Becoming all-season partners: Part - II

In global diplomacy, the dance of US-Pakistan relations has followed an erratic stop-and-go. As the US-Pakistan interplay becomes wilder and more unpredictable, the relationship is at a critical juncture and the music may stop.

As a Harvard Kennedy School graduate, with fellow students and professors having served in past and present US administrations, I returned from my recent trip catching up with some of them with insights into the future of US-Pakistan relations.

Our pursuit of a robust partnership with the US rests on the diversification of our common interests with three powerful ideological or lobbying groups within the US. These interest groups are within the US government, media or corporations representing human rights, commerce, and the defence industry.

A multi-dimensional relationship from our security-centric engagement is necessary to diversify our areas of mutual interest and have a buffer against the political headwinds in Washington DC.

We are guilty of being pessimistic by taking a Pakistan-centric view, instead of understanding the wider context of global developments and realizing that our bilateral relationship is a consequence of the global context. For example, Washington has the feel of a capital under siege from China. This fear of China’s rise is tightly embraced by the new leadership of the US State Department and the National Security Council.

But realist foreign policy thinkers like Thomas Pickering and Joe Nye believe that the China threat is not immediate, nor a conflict with China inevitable. However, the belief of a do-or-die situation in countering China among the new generation of foreign policy thinkers is increasing the shrill rhetoric and severity of US reaction in Ukraine as well as the Middle East.

We must analyze US policy responses to Pakistan in the context of the Great Game between the US and China, and try to position ourselves more strategically. The US pivot towards India as its regional ally to counterbalance China is its necessity in the Great Game. Therefore, the US attitude towards us will be determined by how supportive or at least non-disruptive Pakistan is towards India.

The extent of US leverage over India to stand up to China is uncertain because the ruling Brahmins view themselves as an emerging superpower and might not play second fiddle to the US. But for now, the US is betting on India. This is realpolitik, and instead of an emotional response we should objectively choose our counter-policy based on self-interest and our capabilities.

The prevailing view in Washington post the Afghanistan withdrawal is that “there is no upside in dealing with Pakistan. And there is a similarly limited downside from ignoring it”. It can be described as “indifference, bordering on mild irritation”. This US sentiment is largely due to the outcome of the Afghanistan war, but it also shows that as a nation we are unable to offer additional value other than our security role in the region.

The current disillusionment towards Pakistan is primarily driven by a senior US administration official, fuelled by 20 years of his perceived or real grievance of engaging Pakistan on Afghanistan with little or no results. This is cited as the main obstacle to a phone call or invitation to the Pakistan leadership to visit Washington.

Whilst many painted this episode as personal tension between the leaders of the two countries, it was more a reflection of a senior official’s disillusionment towards the history of US-Pakistan engagement. And it is unlikely to change during the tenure of the Biden Administration.

Further adding to the adverse environment for Pakistan is the strong perception that Pakistan is firmly embedded in China’s camp. My counter to this opinion was that Pakistani elites have consistently sided with the West because their family and business interests are aligned with the US.

The US-Pakistan partnership is redeemable but for that the fear in Pakistan needs to be addressed that reliance on the US will result in Pakistan becoming fragmented and strife-ridden like Afghanistan rather than prosperous and peaceful like West Germany under the Marshall Plan.

Vietnam is an example of the dangers of misunderstood motives and dis-engagement! Many decades after the Vietnam war, in an insightful documentary titled ‘Fog of War’, former US secretary of defence Robert McNamara conceded that the basic assumption of US intervention that a North Vietnamese victory will create a natural ally of the Communists was wrong. The Vietnamese were culturally and historically opposed to China and in fact it was the US intervention that flipped Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia into communist states. These were unintended but drastic consequences of not listening or engaging.

McNamara’s testimony highlights the importance of understanding the geo-strategic compulsions of both sides. Overcoming Pakistan and America’s mutual distrust through the now discontinued US-Pakistan strategic dialogue is imperative.

On our part, we need to give up our victim mindset and overreliance on the security rationale for the US to ally with us. We need to build relationships on the soft power of art, human rights and culture, and envision becoming a valuable partner in technology, commerce and wealth creation. Only a multi-dimensional nation can maintain alliances with the changing tides of the Great Game between China and the US.

Concluded

The writer is a venture builder, a private equity investor and investment banker. He tweets/posts @AhmadJalal_1