Two Americas, one election

The upcoming US presidential election may arguably be one of the most consequential in the country’s history. It is like a referendum on the future of democracy in America, if not on the country itself.

A deeply divided nation faces challenging domestic issues and a complex geopolitical situation. And there is no national consensus on how to cope with them. The main issues in this election are: economy, immigration, women’s reproductive rights, democracy and rule of law, the global role of the US and its foreign policy challenges like China and the ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East.

It is a measure of the polarisation of society that each side has chosen its slate of preferred election issues on which it has an advantage. No wonder the campaign is marked more by attacks on each other’s policies than spelling out policy alternatives. It is a campaign singularly lacking in specifics and a true national debate on issues, largely because of Trump’s strategy to rely on lies, conspiracy theories and vicious attacks on the Democrats and Kamala Harris.

In a report on October 9, The New York Times has tabulated these insults as follows. “Ms Harris is a ‘lunatic’, ‘mentally disabled’ and ‘a Marxist, communist, fascist person’. Mr Biden, meanwhile, is ‘crooked’ and ‘doesn’t know he’s alive’. Barack and Michelle Obama are ‘nasty people’ Nancy Pelosi, the former House speaker, is ‘crazy as a bedbug’. Liberals ‘want to destroy our country’.”

The polarisation did not start with Trump. He merely exploited it and made it worse as he found it beneficial to his political ambitions. The post-cold war hubris of the unipolar moment, the euphoria of the ‘end of history’, and liberal triumphalism’s nexus with globalisation went on to create enormous world prosperity.

But along with the prosperity came a new breed of global elite and concentration of wealth in the hands of what has become known as the top one per cent. While Republicans and Democrats, each tied to its base and special interests, vied for political power with the help of partisan media, sections of the population felt marginalised or short-changed. The price of this neglect: the 2008 financial crisis.

Globalisation and exploitation by domestic elites joined the migration and refugee crisis in creating job losses, social discontent and cultural shocks, and brought class consciousness to the Western shores, first in Europe and then in the US where the lower classes, especially the white and the uneducated, felt victimised and excluded at the hands of forces they did not understand.

Economic anxieties, aggravated by the threat to security from terrorism after 9/11, and by the perceived loss of identity among White Americans – incited by the shifting demographics and the rise of Black activism reflected in the election of a black president – prompted the discontented to look for scapegoats.

This gave rise to xenophobia, especially Islamophobia, and instigated a sentiment of ‘whites only’ at home and ‘America First’ abroad. Trump successfully tapped into all this and nourished the nostalgia for the original identity of America and a yearning for some strongman who could be tough with the terrorists and with countries like China and Nato allies that were taking advantage of the US.

Republican supporters, more radicalised than their Democratic counterparts, were particularly receptive to Trump’s ‘genius’ for insurgent politics. This was where their grievances found a home which Trump effectively tapped into. His most powerful rallying cry was: “We are going to take our country back”.

Different people supported Trump for different reasons – and they may vote again, helping him possibly win – but one theme was common: they were all supporting him to overthrow a system that they felt had let them down. They thought they were launching a ‘revolution’. Trump fomented their belief that politicians and politics had failed them.

Kamala Harris, a traditional politician, will basically follow conventional politics and Biden’s policies which reflect the mainstream Democratic agenda as modified to some degree on the one hand by the progressive wing led by Bernie Sanders, and on the other by the Trump rhetoric in support of the working class and attacks on China. Harris will favour higher taxes on the corporate sector, continue Biden’s shift towards green energy and his industrial policy, child tax credit, healthcare and childcare not to mention the improvement of infrastructure.

But she cannot achieve these objectives without Congressional support which would depend on a Democratic majority in the Congress which is uncertain. Democrats have a tough fight on their hands in maintaining their slim lead in the Senate.

The dysfunctional politics of recent years during which each political party spoke for a different America and focused on laws that favoured its constituency – the so-called base – and the other party refused to cooperate, will make policy consensus difficult. Democrats and Republicans have been drifting apart and there is no meeting ground. There are no overlapping areas to facilitate cooperation.

Elections, especially tight ones, are often decided by independent voters, not by the base of each party. The base is not enough. Right now, the independents are concerned by a lack of specificity in Kamala’s policy prescriptions and the state of the economy, particularly high prices. Harris has another problem. The Muslim voters in some of the swing states, especially Michigan, are deeply unhappy with the Biden administration’s support for the massacre in the Middle East.

Kamala Harris has said little about foreign policy or given few specifics of her domestic policies but these like her foreign policy will be a continuation of Biden's policies. To Biden’s credit, his policies have led to a robust economy. American employers added 254,000 jobs last month. The number was higher than the average monthly gain of 203,000 over the previous 12 months. The unemployment rate came down to 4.1 per cent. Whether it leads to better electorate sentiment remains open to question.

The problem is that the general public sees the economy not the way economists look at it but in emotional terms, and inflation which continues – though at a lower rate – has evoked strong public emotions about the economy. A popular feeling triggered by inflation and high interest rates is that the economy is not working for most people. That gives Trump an advantage. Similarly, all these wars give an appearance of chaos which is being blamed by Trump on Biden. He evokes positive emotions by his disingenuous and counterfactual claim that had he been president these things would not have happened. Much of his campaign is based on blatant lies.

Trump framed his personal quest for power as part of a broader struggle, convincing his followers that their fight was his fight. By echoing their fears and desires, he created the illusion that he spoke for them, fostering a sense of authenticity. To many, he seemed to ‘say it like it is’, which made him appear honest and relatable. They do not realise that Trumpism is all about Trump. He is not in it for them but for himself.

At the core of Trump's belief system is authoritarianism, and the concept of free market capitalism neither bound by regulations nor burdened by taxes based on naked exploitation unrestrained by regard to environment or consumer protection. Yet his populism has taken up the cause of ordinary folks against the elitist system.

While paying lip service to assail the exploitation by the corporate sector, his real assault is not against the corporate elite but liberal institutions like the media, the justice system, and the Democrats – especially progressive politicians who are concerned about income inequality, climate change, racial injustice, and gun violence. He calls them elitist and “enemies of the people” or the “radical left”. He claims he is going to “save the country” from them.

Regardless of the election’s outcome, America’s crisis will not be easily resolved. Whether Trump loses or wins, it will not mark the end of the nation’s troubles. He is both a bad loser and a dangerous winner. If Trump wins the election, it will show an America clearly in decline. If Harris wins, it will be a sign there might still be some hope for the country in the long run.

The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor at Georgetown University and visiting seniorresearch fellow at the National University of Singapore.