The Punjab operation

The military operation in Punjab is being carried out in an opaque manner. Neither the government nor the military has been open about which groups it is targeting, something which should have been essential given the speculation over the years that many militant outfits in Punjab enjoy if not official patronage, then at least the malignant neglect of the authorities. Last week’s meeting of the Joint Operations Coordination Committee, which includes the provincial and federal governments, civilian law enforcement and the military, should have answered these lingering questions. Instead, the ISPR press release about the meeting centred only on the civilian-military aspect, mentioning how all action would be coordinated without stating who the action would be directed against. This is not to say that the issue of civilian control is unimportant. Indeed, it should have been addressed at the start of the operation. It has already affected the Kacha operation where the Punjab Rangers refused to enter into forward positions and the military was reluctant to provide air cover, claiming they lacked the legal authority to do so. This seems like a classic turf battle and no number of press releases will be able to resolve this fundamental tension.

The JOCC also did nothing to clear up the status of the operation in Rajanpur. By most accounts, this operation is being carried out against criminal gangs who have little to no connection to militancy. While tackling the law and order situation is all well and good, we were led to believe that operations in Punjab would be an extension of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and not an extension of routine police work. The web of militancy in Punjab is strong and there are plenty of targets for law enforcement to pick without getting involved in a drawn-out battle with local criminals. Speculations that the Punjab operation was announced to assuage anger after the Lahore park attack without a strong will to completely destroy the militant network in the province should not gain weight, and the operation should not come to be seen as bearing the hallmark of being unable to achieve its stated aims. The civilians and the men in uniform have not been on the same page and there seem to be no apparent criteria for who is on the target list. Action was demanded after the Lahore attack but confusion and in-fighting will need to stop immediately for the action to translate into results.