Future of the Indus Waters Treaty

Pakistan’s response was acknowledged by Indian External Affairs Ministry on April 5

March 28, 2025
General view of the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project in Nosari, in Kashmir’s Neelum Valley. —AFP/File
General view of the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project in Nosari, in Kashmir’s Neelum Valley. —AFP/File

Part ­- I

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed by India and Pakistan on September 19, 1960, has been widely acclaimed as the world’s most successful water-sharing agreement. It is especially lauded for ensuring unimpeded access to the water resources of the shared Indus River Basin by India and Pakistan, its major riparians, whose relations had been predominantly adversarial

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India and Pakistan have time and again reiterated their commitment to its implementation in letter and spirit. Regrettably, since January 2023, India has three times called for bilateral negotiations to “ review and modify” the IWT in the backdrop of an acrimonious dispute over the implementation of the provision concerning its entitlement for limited use of the waters of rivers allotted to Pakistan under the treaty.

In August 2024, India suspended the meetings of the bilateral Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) until Islamabad agreed to start negotiations to rewrite the treaty.

The PIC is mandated to serve “as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the implementation of the Treaty…”. The ‘purpose and functions’ of the commission are to “establish and maintain cooperation between the Parties in the development of the waters of the (Indus Basin) Rivers…” The Indian government’s decision linking the meetings of the PIC to a revision of some of its provisions, therefore, gravely threatens the survival of the IWT.

It is pertinent to recall that the negotiations (1952-1960) leading to the signing of the IWT were facilitated by the World Bank which provided crucial technical backstopping, and assigned a vice president to ensure uninterrupted communications between Indian and Pakistani negotiators. It mobilised funds for large water storage projects to ensure year-long perennial irrigation and several long link canals for carrying water for irrigating Pakistan’s lands that had depended on the flows of the three east-eastern rivers allocated to India for its exclusive use. The World Bank was entrusted with crucial roles in the 10-year transition period (1960-70) and in facilitating the key dispute settlement mechanism that is at the heart of the crisis facing the treaty.

The treaty bifurcated the six rivers of the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan, assigning the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) to India for unrestricted use and allocating the three western rivers (Indus, Chenab and Jhelum ) to Pakistan. However, India was allowed to use their flows for limited use for human consumption, irrigation and generation of electricity by run–of–the–river plants that do not need permanent storage of water.

The IWT established a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), comprising Indus Commissioners of India and Pakistan, to serve as the main institutional mechanism for communication on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the treaty. The treaty created a three- tier mechanism for dispute settlement; all ‘ questions’ relating to the treaty raised by either party were to be resolved by the PIC; if the ‘ questions’ could not be resolved, they are to be referred for arbitration by a ‘neutral expert’ appointed by the World Bank or a seven-member Court of Arbitration chaired by an expert nominated by the World Bank. The parties were to be consulted on both methods of arbitration.

As noted earlier, India’s notice to Pakistan, conveyed on January 25, 2023 by its Indus Commissioner to his Pakistani counterpart, demanding bilateral negotiations on modifying the Indus Waters Treaty has posed a grave risk to the future of the IWT. The Indian move was made under Article XII(3) which states: “The provisions of this treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments”.

Indian media reports, reflecting the official briefing, accused Pakistan of “intransigence” and called out its “actions since 2015 in handling disputes over the Kishenganga and Ratle Hydroelectric plants.” The media extensively reported the differences between India and Pakistan over the mode of arbitration (a neutral expert is favoured by India while a Court of Arbitration is demanded by Pakistan). Curiously, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar declined to comment on, what he described as, “a matter for the two (Indus) Commissioners to sort out”.

In Islamabad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened inter-ministerial consultations on the Indian notice and on April 3, 2023 the Pakistan Indus Commissioner responded to his Indian counterpart that the Permanent Indus Commission was the appropriate forum for discussing Indian concerns. Pakistan’s response was acknowledged by the Indian External Affairs Ministry on April 5. On July 13, 2023, following Pakistani media reports that India had been releasing excess water from eastern rivers (Ravi and Sutlej) towards Pakistan, the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson dismissed the reports saying that New Delhi had been sharing with Islamabad regular updates on water discharge towards Pakistan since July 9 as envisaged in Article 6 of the IWT. The spokesperson said that the IWT “is a very important treaty that has served both Pakistan and India well”, adding that the treaty “ is the gold standard of bilateral treaties on water sharing”. She added that “Pakistan is fully committed to its full implementation”. And, “We hope India will also remain committed to the treaty”.

The latest reaffirmation of Pakistan’s commitment to the IWT was stated by Ambassador Munir Akram on February 14, 2025 during a UN Security Council debate on climate and water security. Referring to “increasing water demand (which), coupled with climate change impacts, creates the potential for aforementioned transboundary water disputes in several parts of the world”, he declared: “Pakistan attaches high priority to the strict implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty and aims to reinvigorate the Indus Basin”.

Notwithstanding Pakistan’s offer to consider India’s grievances through the Permanent Indus Commission, New Delhi has reiterated its call for renegotiating the treaty three times, the last instance being on August 30, 2024.

According to a comment in The Hindu on September 18, “India’s notification highlights fundamental and unforeseen changes in circumstances that require a reassessment of obligations under various articles of the Treaty”. It added that “among various concerns, important ones include changes in population demographics; environmental issues; the need to accelerate development of clean energy to meet India’s emission ( reduction) targets; and the impact of persistent cross-border terrorism etc”.

According to a comment in The Hindu, “Since January 2023 India has written four times to Pakistan to initiate talks on revising the treaty but …had not received a satisfactory response”. Consequently, “India has decided that there will be no more meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission till the governments of India and Pakistan meet and discuss the renegotiation of the … Indus Waters Treaty”.

The comment noted that India had declined Pakistan’s proposal for discussing its concerns at the level of Indus Commissioners, because “Commissioners only execute the Treaty”. However, “ if the governmental negotiations were to begin to renegotiate the treaty, India could consider reviving the Commission as a goodwill measure”. Significantly, the Hindu’s comment underlined that ”India’s prime focus was solving the dispute resolution mechanism set out in the Treaty”.

The New Indian Express, in a comment captioned ‘Coercive Diplomacy to Renegotiate the Indus Waters Treaty’ on March 18, 2025 stated: “India appears to have taken a calibrated step to leverage its upper riparian advantage to renegotiate the treaty”.

The reasons cited by India to justify its call for renegotiating the IWT are not prima facie convincing. However, it would be useful to view the move in a historical context through a broad-brushed overview of the implementation of the treaty since its inception, in particular, the differences and disputes that have arisen and how they were dealt with in accordance with the dispute settlement mechanism prescribed by the IWT.

To be continued


The writer is a retired ambassador and former UN assistant secretary-general.

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