Diplomacy, anyone?

Diplomacy is on pause in Afghanistan once more. At best, it is being wasted on talking about talks. Diplomacy only makes minor gains in the Pakistan-India context as well, and is derailed by untoward developments whenever there is a little flicker of hope.

An important factor behind the diplomatic impasse is the aversion of India and the Afghan Taliban to commence formal negotiations with Kabul and Islamabad respectively; both have a habit of attaching pre-conditions to negotiations.

India takes the position that Pakistan should neutralise non-state actors before the comprehensive dialogue can begin. Indian strategists refuse to take into account that by halting the diplomatic process with Pakistan, they are helping the groups that are actively trying to sabotage the movement to normalise relations between Pakistan and India. The Afghan Taliban want the release of their prisoners and sanctions to be lifted before they resume a fledgling dialogue with Kabul for their own reasons. The end result is the same: a frustrating lack of progress in resolving the Afghan problem or in efforts aimed at bringing greater harmony and stability to India and Pakistan.

In comparison, Kabul and Islamabad are repeatedly stressing the virtues of dialogue to resolve complex issues. Pakistan would like to see progress on Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek, while India pushes its trade and transit agenda but predicates the diplomatic process upon robust action on cases like Mumbai and Pathankot. Matters have been further complicated by a hate campaign against Pakistan, which has adversely affected people to people contact, sports and cultural exchanges.

The diplomatic horizon is now darkened by the Afghan Taliban taking another U-turn on talks with the Afghan government. Their latest statement, reiterating their pre-conditions for the talks, is a clear rebuke of Pakistan’s expectation of a constructive engagement between the Afghan parties. Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz has delineated the leverage available to Pakistan to bring the feuding Taliban – at least those residing here – to the table. The time has come to use that leverage to broker a dialogue between the Afghan parties.

The remarks made by Aziz at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington led some to suggest that Pakistan was controlling the Taliban. But listening to Aziz closely, it becomes obvious that Pakistan has a limited influence over the Afghan Taliban. In the past too, whenever they had to make decisions on important issues, Mullah Omar listened to Pakistan but seldom acted on its advice. Their current zigzagging around the dialogue process reminds us of the uncompromising stance on girls’ education, Bamiyan Buddhas or handing over Osama bin Laden. In each case, they went their own way, regardless of Pakistan’s advice.

The Afghan president has weighed in, asking the Taliban to choose peace or war. He is, no doubt, aware that the Taliban fight better than they talk. And they see any progress towards peace, like a ceasefire, as primarily helping the Afghan government. In any event, Ghani has not indicated what the Taliban might gain from a ceasefire, or what they would do during one.

On our eastern front, the diplomatic process remains tied down by India’s insistence on Pakistan reigning in the militant organisations acting against India. The question that comes up time and again is whether the government can control the outfits that are undercutting this critical relationship. Internally, the country is facing a serious challenge from the growing trend of extremism, despite there being a democratic government in power since 2008.

Critics attribute the strength of the extremists and militants to the reluctance to definitely renouncing the policy of keeping or nurturing assets for external or internal purposes.

This brings us to the vital question of how Pakistan can contribute to the success of diplomacy in dealing with India and Kabul and the Afghan Taliban. I am afraid not much. Both Kabul and New Delhi, with Washington’s help, continue to pressurise Islamabad about putting an end to groups like the Haqqanis, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. All three of these groups were considered assets in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Looking back, Pakistan has paid a huge price for the state-backed rise of militancy. The operations to roll back the militants from the Lal Masjid in the capital, the remote areas in the tribal belt, the towns of southern Punjab and the big cities like Karachi have succeeded in reducing the jihadi and sectarian groups’ destructive power but not in wiping them out. Now, after the Pathankot attack, Pakistan and India have reached a previously unknown level of cooperation, as seen in the tip provided by Pakistan about a group of suspected terrorists crossing into India.

Pakistan’s efforts to uproot the Haqqani network from its soil, followed by measures to curb the activities of the anti-India militant groups and now its sharing of intelligence with the Indian authorities are signs of a shifting paradigm. Pakistan expects reciprocal measures from Delhi and Kabul, renouncing the proxy wars aimed at destabilising Pakistan. Only then can we reach a level of trust where purposeful diplomacy might replace the cloak and dagger methods so common in the region.

Email: saeed.saeedk@gmail.com