No exception for India

India’s hopes of becoming the newest member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have, finally, been quashed after the end of the inconclusive meeting in Vienna. By denying India’s membership bid to the NSG, nuclear supplier countries have sent a strong message that they will not bow down to American bullying and make an exception in the case of India.

In fact, the majority of the members supported China’s original position and agreed to work on identifying the criteria for non-signatories to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). India has repeatedly blamed China for blocking its ambitions but the truth is that many other countries also do not want to open the door to Indian membership in the NSG because it would seriously undermine the group’s ability to ensure that the Indian government respects its non-proliferation commitments.

India’s reckless build-up of nuclear stockpiles is not only a challenge to the existing global nuclear non-proliferation regimes but also a cause of concern for many neighbouring countries. India already has 5.7 tonnes of military plutonium and continues to produce more fissile materials. Although largely ignored by the international group, India’s flagrant disregard of global non-proliferation goals must be discouraged on all diplomatic fronts.

The major concern on the part of Pakistan’s nuclear establishment is that if India becomes a member of the NSG, it would permanently block Pakistani membership in the future as all decisions in the NSG are taken by consensus. There is evidence to support this concern because of New Delhi’s reluctance to agree to any “criteria-based” approach for new entrants. It is commonly agreed by most experts that deviation from a criteria-based approach is more likely to erode the credibility of the NSG.

The NSG’s original aim was to supplement the NPT, which permits peaceful use of nuclear energy but also prevents nuclear technology from being used for military purposes. Yet, in light of major developments, particularly the increasing nuclear proliferation outside multilateral controls, the NSG faces a host of challenges ranging from big question marks on its credibility to a growing debate about engaging nuclear states outside the NSG framework.

In the course of globalisation, the world’s nuclear industry is rapidly evolving into a system of complex proliferation transactions involving independent financiers and traders whose shady dealings are totally disconnected from the world of nuclear trade controls.

Furthermore, the question of expanding membership will have to be decided from the perspective of the NSG remaining fundamentally committed to the goals of the NPT or developing into a group of states that is capable of engaging in nuclear exports. Many countries have frequently complained that the NSG constitutes a cartel of nuclear technology owners.

Pakistan also demands a civilian nuclear deal similar to the India-US accord that allows India access to nuclear technology despite being a non-signatory to the NPT. China has supported Pakistan for membership of the NSG. However, on whether the US should extend cooperation to Pakistan in civilian nuclear technology, US experts feel that, in addition to proliferation threats, Pakistan, due to its poor economic situation, might not be able to buy sensitive nuclear technology even if the US agrees to any such kind of deal.

Approval of a country’s bid for NSG membership must be agreed on by all NSG members. The criteria include adherence to the NPT or a nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaty, the capability to supply the goods listed in the NSG guidelines and the ability to ensure implementation of nuclear export control regimes in compliance with NSG rules.

From the NSG’s point of view, the advantages of Indian membership would be the integration of an important potential exporter into its regime and that many other countries may also profit from India’s nuclear market.

The watershed event in this process occurred in 2008, when the NSG issued an India-specific waiver allowing it to engage in nuclear trade. Later, India signed civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Canada, Russia, Kazakhstan, South Korea and many other countries. By securing full membership of this export control cartel, India would have its voice heard in determining new export guidelines.

From a non-proliferation perspective, India’s NSG participation seriously threatens the credibility of the NSG, particularly given the irony of adding a member whose action was the very impetus for the body’s creation. However, India’s acceptance would make it the first non-NPT country in the NSG and encourage Pakistan to seek membership, emboldened by China’s support.

Acceptance of India would permanently preclude later admission of Pakistan, as Delhi is most likely to vote against Islamabad’s entry. NSG membership for India would increase resentment among those non-nuclear NPT states that regard the NSG as an illegitimate instrument of industrialised countries, which aim to refuse less developed countries access to economically significant technologies.

India is thus far unwilling to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); it is more likely that India would try to relax existing guidelines and thus be an obstacle to addressing future proliferation threats. This will also be a dangerous precedent.

At the moment, it is certainly difficult to predict the future of the NSG but admission to the group should be based on some consistent criteria. Creating an exception only for India has the potential to render the NSG irrelevant – to the detriment of non-proliferation norms.

How the NSG resolves this issue will inevitably shape its future role in the non-proliferation agenda. But one thing is clear: New Delhi will have to get rid of policies associated with irresponsible nuclear behaviour otherwise the Modi government should better forget about NSG.

Email:rizwanasghar5@unm.edu