the Pakistan evacuation of Kanjarkot; the Indian 31 Infantry Brigade Group under Brigadier S. S. M. Pahalajani was tasked with this operation and authorized to cross the international border if necessary to secure this objective, and Indian forces began to assemble at Bhuj (Chakravorty, 21) Despite these orders, it appears that Indian troops on the ground realized they were inadequate to force a Pakistani withdrawal from Kanjarkot and maintained a largely defensive position, but now decided to proceed with more regular and aggressive patrolling. Pakistan realized that there was now a major move under way by Indian regular forces, and on 22 February the Pakistani Indus Rangers were ordered by Major General Tikka Khan, GOC, 8 Infantry Division to occupy Kanjarkot Fort in strength. This means that whether Pakistan admitted it was in control of Kanjarkot before 22 February or not (and it seems likely that it was), there is no doubt that it was after this date. Despite the order being given for strong and aggressive patrolling to be carried out in Kabadi, Indian forces did not appear to take the initiative despite the order and remained relatively defensive, no doubt conscious of the relative strength of the Pakistani forces available in the border area. Pakistan now ordered 51 Brigade under Brigadier Azhar from 8 Division to patrol the area claimed by Pakistan and its brigade headquarters was established at Badin. 51 Brigade had three battalions, 18 Punjab, 6 Baluch and 8 Frontier Force, in addition to the Indus Rangers placed under its command.
“On 24 February the political stakes were also upped by the Gujarat Home Minister who gave the Indian version of events and stated that India was ready ‘to accept the challenge if the situation worsens’. On 1 March Pakistan sent a Note to India stating that the area around Kanjarkot had been in Pakistan’s de facto possession since 1947 and rejected the Indian request for a meeting of the two Surveyors-General on the grounds that the alignment of the border was a matter for political discussion between the two governments. Pakistan added that although the Pakistan police were patrolling the area around Kanjarkot Fort, they had not occupied the Fort itself; which appears to be at variance with General Tikka Khan’s orders of 22 February.
“On 4 March the Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, gave a press conference in which he stated that Pakistan had never been in de facto possession of the area and that the Rann of Kutch was a disputed area whose borders had not been demarcated. During March, India decided on patrols to ‘show the flag’ and military exercises were held in the Kutch area to demonstrate Indian resolve towards the dispute. By 6 March troops from Pakistan’s 8 Division, 8 Frontier Force and 18 Punjab, each with its supporting artillery including a battery of 25 pounders, had moved to Kanjarkot but apparently not south of the Indian claim line. They were under orders not to allow the Indians to edge forward but not themselves to advance beyond the line already held by the Rangers. On 30 March Pakistan sent an aide memoire to India describing the Indian military actions as provocative and warlike.
“Both sides realized that the situation on the ground was escalating and both armies now reinforced then respective positions. Major-General P. O. Dunn was now appointed commander of the region by the Indian government, and he moved his HQ from Bombay to Khavda, while 50 Para Brigade was sent to Kutch on 9 April, comprising 2 and 3 Para battalions, which meant that by 18 April India had two regular army brigades inside Kutch; these were now designated as ‘Kilo Force’ by Indian GHQ and Dunn was now GOC Kilo Force (Chakravorty, 26). It appears from Dunn’s orders that the Indian position was still essentially defensive, as the orders were to maintain the Indian positions at Sardar and Vigiokot posts rather than remove Pakistani border posts, but India was still not ready to concede any territory to Pakistan. Pakistan meanwhile moved the whole of 8 Infantry Division to Hyderabad from Karachi as Pakistan’s GHQ was now expecting a strong Indian reaction to the Pakistani attack on Sardar post. The Pakistan 8 Infantry Division consisted of four brigades, 6 Brigade under Brigadier Iftikhar Janjua, 51 Brigade under K. M. Azhar (which had already seen action at Sardar post), 52 Brigade under Brigadier Sardar Ismail and Divisional Artillery under Brigadier S. M. Aslam. It was the arrival of the artillery brigade with its armour and artillery that was to pose a real threat to the Indian posts inside Kutch.
“25 April, Pakistan turned its attention to the capture of Biar Bet, which was first attacked in the afternoon of that day. Fighting went on intermittently throughout the night and India managed to send some reinforcements overnight to Biar Bet, but it was to prove of no avail as the bet was virtually indefensible against the Pakistani attacking force. Although a company of the Indian 3 Paratroopers held Biar Bet, the Pakistani assault using both tanks and artillery was too much and by 0730 hours, 26 April, Biar Bet and a large quantity of arms and equipment were also captured by Pakistani forces (Chakravorty, 34). Pakistan added to India’s public discomfort by flying national and international journalists to Biar Bet to show the arms and ammunition left behind by the retreating Indian soldiers.
“India was humiliated in the fighting and now had to decide its next move with public opinion calling out for some reaction to the latest Pakistani offensive. Pakistan’s GHQ now felt they had the measure of the Indian Army-purely on the basis of a limited border clash involving no more than a couple of brigades on either side. Ayub was now made aware through Western channels of growing Indian public anger and the likelihood of all-out war if Arrow Head was carried to its planned conclusion, and therefore ordered all plans for further advance movements in Kutch to cease with immediate effect. Ayub was effectively cancelling Operation Arrow Head without the public of either India or Pakistan even being aware of its existence.
“As a result of patient and inexhaustible British diplomacy, American pressure and the reluctance of both sides to begin a war over ‘the possession of various ruined forts on sandbanks in a tidal marsh’, there was finally an agreement on the mechanism of resolving the Kutch dispute on 30 June. The Kutch agreement was signed simultaneously in Delhi and Karachi and the ceasefire was to be effective from 0530 hours PST, 1 July 1965. The mediation process had taken nearly two months to reach a successful conclusion, but even during the hostilities which were to follow, the ceasefire in the Rann held firm.”
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