Opposition alliance but for what?

Pakistan has a troubled history with democracy, often oscillating between civilian rule and military interventions. Opposition alliances, usually formed under the banner of restoring democracy, have paradoxically played a role in both resisting and enabling authoritarian takeovers.

Some alliances, like the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1981, opposed General Ziaul Haq’s military regime and laid the groundwork for democratic resurgence, whereas the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), formed in 1977 to implement Islamic laws and challenge what they called the 'fascist' rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, fueled chaos instead that culminated in Gen Zia’s imposition of martial law later that year.

Similarly, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), an establishment-backed alliance formed in 1988, was a blatant attempt to obstruct Benazir Bhutto’s rise to power. More recently, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), founded in 2020 as an anti-Imran Khan and anti-establishment coalition, has undergone an ideological transformation. After Imran Khan's removal in a no-trust move, the PDM – now with the inclusion of the PPP and the exclusion of Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Mehmood Khan Achakzai – has aligned itself with the establishment, a stark contrast to its initial stance.

Given these contradictory outcomes of past alliances, a critical question arises: Is the latest Grand Opposition Alliance genuinely striving for democratic restoration and civilian supremacy, or is it merely a vehicle for another power shift that could ultimately lead to military intervention?

In principle, political alliances are a constructive force in fragmented societies. They foster unity among diverse political factions, bridge ideological gaps, and amplify collective influence. The MRD, for instance, brought smaller nationalist parties to the national stage, advocating for provincial rights – a movement that eventually contributed to the passage of the 18th Amendment, which devolved greater authority to the provinces. Similarly, the 2006 Charter of Democracy (CoD) between the PPP and the PML-N was a landmark achievement, reducing military influence in politics and laying the groundwork for stable democratic transitions.

Historical precedents also illustrate how opposition alliances can be instrumental in altering governance structures. The shift from a presidential to a parliamentary system in 1973 was a direct result of concerted opposition pressure during the 1969 Round Table Conference, which compelled Gen Ayub Khan to abandon his presidential system.

However, alliances are not inherently virtuous. The 2014 Tsunami march, also called the Azadi march, and sit-in led by Imran Khan and Dr Tahirul Qadri, though framed as a democratic protest against election rigging, significantly undermined civilian governance and emboldened non-democratic forces.

If the newly proposed Grand Opposition Alliance is genuinely committed to civilian supremacy and democratic restoration, it must begin with self-accountability. The PTI, the dominant party in the alliance, must acknowledge its past missteps, including its suppression of media freedoms, the arbitrary imprisonment of political opponents, and its complicity in ceding civilian space to the establishment. An honest reckoning, accompanied by a public commitment to uphold democratic values, is essential for the alliance to gain credibility. Without this, the opposition’s struggle will appear as nothing more than a power grab.

Furthermore, a successful alliance requires more than just a shared desire to oust the current government. It must articulate a concrete strategy to strengthen democratic institutions, restore constitutional supremacy, and protect civil liberties. This entails developing a clear policy framework, advocating for legal and constitutional reforms, and ensuring that their movement does not merely serve as a temporary arrangement for political expediency.

The most glaring weakness of the new opposition alliance lies in its internal contradictions. While it purports to challenge the alleged rigging in the 2024 elections, its member parties offer conflicting narratives. The PTI insists that electoral fraud was limited to Punjab and Karachi, thereby excluding Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) from its allegations. In contrast, Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) accuses the PTI of orchestrating rigging in KP, creating an irreconcilable divergence in their claims.

Similarly, leadership ambitions threaten to destabilise the alliance. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, a former prime minister, would naturally aspire to reclaim the premiership to implement economic reforms, yet the PTI is unlikely to endorse anyone other than Imran Khan. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, known for his political manoeuvring, has long harboured aspirations to become president of Pakistan, an ambition he would expect the PTI to endorse. However, given the PTI’s precarious position, it lacks the leverage to make such promises. These competing interests make long-term cohesion unlikely.

The alliance also faces a practical dilemma in KP, where the PTI and JUI are direct electoral rivals. The region has historically been a two-party contest between them, making a one-to-one electoral arrangement nearly impossible. High-profile figures like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur and Maulana Fazlur Rehman himself are set to clash in the same constituencies. Even if a compromise is forced, it risks creating a vacuum that could be filled by a third political force, similar to how PTI capitalised on the political space left by the CoD agreement between PML-N and PPP.

Another wildcard in the alliance is Mehmood Khan Achakzai, a seasoned politician with a strong nationalist stance. While personally inclined towards reconciliation, his anti-establishment rhetoric has made him a contentious figure. His longstanding alliance with Nawaz Sharif from the 1990s until 2018 has now turned into a direct rivalry. The PTI, which has struggled to accommodate independent-minded leaders, has already sidelined Achakzai in key negotiations, signalling potential fractures within the alliance. His limited autonomy in engaging with major political figures like Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari underscores the PTI’s reluctance to delegate authority, further weakening the coalition’s coherence.

A significant internal struggle within the alliance revolves around control and decision-making. PTI leaders Asad Qaiser, Umar Ayub Khan and Barrister Gohar have reassured allies with diplomatic overtures, but Imran Khan, operating from prison, insists on micromanaging the coalition. This centralised control has stalled progress and prevented the alliance from evolving into an effective political platform. The lack of cohesion has already cost the opposition dearly; the passage of the 26th Constitutional Amendment is a glaring example of how governmental initiatives continue unchallenged due to the opposition’s disarray.

For the alliance to be meaningful, the PTI must extend full trust to its partners and empower them to negotiate effectively. If it continues to operate under a contradictory policy – seeking alliance benefits while simultaneously resisting internal compromises – it will remain an ineffective force. However, if the PTI commits to genuine collaboration, the alliance could become a formidable political entity, both within parliament and on the streets. The choice is theirs to make.

The writer is the editor of Jang in Lahore, an anchor, and the executive director at Geo TV.