Options for Nato

In the aftermath of World War II, the US and its allies created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) in 1949 to curtail Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe.

Given the volatile history of interstate conflict in Europe, a collective security agreement in the form of Nato was a unique phenomenon. Europe aspired to rebuild and develop under the guarantee of American security, which ensured military support against the Soviet Union.

In exchange for economic and military support, most of Europe aligned with US foreign policy. However, over the years, this alignment has weakened, leading to policy differences between the two. These divergences are evident in issues such as the Iran nuclear deal, the Palestine conflict, and more recently, the Russo-Ukrainian war. As a result, tensions have emerged between the US and Europe, particularly regarding Nato.

The first major point of contention between Brussels and Washington is the unequal distribution of defence expenditure. In 2014, Nato members agreed to commit two per cent of their GDP to defence expenditures. In 2024, nine Nato member-states failed to meet this benchmark, fuelling tensions between Washington and its allies.

The Trump administration openly expressed concerns, warning that the US might not defend a Nato ally if it failed to meet the defence spending requirement. More recently, President Trump has signalled an intention to raise the threshold to five per cent of GDP. However, this proposal has faced resistance in Europe, with German Chancellor-in-waiting Olaf Scholz arguing that five per cent is too high.

The second point of contention is Washington’s shifting and diverging strategic priorities. It has made no secret of its animosity towards Beijing, viewing China as a greater strategic rival than Russia. This shift is reflected in the 2022 National Security Strategy, which identified China as the only competitor capable of reshaping the international order.

To counter this challenge, President Trump plans to weaken the China-Russia alliance, viewing it as a threat to American security. This approach has been dubbed ‘Reverse Kissingerism’, referencing the cold war-era US strategy that sought to divide China and the Soviet Union. This policy clashes with European leadership, which perceives Moscow as a greater threat to its national security than China and relies on the US for security assurances. This divergence creates a security gap, one that Europe must address with its own forces.

On the other hand, to develop ties with Moscow, President Trump is currently playing the negotiator’s role in ending the Russo-Ukrainian war by offering a peace settlement to Russia. The realisation that Washington will not risk its own interests to guarantee Ukraine’s defence has left European leaders feeling shocked and betrayed. This has reinforced the growing acknowledgement that Europe must take responsibility for Ukraine’s defence and, in turn, secure its own interests by remilitarising. In this context, the French government recently pledged $211 million in aid to Ukraine. However, the key question remains: Can Europe secure itself and support Ukraine without US assistance?

Europe’s pursuit of independent security without the US, while ambitious, faces limitations. Nato’s logistical network remains heavily reliant on US military bases in Europe, which provide essential services such as troop transport, training, and refuelling. Beyond logistics, Europe also depends on the US nuclear umbrella for deterrence, as the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France lack the redundancy and extensive weapon systems that the US has.

These political and military realities give rise to three possible scenarios. In the first, Nato remains intact, with Europe complying with the Trump administration’s demands, largely due to its dependence on the US logistical network and nuclear umbrella. In the second scenario, the US may either leave Nato or substantially reduce its support, allowing a European state to assume Nato’s leadership. This could happen if Washington decides to redirect its resources toward containing China as part of its ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy.

The third scenario may be Nato’s dissolution and being replaced by a new European security organisation. This outcome could become plausible if Europe successfully remilitarises without US support.

While less likely, such a shift would have an irreversible impact on US-Europe relations, enabling Europe to pursue an independent foreign policy, including a recalibrated approach to China, at the expense of its traditional ties with Washington.

As transatlantic tensions grow, Europe faces a critical choice: comply with US demands, assume greater leadership within Nato, or pursue full military independence. Each path carries profound consequences for European security and global stability. If Europe successfully remilitarises and asserts strategic autonomy, it could mark a turning point in US-Europe relations, potentially shifting the balance of global power.

The writer is a research assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad. He can be reached at: cass.thinkers@casstt.com