Cutting ‘Chotus’down to size

The Punjab police’s failure to apprehend the outlaws in the Indus riverine area, and the subsequent army action that led to the surrender of the so-called Chotu gang, highlight the need for a better police force and an inter-provincial effort to curb the menace of gangsters along the Indus River.

The fact that a large police force failed to subdue a local band of dacoits and that the army overwhelmed the group by employing gunship helicopters and artillery shows how powerful the gang had become. Had the state managed to tackle gang in time, this menace would not have grown to the level that an action against it appeared to be a mini-war.

Before this episode, the Punjab government was in a state of denial about the existence of outlaws’ sanctuaries in southern Punjab. For the past year, the Punjab government had been resisting the demands of the Punjab apex committee that the Rangers should be deployed to hunt down criminals and militants in the southern districts of the province.

The Lahore park massacre forced the provincial government to act. The Punjab police went into the marshy thickets of the Rajanpur and Rahim Yar Khan districts all by themselves, ignoring the fact that in the past five years, three different police campaigns against the same gangs had failed miserably.

Initially, the provincial government did not want to call the Rangers and the army. The apprehension was that it would give the impression that the civil administration was weak and incapable of maintaining law and order. When the Chotu gang brought the police to its knees by killing seven police officials and abducting 24 others, the administration had to fall back upon the army.

It is obvious that the police are not trained to take on a group like the Chotu gang, which was heavily armed with sophisticated weapons and had the advantage of sanctuaries in the middle of the Indus River. There is a riverine (katcha) area with a forest on the eastern side and the Koh-e-Suleman mountain on the western bank. The outlaws had built their bunkers on the islands in the river, which could be smashed using artillery.

Given the nature of the territory, any action cannot be conducted without an aerial surveillance and thorough intelligence. Both were missing. A provincial government that spends billions of rupees on fleets of expensive cars for the high-ups, can’t buy, or at least hire, a few helicopters for the police. Private television stations can afford to use drones for reporting events, but the police do not have this facility.

The riverine belt, spread over hundreds of kilometres along the Indus River from southern Punjab to Hyderabad in Sindh, is a traditional sanctuary for gangs known for committing highway robberies, abduction for ransom and extortion from traders. Dozens of big and small islands in the middle of the river (some of them do not get submerged, even during moderate floods) provide ideal hideouts to criminals. The Indus River is up to 11 kilometres wide at certain places.

Most of these dacoits living in the Indus are sons of the soil and Robin Hood-like characters, popular among their tribes. Mostly Baloch tribes inhabit this belt, which is located at the confluence of the three provinces of Punjab, Balochistan and Sindh. The state has paid little attention to the economic and human development of this backward region. There is no electricity or access to clean drinking water. There are no schools or hospitals. Most people survive on the bare minimum. How can one expect them to be loyal to the state and not to the dacoits who help them?

Local politicians and big landlords are alleged to have clandestine ties to these criminals. The local politicians patronise criminals, who in turn assist them – through strong arm tactics – in perpetuating their hold in the constituency. However, this kind of collusion is not exclusive to the riverine belt but prevails in the rural areas across the province. This nexus can be broken if the police are made free of political influence.

Since the 1980s, the proliferation of arms and the narcotics trade have both further boosted the Indus gangs. In the past decade, faster means of communication have connected the gangs with sectarian and ethnic militants – the former have facilities of safe havens, while the latter have expertise in manufacturing and supplying arms and ammunition. This convergence has made both even more lethal.

Time and again, Punjab and Sindh have separately started action against the Indus dacoits, but have never succeeded in eliminating this problem. When the Punjab police chase them, they flee to the south and when the Sindh police take them on, they shift to the north. When a don gets killed, another emerges. A little while ago, Sindh’s notorious brigand Nazro Narejo was shot dead in a clash with the police, but he was soon succeeded by Sultan Salfu Shar, who dominates the territory these days.

For the time being, the army has cleansed southern Punjab of the Chotu gang, but this achievement may prove to be short-lived, unless a simultaneous operation is carried out in the northern districts of Sindh, where dozens of dacoits are thriving. As soon as the military and paramilitary forces pull out of southern Punjab, the gangs in Sindh will extend their activities towards the north.

This is not a one-time job. A joint force of Sindh and Punjab needs to keep a constant eye on the riverine belt stretching from Muzaffargarh district to Hyderabad district. Aerial surveillance of the riverine region and choking the supply of arms and ammunition to the outlaws are essential to make this territory safe. Until the provincial governments can build the capacity of their police forces to meet these kinds of challenges, they should not be shy of seeking the army’s support; public safety is more important than any other concern.

Email: adnanadilzaidi@gmail.com