Countering terror — beyond labels

During the past few weeks, terrorists affiliated with the TTP), Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) have been referred to by Pakistani authorities as Khawarij. This term, rooted in early Islamic history (7th century), was used to describe a rebellious group that declared caliphs as infidels, rejected their authority, and perpetrated violence against mainstream Muslims.

The Khawarij were notorious for their extremist proclamations, branding anyone who disagreed with their views as heretics and beyond the pale of the law. They believed that those who did not conform to their interpretation of religion were apostates and thus legitimate targets for violence. In support of their actions, they frequently cited the Quranic verse directing believers “to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong”.

The Khawarij ideology has reappeared throughout Islamic history with cyclical regularity. They led numerous rebellions and continued to be a source of insurrection. Mainstream scholars consistently condemned them.

Most Muslims today reject violence and terrorism, adhering to the Quran and various schools of Islamic law that forbid the killing of innocent civilians and law enforcement personnel. They uphold the belief that Islam’s central message is peace. In the present era, the influence of Khawarij ideology is evident in groups subscribing to the doctrines of the Taliban, Bin Laden, or Daesh. Thus, TTP, AQ, and ISKP can aptly be termed Neo-Kharijites.

This discourse reinforces the rationale behind labeling these terrorists as Khawarij, as it strengthens the counter-narrative to the terrorists’ ideology. However, questions remain: does this measure, coupled with rhetorical promises and expressions of resolve to send terrorists to hell, suffice? Additionally, where is the comprehensive counter-narrative against terrorism and extremism, and how is it being disseminated to the public, particularly to disillusioned youth?

The national counter-narrative available on the Nacta website primarily relies on the Paigham-e-Pakistan fatwa, which focuses on condemning acts of terrorism, including suicide bombings and other violent means, as being against the tenets of Islam. However, it fails to address broader aspects, such as Islam’s alignment with democratic principles and the concept of nation-states being compatible with Islamic teachings.

It also does not emphasise that matters such as blasphemy, apostasy, and disbelief fall under the jurisdiction of the state and not individuals. The narrative is also silent on Islam’s teachings regarding peace, as well as its social and economic dimensions. Moreover, the propagation and publicity of the national counter-narrative against terrorism and extremism through electronic and print media remain inadequate.

Religiously motivated acts of terrorism are predominantly concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Quetta, and surrounding areas, where groups like TTP, AQ, and ISKP are active. These organisations aim to gain territorial control in the newly merged districts of the erstwhile Fata, with their primary objective being the establishment of an Islamic state or caliphate. Their main targets include law-enforcement agencies, Shias, minorities, political leaders, and political gatherings.

In the rest of Balochistan, however, subversive activities are largely carried out by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and other militant nationalist groups seeking the secession of the province from Pakistan. Their targets include security forces, individuals from other ethnic backgrounds, mine workers, goods transport vehicles, railway infrastructure, and Sui gas installations.

According to Nacta, the alarming surge in terrorist acts across the country in 2024 saw 1,566 violent incidents resulting in the martyrdom of 925 law enforcement personnel (LEAs) and civilians by October. This marks a significant increase compared to the 1,284 incidents and 771 martyrdoms reported during the same period last year, reflecting a 22 percent rise in incidents and a 20 per cent increase in casualties. Of these, 60 per cent occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and 37 per cent in Balochistan, making these two provinces the most vulnerable to such acts. Exploiting the situation, terrorist organisations have resorted to illegal activities such as smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom to fund their operations.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts have been ongoing for decades, with varying degrees of success since 2001. Numerous military operations have been launched to combat terrorism, achieving reasonable results, but they have failed to develop into a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Political instability and corruption have further undermined the effectiveness of the fragmented plans implemented so far.

Combating insurgency and terrorism requires a multifaceted approach that combines kinetic and non-kinetic measures. The troubled regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan remain among the nation’s most impoverished areas. In KP, people demand the fulfillment of promises regarding development in the newly merged districts, rehabilitation of displaced populations, the revival of border trade, and freedom of movement. They also advocate for the police to take a leading role in countering insurgency and terrorism.

In Balochistan, the foremost demand is genuine representation of the people in the provincial government, as opposed to the ever-increasing de facto power of the establishment. The state is accused of systematically neglecting their needs and exploiting their resources, which fuels feelings of betrayal and deprivation. Socioeconomic injustice and widespread discontent drive disillusioned youth toward subversive activities. The government’s harsh response to peaceful protests in Gwadar and other areas, coupled with the forced disappearances of many Baloch activists, has deepened distrust and strengthened support for separatist sentiments.

In both provinces, external factors also contribute to the unrest. Rebel Baloch leaders maintain strong ties with India. A notable case is that of Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Jhadav, who was apprehended in Balochistan a few years ago on charges of espionage and terrorism. Additionally, Pakistani agencies have documented evidence of Indian intelligence agencies aiding the BLA, TTP, and other terrorist groups.

The state’s policy of branding non-militant organisations like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) as enemy agents is profoundly misguided. Their demands call for sincere engagement, avoiding negative labeling and marginalisation. Failure to include them in constructive dialogue will only exacerbate existing tensions.

To effectively combat insurgency and terrorism, intelligence-based kinetic operations must be improved by establishing robust mechanisms for intelligence sharing and coordination among various civilian and military agencies. Once areas are cleared of insurgents, the lead role should be handed over to the police, with support from paramilitary forces and the army, as practiced in most democracies. Gradually merging the tribal areas of KP and Punjab, along with the ‘B areas’ of Balochistan, into the mainstream administrative system would help eliminate insurgents’ hiding places and ensure uniform governance.

In the non-kinetic domain, establishing bilateral border trade zones at crossing points along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, modeled after the Gabd-Rimdan trade zone on the Pakistan-Iran border, could significantly boost local economies. Such zones, which facilitate trade in local currencies, generate government revenue through taxes and duties while creating employment opportunities. For instance, the yearly trade volume at the Pakistan-Iran border market is approximately Rs12.6 billion, contributing Rs2.5 billion in revenue and creating 5,000–7,000 jobs.

Other critical measures include the development of infrastructure, improved health and education facilities in troubled regions, and reduced interference by military institutions in local affairs. Long-delayed madrassah reforms outlined in the revised National Action Plan should be implemented to cut off recruitment pipelines for terrorist organisations. Enlightened Islamic scholar Javed Ahmad Ghamdi has proposed making a minimum of intermediate-level general education mandatory before undertaking Dars-e-Nizami, the six-year course required to become an alim.

Regarding Balochistan, there are “no simple solutions or quick fixes”, as noted by public policy specialist Rafiullah Kakar in a recent article. He argues that confidence-building measures (CBMs) could lay the groundwork for future political engagement. At a minimum, these CBMs should include ensuring genuine political representation, ending enforced disappearances, and reducing reliance on force. Such measures could pave the way for political reconciliation, without which, he warns, “the future of Balochistan looks bleak”.

The writer is a retired inspector general of police and former

caretaker home minister of Punjab.