India’s armed forces have long relied heavily on Russian weapons and military equipment, and that dependence will not change soon. However, since Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, the Russian defence industry is struggling to resupply Moscow’s own forces at the front, which have drawn down weapons and ammunition stocks at a remarkable rate. Therefore, Russia will almost certainly not be able to satisfy many export demands for the rest of the decade — with profound implications for the country’s most important arms customer, India.
According to an analysis in foreign media, the immediate effect will be reduced availability for much of India’s Russian-origin defence equipment. That will make replenishing munitions stocks much more difficult and negatively affect operational capability. This marks a significant challenge for the Indian government, whose security focus has shifted to countering China’s assertive behavior and military buildup along the Line of Actual Control, securing the Indian Ocean, and managing continued tensions with neighboring Pakistan.
Before the war, India was already working to diversify arms suppliers, including a shift to greater domestic production. But the sheer amount of Russian-made equipment operated by the Indian armed forces is so great that it will take a long time to make any significant dent — and meanwhile, the vast existing Russian arsenal needs to be maintained and supplied with ammunition and spare parts.
Today, according to data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance, more than 90 percent of the Indian Army’s armored vehicles, 69 percent of combat aircraft operated by the Air Force and Navy, and 44 percent of the Navy’s submarines
and warships are Russian. Of these vessels, 65 percent carry Russian missiles. For a long time, this dependence came with clear benefits to India because Moscow was willing to provide critical defence technology denied to New Delhi by the West. What’s more, Russian equipment is typically cheaper than Western equivalents and carries few restrictions on end use. Already faced with long-term structural issues — such as overstaffing and the need for consolidation — and greater global competition, the Russian defence industry is now significantly constrained due to new economic sanctions imposed since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Problems have included brain drain, component shortages, and work stoppages. Russian intelligence agencies now spend time and effort on sourcing components, sometimes settling on inferior or defective substitutes. Reports of the use of convict labor (likely for low-skill positions), the cannibalization of civilian products such as dishwashers for microchips, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public berating of the minister for trade and industry all suggest that the sector is under immense pressure.
Russia will struggle to solve these problems in the short term and will likely have a severely restricted export capacity for the rest of the decade as its defence industry seeks to adapt to the new circumstances. Some systems may be less affected because they have seen little use in Ukraine, such as air-to-air missiles and naval systems. Nonetheless, Moscow will likely continue to lose ground in export markets as many countries seek to diversify their suppliers or invest in their own production capabilities. At a time when India faces growing challenges on its border with China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is already having an impact on Indian operational capabilities. New Delhi has faced delays on the delivery of key equipment, spare parts, and ammunition from Russia, along with payment issues following the global financial sanctions imposed on Moscow.