Normalizing ties with India

The question often comes up, especially among the young generation, why Pakistan has to remain on bad terms with India. This would have been a perfectly legitimate question a decade or so back when both sides were invested in the status quo. But now Pakistan seems open to change, India is not.

Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has returned to Pakistan after six years of self-imposed exile and in his very public speech he promised to reach out to the country’s neighbours. He tried to do this during his last tenure but it cost him his job. The powers that be without whose blessing he could not have returned from exile may be more open to Nawaz Sharif’s foreign policy this time.

Former COAS Gen Bajwa recognized this reality though he may have expressed it poorly. His remarks “let us forget the past” at the Islamabad Security Dialogue in February 2021 were taken by India as a sign of weakness. Unsurprisingly, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar has since been calling Pakistan “irrelevant”.

India was not always dismissive like that. Surely it has come a long way from its embarrassing status as an unconvincing regional power to which Pakistan had the pretensions to speak as an ‘equal’, enabling it to attract US and Western attention to itself, and to the Kashmir dispute. With its economic rise, nuclear capability (enhanced by the US-India nuclear deal), rising status in IT (worth $250 billion), Pakistan ‘s precipitous decline due to internal failures and erosion in its ability to challenge India , and the US, Japan and Australia’s obsession to contain China, a whole new door has opened for India to being a global player. Prime Minister Modi’s ruthlessness has also played a part in leaving behind, what Raja Mohan calls, India’s hesitations of the past, enabling India to fully grab global attention.

While India is now a global player, the geopolitical environment on which Pakistan had banked all these decades to define its value for big powers is no more. No wonder the world’s attention has deserted Pakistan. As Pakistan loses, so does Kashmir.

By his Aug 5, 2019 action, Prime Minister Modi has stripped Pakistan of its locus standi on the Kashmir dispute, having earlier brought internal and external pressure on it to back away from supporting the Kashmiris. He has put the dispute beyond Pakistan’s diplomatic reach. In fact he does not even want to talk to Pakistan on Kashmir or any other issue unless the dialogue is on his terms.

There is an opinion in Pakistan that India might return to dialogue after the 2024 elections. This prospect would have been realistic if electoral politics were the only reason India did not want to talk. The fact is that when it comes to Pakistan, New Delhi has an exceptional policy not dependent on a single factor.

The India-Pakistan relationship is like none other and it remains marred by lingering tensions rooted in religion, culture and identity, and conflicting versions of history and war. History, ideology, and domestic politics have fostered divisiveness. Hostility towards Pakistan reflects the core tenet of the RSS towards Muslims, Kashmir and Pakistan, and is central to Hindutva.

Modi has played up the alleged militant attacks from across the border to harden the traditional public attitudes towards Pakistan and enhance domestic support for his agenda. The attacks in Pathankot in January 2016 and Uri in September 2016 blamed by India on extremists had triggered an enormous emotional response of the Indian citizenry and changed everything.

Marketing-savvy and skilled in the use of digital tools, Modi tapped into the traditional nationalist ideology of his party and exploited the issue of terrorism to his political advantage. The issue also helped Modi gain his military’s support. India has risen and so has its military’s ambitions. The overblown threat of terrorism has broadened the scope of conflict and enlarged the concept of national security elevating the military’s national profile.

Enmity with Pakistan thus serves many purposes, interests, and stakeholders domestically for India. As for foreign policy, Modi’s negativity towards Pakistan adds to India’s value in the containment of China and is thus an asset in his relations with the US. And, finally, challenging Pakistan especially on CPEC gives him leverage against both China and Pakistan. There is a logic to India’s Pakistan policy.

This is a moment for reflection by Pakistan. The reality is that Prime Minister Modi has changed the India-Pakistan equation. On Kashmir, Pakistan has been reduced to the status of a bystander. The opportunities that a conflicted relationship with India had provided to help the Kashmir cause, such as a diplomatic campaign against India, and the military option have all but vanished. Nor is Pakistan – that was once a factor in the resolution of the dispute – the same.

Pakistan has to recognize that India is not going to talk till such time that Pakistan takes the lead in giving concessions on issues of interest to India, principally Kashmir. These concessions no longer relate to the solution of the dispute since India feels it has already solved it without Pakistan’s help. India would now like Pakistan to accept the new reality.

Pakistan does not have any leverage on Kashmir now. It will have to create one. That will come with, not without, relations. If India rejects Pakistan’s overtures, Pakistan should leave it at that, rather than beseeching India for a dialogue. If a country is not even willing to talk, you can hardly expect it to give any concessions.

Assuming that the dialogue does take place and leads to some basic normalization, we need to be clear what this normalization will and will not do. It is said that it would be beneficial to Pakistan’s economy, especially if economic relations resume. But the fact is that the real benefit to Pakistan’s economy can only come from an integrated South Asia market linked to Central Asia through a peaceful and stable Afghanistan and a globally engaged Iran providing an environment for pipelines and transit trade. That is nowhere in sight.

That leaves only bilateral trade as the only viable economic relationship for now. If our economic experts feel it would be beneficial then Pakistan should not hesitate. To an ordinary observer, however, it seems the lack of an economic relationship with India is only a small part of the problems of Pakistan’s economy that has deep structural issues. Opening up the economy to India may likewise play only a small part in its revival. Yet the move might be necessary to entice India into normalization.

Once initial normalization through trade takes place then Pakistan can start calibrating the level of engagement like upgrading of economic ties to transit etc – not only to exert some influence on India in regard to Kashmir but also other issues. India has its complaints, Pakistan its own. The first step may not bring benefits but without it further steps that might bring benefits will not take place.

The bottom-line is: what purpose is the conflicted relationship serving anyway? Pakistan is secure enough to take chances with change.

The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor at Georgetown University and visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore.