always proper and a stickler for the rules never behaved subserviently before the general. At their very first meeting, this was after being selected as PM, Junejo, much to Zia’s shock, felt no hesitation in asking    when martial law would be lifted.

Junejo could act thus because he had nothing to hide. But when your name is embroiled in scandals and questions are raised about your financial probity, then the idea of summoning generals to your table and giving them instructions on policy and strategy becomes somewhat problematic.

You can have the experience of appointing not one but half a dozen army chiefs, but if your bosom is not clean and your hands are tainted, and the country is swirling with fact and innuendo about your financial dealings, then the moral authority you may seek in your dreams becomes elusive.

Corruption has permeated military ranks too and the real-estate virus, as exemplified by defence housing authorities which exist nowhere else in the world, has affected all the defence services. Things are so far advanced on this front that even the Intelligence Bureau, which must be a first for any intelligence outfit in the world, has entered into the real estate. When will the ISI have a housing authority all to itself?        

But despite this plot-hunger, the army has jealously guarded its professional autonomy and it remains the country’s most organised and vital institution. And its spirit, grievously affected during the Musharraf years, stands restored as a result of Gen Raheel Sharif’s outstanding leadership.

Derided not long ago as a chocolate army – when its corps commanders were better known as crore commanders – it is now widely acknowledged as a battle-hardened army which has taken heavy losses in the war against the TTP but has restored Pakistani sovereignty in wide stretches of territory where this sovereignty had been lost. For this the army has reasons to thank the TTP which re-taught it        the forgotten lesson that an army’s first duty is to be ready for war.        

Regardless of who the next army chief is, the old problem will remain much as it was: how do you look generals in the eye and tell them the lay of the land when serious charges of corruption and financial wrongdoing are swirling around you and a landmark case, however it turns out, involving those charges is before the Supreme Court?

Consider this: if there was any financial scandal surrounding Gen Raheel would he have been the commander he’s proved to be? The same principle applies to the political class. For exercising moral authority over the military arm, clean hands are a must and competence and knowledge become plus factors.   But if your main concern is self-enrichment your vast holdings are both here and abroad, and conflict-of-interest is a notion that is simply beyond your comprehension, then you will keep having problems with the sword-bearers.

Just as an army can’t do well for itself if it mixes business with the warrior principle, those entrusted with the responsibility of leadership betray their trust, and the mandate of heaven, when they use power for no other purpose than their own betterment.

 

Email: bhagwal63@gmail.com