A blueprint for structural reform

Before the February 2024 national elections, I had the opportunity to conduct an in-depth study of all previous elections in Pakistan.

This research was published in book form a few weeks before the election. In the concluding section of the book, I presented a few observations. First, regardless of the results, there would be no significant progress in resolving Pakistan’s perennial political crisis. Just as the eleven elections from 1970 to 2018 failed to address the country's persistent political instability, the twelfth national election would also fail in this regard.

Second, the election results would be disputed, and political parties would refuse to accept each other’s mandate, as has happened in the past. Third, conflicts over authority between electoral and administrative institutions would persist, with no correction in the imbalance in their relationships.

However, I believed that despite disputes over the elections, the newly elected national and provincial assemblies, cabinets and governments would attempt to complete their terms, as has happened in the past. The immediate political crisis might subside temporarily, but regardless of the government's performance or economic conditions, the underlying political crisis would remain unresolved. In light of these concerns, I suggested that any political respite should be leveraged to focus on fundamental structural reforms in its political framework. These structural reforms form the core subject of this article.

Before discussing structural reforms, it is essential to correctly diagnose Pakistan’s persistent political crisis, as the proposed solutions will be based on this diagnosis. The crisis stems from three main causes. One, contentious and unstable relationships between electoral and administrative institutions. Over the years, electoral processes and results have often led to tensions between institutions, which undermines the stability of any elected government.

Two, the weak organisational structure of political parties. Most political parties lack strong ideological, organizational, and democratic foundations. They suffer from internal democracy deficits and are dominated by specific individuals rather than institutional frameworks.

And, finally, electoral laws that allow governments to be formed without majority public support. Pakistan’s electoral system enables parties to form governments even without securing 50 per cent of the total votes. This results in a lack of public confidence in the electoral process and persistent political instability.

Along with these persistent factors, a new element has emerged in Pakistan’s recent political crisis -- disruptive social change. Despite the ongoing political instability, Pakistan’s economy has witnessed substantial overall growth over the past 25 years. Rapid advancements in transportation and integration into the global economy have triggered a social transformation.

The number of college and university graduates has increased dramatically, with a tenfold rise in highly educated youth in the past decade alone. This transformation has given birth to a new political class that seeks not only economic prosperity but also a role in governing it. They seek participation beyond prosperity.

While the population has surged from 150 million to 250 million, opportunities for political participation have not increased proportionally since the year 2000. As a result, there is a growing imbalance between the aspiration for power and the available seats of authority. Thus, alongside the three traditional causes of Pakistan’s chronic political crisis, a fourth factor has emerged: the impact of social transformation and the demand for political participation. Any effective solution must take this into account.

Here are some practical recommendations to take things forward. One, introduce proportional representation in elections

Future national and provincial elections should be conducted under a proportional representation system. Under this model, a party must either secure more than 50 per cent of the votes or form a coalition with like-minded parties to meet this requirement. Ensuring both a majority of seats and a majority of votes would allow national and provincial assemblies to function more harmoniously.

Proportional representation would also compel political parties to strengthen their internal structures. Each party would be required to publish a ranked list of candidates before the elections, ensuring that only the most suitable candidates, especially those with legislative expertise, secure seats. While grassroots political workers might feel sidelined, measures should be taken to address their concerns through appropriate remedial measures.

For years, all major political parties in Pakistan have included proportional representation in their manifestos. Implementing this proposal would fulfill this long-standing demand. Although there may be differences over technical details, these can be resolved through consultations among key stakeholders.

The second recommendation is to establish a Senate for each provincial assembly. Currently, Pakistan has a Senate at the national level, but a similar system should be introduced for each provincial assembly. The rationale behind this proposal lies in the demographic realities of Pakistan. Each province has a population larger than many independent nations. For example: Balochistan, despite holding only 7.0 per cent of Pakistan’s total population, has more people than most of the member countries of the European Union (EU). It has a greater population than Sweden and Norway combined. It surpasses the populations of the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Greece, and Portugal.

Similarly, several administrative divisions within Punjab and Sindh have larger populations than many European nations considered benchmarks of democracy.

Given this demographic backdrop, a well-structured Senate should be established in each province to ensure balanced representation of all the regions within it. At least six units in Punjab, four in Sindh, four in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and three in Balochistan could form the basis of these provincial Senates. This would promote consensus in decisions regarding fairly distributing governmental expenditures, revenue collection and public services, across provincial regions.

Third, introduce metropolitan governments for large administrative units. To improve governance in Pakistan’s populous provinces, ensure efficient resource utilisation and promote fiscal responsibility, all administrative units eligible for Senate representation should be given metropolitan government status. These metropolitan units would have their own elected mayor; the authority to draft regulations for administrative and financial matters; and responsibility for financial management based on their revenue-generating capacity.

If in due course, Pakistan’s four provinces collectively establish 25 such metropolitan units, each unit would govern an average of 10 million people, with variations in size. By delegating business-like responsibilities to these metropolitan governments, a system of accountable governance can be implemented. Each unit would be responsible for managing its resources and expenditures while remaining accountable to its residents.

This model aligns with democratic frameworks seen in various countries, where local governments operate successfully with significant autonomy while maintaining financial and administrative discipline.

Essentially, the roots of the current political crisis are deeper than the dispute about the results of the election in 2024.Therefore, resolving current electoral dispute alone will not resolve the crisis. The root cause of the crisis is not economic instability. Thus, improving economic conditions alone will not solve the problem.

Structural reforms in the country’s administrative and electoral framework are necessary to address Pakistan’s chronic or perennial political crisis. Without these long-term changes, temporary political crises will continue to surface and remain unaddressed by those in power.

(This article is a translation of the original Urdu article that appeared in Jang).

The writer is the chairman of the Gilani Research Foundation and a professor of international relations and politics. He holds a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).