Talking to the Taliban

The recent resumption of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, overseen by the US, in Doha had one notable absentee. Pakistan was long thought to be indispensable to any eventual leverage because it was the only country thought to have any leverage over the militant group. Now, however, the Afghan Taliban have been moving away from Pakistan after many of their members were targeted in Operation Zarb-e-Azb and their chief Mullah Mansour was killed in a US drone strike in Balochistan. Taliban sources told the media after the talks in Doha that they no longer saw Pakistan as integral to any eventual agreement. With the Afghan government still trying to freeze Pakistan out for what it sees as patronage of the Taliban, and the Quadrilateral Coordination Group making no progress, it looked like Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan had been diminished. Still, after the meeting in Doha, a delegation of the Afghan Taliban, including members of the Qatar-based Taliban Political Commission, visited Pakistan where they were reportedly told to either seek a peaceful solution with the Afghanistan government or face action by Pakistan. The delegation, reportedly, didn’t commit to peace talks and to giving up the military option, saying they needed time to consult with Taliban commanders in Afghanistan. This is where Pakistan may still hold some sway over the Taliban since many of their members are in our custody and it would likely take a final peace settlement with Afghanistan for us to release them.

An eventual peace deal is the only way to end the war in Afghanistan. The Afghan army, even with significant Nato air support and troops, has shown that neither it nor anyone else can militarily defeat the Taliban.      If anything, the presence of foreign powers makes peace even more unlikely. Afghans are naturally angered, and some radicalised, when Nato forces massacre civilians, as they did on Thursday during a special forces mission in Northern Afghanistan which killed 30 people. Nato follows these missions with massive bombing campaigns to clear the area which only kills more civilians. It also, in contravention of international law, bombs hospitals where Taliban members may be receiving treatment and also attacks funerals of suspected militants. All of this contributes to a justified hatred for the US and its allies – and that hatred extends to the Afghan government. But the Taliban cannot defeat the Afghan army and take over the country either. They         are too entrenched in Afghanistan and capable of fighting both conventional battles and guerrilla warfare. And the Taliban can, likewise, hold the Afghan army at bay but cannot take over the entire country. An endless stalemate is the only outcome should the Taliban not agree to a political solution. Pakistan’s role in this should be to support the Afghan government and nudge it in the direction of peace whenever it wavers. The US is another wildcard, which is why Pakistan has been urging the Taliban to get the peace process in motion before a new president is sworn in the US. Barack Obama’s likely successor Hillary Clinton is even more hawkish than him. And, while no one knows what Donald Trump would do, one can be reasonably sure it would be nothing good. Obama may like to burnish his legacy with a successful political agreement before leaving office in January. Pakistan needs to use any influence it has with the Taliban to work towards that goal.