A dangerous lie

There is something dangerously seductive about a good conspiracy theory. The suggestion that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are ‘for sale’ is one such reckless fabrication. It is a narrative so absurd that it should be dismissed outright, yet it lingers in geopolitical discourse, recycled by those who either misunderstand Pakistan’s nuclear policy or deliberately choose to misrepresent it.

The latest iteration of this claim comes from Bob Woodward’s book, which attributes an unverified statement to a Midde-Eastern senior personality, suggesting that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is up for sale. It is a statement so detached from reality, so fundamentally at odds with history and policy, that it warrants a serious rebuttal. It is also a dangerous distortion, undermining decades of responsible nuclear stewardship by Pakistan and ignoring the country’s steadfast commitment to non-proliferation.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme is not a bargaining chip. It is a matter of national security, a strategic necessity born out of regional threats and historical precedent. For those who take even a cursory look at South Asia’s security dynamics, the rationale for Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is self-evident. Since becoming a nuclear power in 1998, Pakistan has adhered to a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence. This policy is designed solely to safeguard national security and prevent conflict, not to be exploited for financial or diplomatic leverage.

There is a fundamental flaw in the logic of those who claim Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could be transferred to another state. If there were any truth to this, would there not be evidence by now? Wouldn’t there be some instance, some transaction, some leakage to substantiate this wild theory? Instead, the reality is the opposite. Pakistan has maintained one of the world’s most secure nuclear programmes, consistently recognised by international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The command-and-control structure of Pakistan’s nuclear assets is among the most sophisticated in the world. It is overseen by the National Command Authority and safeguarded by multiple layers of security. The idea that these weapons could somehow be ‘purchased’ betrays a fundamental ignorance of how modern nuclear states operate. These are not briefcases of cash changing hands in backroom deals. These are the most sensitive and heavily protected assets a nation can possess.

Beyond technical safeguards, Pakistan’s foreign policy history itself contradicts this baseless claim. If Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent was indeed a commodity for sale, why did it refuse Saudi Arabia’s pressure to intervene militarily in Yemen, even at the cost of straining its relationship with Riyadh? If nuclear policy was dictated by external influence, why has Pakistan continued to assert its strategic autonomy, often making foreign policy decisions that prioritise national interest over external expectations?

This autonomy has long been a defining feature of Pakistan’s approach to global affairs. The country has navigated complex alliances, regional pressures and security challenges while maintaining an independent stance on key issues. Those who claim otherwise either fail to grasp the nuances of Pakistan’s decision-making or choose to ignore them in favour of alarmist narratives.

It is also worth considering the consequences of such baseless speculation. In a world where nuclear security is a paramount concern, spreading misinformation about a country’s nuclear policy is not just irresponsible. It is dangerous. It fosters unnecessary suspicion, fuels diplomatic tensions and distracts from real security concerns that deserve attention. At a time when global stability is fragile and responsible diplomacy is needed more than ever, such misleading claims serve only to undermine efforts toward constructive dialogue.

Pakistan has never violated its commitment to nuclear responsibility, nor has it ever wavered in its adherence to non-proliferation principles. Those who genuinely care about nuclear security should focus their attention on fostering trust and engagement rather than amplifying baseless rumours. The global community should recognise Pakistan for what it is: a responsible nuclear state that has consistently safeguarded its deterrent and contributed to regional stability.

The world must learn to differentiate between fact and fiction, between reality and the convenient narratives pushed by those with political motives. The idea that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is for sale is an insult to the years of discipline, strategy and security that have gone into maintaining it.

Facts must always prevail over fiction. Pakistan’s nuclear policy is not dictated by opportunism, nor is it subject to external transactions. It is, and always has been, a cornerstone of national defence, built on the principles of responsibility, restraint, and strategic stability.

The real conversation should be about how to strengthen nuclear diplomacy, not about indulging in baseless and irresponsible claims that serve no purpose other than to stoke unwarranted fears.

The next time someone claims that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are ‘for sale’, one should ask a simple question. Where is the evidence? The answer, as it has been for decades, is nowhere to be found. Because it does not exist.

The writer is a non-resident fellow at the CISS. He posts/tweets@umarwrites