The testimony of a general

Part - II

Abdul Majid Malik was probably the oldest living general of the Pakistan Army till his death earlier this month. An extraordinary degree of perseverance enabled him to finish and see his autobiography, ‘Hum bhee wahan maaujood thai’ published last year at age 95.

The book stands out as a frank discourse on the tendency to find easy solutions to complex problems through military takeovers, with each military ruler facing an inglorious end. Malik is particularly critical of the first martial law as it established a long and wrong tradition of military coups. He also analyses how the selection of army chiefs on grounds of perceived loyalty instead of seniority or merit ended in coups by the same ‘loyals’.

Malik recounts that Pakistan’s first military dictator, Ayub Khan, had grown so used to ruling within a culture of sycophancy that he showed weak judgement and even weaker resolve when the chips were down. Things had begun to deteriorate rapidly as Bhutto tried to exploit the Tashkent episode and a vigorous agitation by the combined opposition threatened Ayub’s hold on power. A heart attack rendered Ayub more vulnerable. He was ready to hand over to the speaker of the National Assembly but elements within the army sabotaged the plan, forcing Ayub to hand over power to the army chief, General Yahya Khan.

Malik was once again close to the centre of power as he was posted from 1969 to 1971 as director Military Operations (the post was later upgraded to DG MO) at the GHQ. He narrates events marking the slide to chaos and the war in East Pakistan.

Promoted in April, 1971 to major-general, Malik was given command of the 11 Div at Lahore in the fast deteriorating politico-military situation. He argues that had Pakistan retaliated on the western front by capturing Indian territory soon enough, it could have been in a better bargaining position. However, Yahya was incapable of taking such decisions. When action started on the western front on December 3, 1971, it was too late.

Malik ordered his troops to advance in the Hussaini Wala sector and capture an Indian fort in the area, giving the Pakistan Army a much-needed boost. He was deeply affected by the humiliation suffered in East Pakistan – especially over the 90,000 taken by the Indian army as POWs including 55,000 military personnel. He calls the defeat in East Pakistan the greatest shock of his life and December 16, 1971 would stay in his memory as the darkest day in the country’s history.

He found it extremely difficult to address troops to console them. On return to the Div Headquarter, he cried bitterly and dared not look at the Quaid’s portrait. In a personal affront, Malik was not awarded for his extraordinary victory in Hussaini Wala because his corps commander, Gen Bahadur Sher (more in sync with the high command?) was opposed to the operation.

On December 16, a group of officers staged a protest in Gujranwala Cantonment. Some delivered speeches against the high command, asking for immediate resignation of Yahya Khan and his colleagues. Yahya’s deputy, Gen Hamid tried to address officers in the GHQ but some of them stood up and began speaking against the high command. Hamid retreated through the back door. The anger in the military against them was also reflected in popular sentiment.

Bhutto visited Malik’s command and troops in the Hussaini Wala area. The two had “good chemistry” in their first meeting. Six months later, Malik was posted to 12 Div in Murree where he mounted an operation to recapture three mountainous posts occupied by the Indians in violation of the Line of Control. Bhutto informed Malik of his appointment as chief of the general staff. Soon after, the US ambassador called on him and hinted about “working together”. Malik recalls replying that his services were devoted to the Pak Army.

Majid Malik was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1975 and given the task of establishing the 11 Corps to defend the western border. By then, speculation had begun about the successor of the army chief. Bhutto, then prime minister, called Malik to Lahore where in the then governor Khar’s presence, he expressed the desire to appoint Malik as army chief.

This would, however, remain a promise as Lt-Gen Ziaul Haq was manoeuvring assiduously to cultivate Bhutto while heading the court martial trying the officers accused of plotting a mutiny. In order to win Bhutto’s favour, Zia – heading the Armoured Corps – in an unprecedented move made Bhutto colonel-in-chief of the corps.

Malik agonised long over Bhutto’s decision to elevate Zia as army chief. Among reasons he cites for this change of mind is that the agencies were clearly supporting Zia. Further, he quotes from ‘Bhutto and Pakistan’ by Rafi Raza, a close adviser to Bhutto, noting that Bhutto had ruled out Malik as army chief for “reasons of questionable loyalty to him”. Rafi went on to say that for similar reasons, Bhutto eliminated five other lieutenant-generals senior to Zia.

Of the six generals passed over to appoint Zia as the new army chief, only Malik and Akbar decided to resign from the army. Bhutto was concerned about their popularity in the army and kept a watch on them through intelligence agencies, and also offered to send both as envoys abroad. Gen Akbar accepted the offer to serve in Mexico. Malik refused to go as ambassador to Libya or the UAE. He was then offered ambassadorship to Morocco, where French is widely spoken, a language Malik spoke fluently.

Sensing Malik’s hesitation, Gen Raza, Secretary (administration) in the foreign ministry, invited Malik for a meeting and warned him, “Don’t be a fool. Get out of this country otherwise your life, your family’s and friends’ life will be made hell”. Malik understood the message and left for Morocco in July, 1976.

To be continued

Email: saeed.saeedk@gmail.com