A fragile reset

On October 15-16, 2024, India’s Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar visited Islamabad for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit.

This marked the first visit by an Indian minister to Pakistan since 2015, following nearly a decade of strained relations. Jaishankar’s trip fueled speculation that India-Pakistan tensions might ease. Although he clarified beforehand that the visit was purely for multilateral engagement, he remarked that he would “behave himself”. This intent was somewhat reflected in his relatively measured statements during the summit, which had a calming effect.

Other factors, such as Canada and the US’s revelations about alleged transnational terrorist activities by Indian government agents, may have also influenced this cautious approach.

Shortly after the visit, both countries announced the extension of the November 2019 agreement, ensuring visa-free access to the Kartarpur Sahib Corridor for Sikh pilgrims until October 2029. While this renewal may have been in the works before Jaishankar’s visit, its timing suggested an emerging optimism in bilateral relations. With India under scrutiny for its treatment of Sikhs, opposition to the agreement’s renewal could have added to the country’s challenges. These developments hinted at a possible softening of India’s stance and raised hopes for some form of engagement after years of animosity.

Further bolstering this perception were gestures by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the 2024 election season. Speculation had been rife that Modi might take bold steps toward engagement with Pakistan to bolster his legacy, as previous Indian prime ministers had done in their final terms. Notably, his election campaign eschewed the anti-Pakistan rhetoric that had been prevalent during the 2019 elections.

Following Jaishankar’s visit, attention shifted to the Indian cricket team’s potential participation in the ICC Champions Trophy in Pakistan. Such a move was viewed as a low-risk opportunity to break the deadlock in bilateral relations. However, this optimism remained wishful thinking.

It remains unrealistic to expect India to engage in constructive dialogue with Pakistan to resolve long-standing disputes. Since the far-right, Hindutva-led BJP government came to power in 2014, India’s stance towards Pakistan has grown increasingly rigid, with little willingness to compromise. This intransigence is partly a product of India’s expanding global influence and its positioning as the ‘net security provider’ in the Indo-Pacific construct.

India appears interested in engaging with Pakistan only when it aligns with its strategic goals. For example, the Line of Control (LoC) ceasefire agreement has remained intact largely because of the ongoing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China since the 2020 Galwan Crisis. Avoiding a two-front conflict has necessitated India’s adherence to the ceasefire with Pakistan.

While India and China recently reached a patrolling agreement after four years of standoff and 21 rounds of military discussions, the details of the arrangement remain unclear. This lack of trust ensures that India’s relations with both Pakistan and China over disputed territories will remain precarious.

India’s persistent push to “review and modify” the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty further underscores the fragility of its relations with Pakistan. The treaty, which governs the sharing of water resources between the two nations, has come under pressure as India seeks to meet the rising demands of its growing settler population in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) rejecting India’s objections to the treaty in April last year, India boycotted the proceedings and questioned the court’s legitimacy. In September 2024, India issued a second formal notice to Pakistan, reiterating its demand for a review and modification of the 64-year-old treaty. This underscores India’s disregard for international arbitration and its hydropower projects’ apparent violations of treaty provisions.

Discussions on trade and environmental issues, such as smog, have also surfaced. However, these conversations have yielded little progress. Pakistan suspended trade relations with India following the latter’s illegal and unilateral actions in August 2019, which included revoking Occupied Jammu and Kashmir’s special constitutional status.

While some Indian analysts have called for the restoration of high commissioners to each other’s capitals, such steps seem improbable until tensions ease. Meanwhile, New Delhi has shown little urgency in addressing the regional smog crisis, which has severe implications for both nations.

For dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad to occur, it must be based on mutually acceptable terms, not just on India’s demands. Pakistan remains steadfast in its legal and moral positions on key issues, particularly the reversal of Articles 370 and 35A, as well as the broader Kashmir issue.

India’s assumption that its growing geopolitical clout can coerce Pakistan into concessions is misguided. A review of the past two years reveals that India’s international reputation has suffered significantly, particularly in light of allegations of transnational misconduct.

Looking ahead, India must abandon its politicisation of issues such as trade and sports if it genuinely seeks to improve relations with Pakistan. Jaishankar’s visit to Islamabad was a significant diplomatic moment, but the responsibility for recalibrating bilateral relations now rests squarely on New Delhi.

For its part, Pakistan must avoid projecting urgency in resolving these tensions. The deep-seated animosity of the past decade – and indeed, the past seven decades – cannot be resolved overnight. Islamabad must, therefore, exercise strategic patience and remain measured in its approach.

The writer is a research analyst in emerging technologies and international security. She tweets/posts @MaheenShafeeq