Doing the right thing

The writer is former executive 3editor of The News and a senior journalist with Geo TV.

A rearguard move is underway to create an ‘enabling environment’ for Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif to go against his recently-spoken words of leaving the post on time, and instead stay on for, possibly, another full term.

There is no evidence yet that this move has the backing of official military quarters, but those who are pushing the envelope are persistent and have enlarged their campaign significantly in the past few weeks. Whether former president Asif Ali Zardari’s statement of support for the general’s extension – which his party has since disowned in a scandalous way – was part of this campaign or not is a matter of debate, but it did reinforce the impression that this idea is not just idle gossip, that it will gather more currency in the days ahead.

The idea is a classic ‘best-intentions paving the way to hell’ example. It is inimical to the army’s interests as an institution; it is an IED installed to explode beneath the general’s repute; and, worst of them all, truly bad for the country’s small yet precious democratic gains of the last decade. If the proponents, both visible and out-of-sight, of this plan had cared to throw a glance at recent-past developments involving the army command, they would have held their horses tightly. But they haven’t. They are galloping ahead. A timely reminder is in order. Nothing is more instructive to learn from in this regard than the curious case of former chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani.

Despite his tenure’s ups and downs, the ex-COAS had many things going for him. His transition from his first tenure to the second was without drama and needless ado. The then prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilani appeared on the national hook up and announced the decision in a short statement laced with flowery compliments. The build-up to Gen Kayani’s decision to accept the second tenure – which I vehemently, roundly and repeatedly critiqued and opposed even when most others were praising it with lute and harp, strings and pipe – too was chatter-free. All political parties were in agreement that the move this was a better way forward than a new person taking command to oversee a civilian government handing over power through elections to another for the first time in national history.

Besides he was a known depoliticiser of an army that his predecessor General Pervez Musharraf had brazenly used for protecting his personal political interests, disregarding the deep damage it caused to the professional ethos of the institution. Kayani de-inducted the army from politics and focused its energies on professional matters – four army, one ogistics, 20 corps-size war games, two largest-ever army field exercises to validate and test operational doctrine against India’s Cold Start. This sat well with civilians struggling to find space to wrest back power from the entrenched order Musharraf had left behind.

The argument for General Kayani’s extension, and later on the defence of his second tenure, also flew on the force of what he brought to the table as a commander on the most crucial front: dealing with organised terrorism. Operations were conducted in the Malakand Division (made infamous by the Taliban take-over and occupation) that was cleaned up swiftly in three and a half months and over 2.5 million dislocated residents returned to their homes. Operations also unfolded in six tribal agencies. The numbers were staggering: three corps-sized operations; five division-sized operations; over a hundred brigade-sized operations and 2,200 battalion-sized campaigns.

These weren’t cakewalks. All were hard-fought, bloody affairs with exceptional tales of bravery in desperate but fruitful battles. Over 4000 soldiers were martyred; over 10,000 were injured, many maimed for life. (Yes these sacrifices were made and it is a crying shame that we don’t even acknowledge them anymore.)

Within the army the decision to give General Kayani another tenure did create ripples and legitimate heartburn but much of this was largely absorbed by his investment in the welfare of soldiers and officers alike. Documented record suggests that on average the pay scales of soldiers went up 150 percent and those of the officers 130 percent. Soldiers’ rations were doubled and all of them were given membership of DHA, which meant a minimum financial advantage of Rs3.5 million upon retirement. For the families of martyrs the 2007 financial package of Rs1.2 million had gone up by Rs15 million by the time General Kayani had retired. Approximately 5000 families of martyrs starting from 1999 were accommodated.

This was a lot, quite a lot, and yet – and yet – as years rolled on Gen Kayani looked more and more like a general on extension than a general in command of his environment. Six years is a long time to preserve one’s reputation in a highly complex and demanding job. Regardless of fact-sheets and performance records, extended years in power tend to degenerate images and defile standing. Or at least cause inevitable wear and tear to what generally seems like an iron-cast aura.

There is no reason to believe that General Raheel Sharif’s extended tenure will be the same as his first one. He has already peaked. He has been lucky also. He inherited a professionally geared-up and battle-trained army with exceptional capability to understand and apply challenging counterterror and counter-insurgency concepts in deadly conflict zones. The North Waziristan operation was made simple by the army’s hard-earned experience in the area from the last decade. (Even in Karachi the operation was underway – headed by General Rizwan Akhtar, the present DG ISI, as DG Rangers with a complete what-is-to-come-next calendar of events.)

It is to General Raheel Sharif’s credit that he is taking long Fata operations’ last battle toward culmination, even though from the return of the displaced persons to reconstructing battered and bombed cities there is much work that needs to be done before claiming real success. It is also to his credit that he has not allowed the focus to shift from Operation Zarb-e-Azb and has had the gains of this operation projected and expanded through a smart media outreach strategy.

Also he has stayed away from media interface and has avoided expanded conversations on professional matters. This has given his persona mystique and charm. He is presented by his media team from a safe distance as carefully selected images and videos hit news outlets on a daily basis with fantastic phrases of hope and glory. Political need (and tendency) to keep the army happy and in good humour has also made traditional detractors join in the praise-battalion; this has restricted genuine reflections on the performance card of his leadership. But altogether General Raheel Sharif has good things going for him. His ratings are high. His name is bright. His fan following is considerable. If he is able to stabilise and bring back normal life in North Waziristan, history will judge him in good terms.

But to think that he needs time (and another tenure) to become Quaid-e-Azam reincarnate is to build castles in the air. He is a chief of army staff who has done his duty. He isn’t the rock of our salvation. He isn’t a messiah. Those who are intent on showing him in this light aren’t doing him a favour. They are setting him up for a loss that he will never recover from. With friends like these, he does not need enemies.

More than imagined heroes, Pakistan needs role models who understand the value of graceful exits. Overstaying one’s tenure is to overstay one’s welcome. General Raheel Sharif should know this. He can turn back and look at where his predecessor went wrong even after having done most of the things right. It was General Kayani’s fateful decision of accepting another term in office that started his slippery slope. There is no need for Gen Raheel to make that mistake. The Pakistan Army is capable of throwing up worthy commanders. Qualified and deserving men await their turn to lead this institution. It is their chance to do their duty. That’s what they are trained for.

Email: syedtalathussain@gmail.com

Twitter: @TalatHussain12