COP28: Pakistan’s narrative-Part - II

Pakistan's climate narrative is one of victimhood, shaped by the severe and disproportionate impact it faces, despite being a low emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG).

The country ranks fifth in the Global Climate Risk Index (CRI) – up from eighth place just a few years ago. The floods of 2022 alone inflicted an estimated $33 billion in damages and reconstruction costs, equivalent to approximately 10 per cent of GDP within a few months.

With a population of 241 million people, a growth rate of 2.55, and a median age of 22.8 years, Pakistan boasts one of the youngest and largest youth populations globally. The conversation often revolves around the latent potential of Pakistan, envisioning a transformative moment when all the right factors align to propel the nation into a new era of prosperity and innovation.

However, this anticipated moment never seems to materialize. Much has been waxed lyrical about what needs to change: tackling corruption, dismantling deep-seated elite capture, comprehensive education reform, bolstering healthcare and infrastructure, implementing a robust and inclusive social protection system, improving, and incentivizing the tax net, expanding export-oriented industries, and perhaps most importantly, ensuring political and policy continuity. None of these conversations are new, and the Pakistani youth, increasingly disenfranchised, await that change.

This game of patience extends to the international community. The gravity with which Pakistan approaches climate change not only impacts its own resilience and sustainability but also shapes the global narrative on climate action, determining whether Pakistan is perceived as a responsible player on the international stage.

The question arises: while acknowledging Pakistan as a low emitter of GHG suffering disproportionately from the effects of climate change, is the country genuinely committed to putting its own house in order?

Pakistan has implemented various policies and mechanisms in response to the climate crisis, notably the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) and National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy (NDRRP), aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the objectives of the Convention on Climate Change. Additionally, frameworks like the Framework for Implementation of the Climate Change Policy, National Adaptation Plan (NAP), and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) are in place.

On paper, the Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC) is supported by numerous bodies and departments contributing to the climate conversation, such as the Global Change Impact Studies Centre (GCISC), National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak-EPA), Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD), Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC), Federal Flood Commission (FFC), and Indus River System Authority (IRSA) – the official list is as expansive as the day is long.

However, a crucial missing element – especially after the 18th Amendment devolved powers to sub-national governments – are climate change departments at the provincial level. Without a provincial counterpart to the MoCC, there is a significant gap in translating Pakistan's international commitments into actionable initiatives on the ground. This becomes evident in the context of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), where Pakistan commits to a 50 per cent reduction in emissions, contingent on external support, without a mechanism for provincial implementation.

Ideally, Provincial Transport Departments (PTDs) should contribute to emission reduction, given the presence of the Electric Vehicle Policy (EVP). However, PTDs prioritize vehicle registration as a tax collection exercise, neglecting emissions control, while the EVP only applies to three-wheeled vehicles and below.

To be taken seriously in its internal efforts to combat climate change, Pakistan must prioritize the establishment of sub-national climate change departments. While there is a movement to reshape provincial environment protection departments in Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for this purpose, the emergent structures must be empowered, not overburdened. Thus, Pakistan’s international narrative on climate change, particularly at forums like COP28, is also a function of its internal commitment, first and foremost to its people, to combat the devastating and debilitating effects of climate change.

Part III will delve into the key narrative adjustments Pakistan ought to make when it comes to its international stance on climate change.

To be continued

The writer is the Director for the Center for Regional and Global Connectivity at Tabadlab, Pakistan. He tweets/posts @zeesalahuddin, and can be reached at:

zeeshan.salahuddin@gmail.com